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How can international financial centres like Hong Kong increase assets under 
management – and thus their size and ranking? Most policymakers and their advisors 
wrongly answer this question by focusing on financial institutions, and the law that 
governs them. Instead, policymakers need to start by looking at actual markets. What new 
tastes and technologies need funding? How can such funding fit into already existing 
geographies of production, distribution and finance? In this paper, we show how a focus 
on funding sunrise industries can help increase assets under management for the financial 
institutions operating in an international financial centre like Hong Kong. We show – 
using the specific example the photovoltaic (solar power) sector – how changes in 
financial law need to be contingent on market needs. We specifically show how legal 
changes which promote the securitisation of solar assets (and the sale of these securities) 
can help increase Hong Kong’s financial institutions’ assets under management. By using 
this specific case, we hope to provide insight into the broader question of how 
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What Role Can an International Financial Centre’s Law Play in the Development of 
a Sunrise Industry? The Case of Hong Kong and Solar Powered Investments 




International financial centres have traditionally emerged around new technologies. 
Booming industries in New York, Chicago, London, Paris and Berlin made the 
development of financial centres around those urban spaces important. Yet, many 
policymakers and their advisors focus on the financial institutions and financial flows 
themselves – rather than what those flows hope to accomplish. These policy advisors 
have forgotten the reason international financial centres – and the financial law which 
underpins them -- emerge in the first place. Their “structuralist” view of financial centre 
development sees financial centres emerging as the result of legal (and other institutional) 
change. Regulate the banks correctly, they argue, and the money will come. These 
policymakers, and their academic advisors, need to return to a more “contingency-based 
view” of financial centre development. Such a view sees financial law and international 
financial centre development revolve around the tastes and technologies they finance in 
the first place. 
 
In such a contingency-based view, financial sector regulators focus on helping financial 
institutions fund existing and new tastes and technologies in the actual geographical 
spaces where those tastes and technologies lie. Such a view does not copy legal “best 
practice” or compare current financial flows with best-in-class financial centres. Such a 
view also does not even necessarily focus on the financial sector itself – through creating 
better and more efficient foreign exchange trading departments, tax incentives and right-
regulating derivatives markets and so forth. Instead, such a view asks; where are savers 
and investors? How can the financial institutions operating in the international financial 
centre add value to the existing “geography of production, distribution and investment”? 
What competencies can these institutions provide – and thus add value?  
 
In this paper, we illustrate how a focus on contingency-based financial law can 
potentially improve the competitiveness of an international financial centre like Hong 
Kong. We argue that financial law needs to actively encourage an international financial 
centre’s financial institutions to seek out providers of funds to new technologies and 
facilitate the risk-adjusted value of such flows.1 We illustrate this view with the case of 
Hong Kong and the role its financial intermediaries can play in intermediating 
investments in local and Mainland-based solar-based (photovoltaic) energy generation 
technologies. We show how Hong Kong’s financial law can respond to market needs, 
rather than simply rely on prescriptive advice focused at implementing “international best 
practice” or general advice focused on the financial sector itself. By showing several 
areas where a contingency-based view of financial law serves the objective of creating an 
                                                 
1 We do not deny the important macroprudential role regulation needs to play. Instead, we argue that 
policies can serve macroprudential objectives also by encouraging financial intermediation in the 
economically and socially-beneficial production of goods and services (instead of just shifting money 
around, like in the Minibond case which we describe later).  
international financial centre better than a structuralist-based view, we hope to contribute 
to the larger debate about how to create and promote an international financial centre.  
 
We organise the paper as follows. The first section positions our work in the broader 
debate about international financial centres – and the role that technological progress, 
geography and financial law play in the development of such centres. We argue against 
the increasing streak of “structuralist” analysis – which focuses on financial institutions 
themselves and the law that regulates them. The academic literature finds resoundingly 
for a contingency-based view of international financial centres. Their development 
traditionally has served to identify companies catering to new tastes and technologies and 
to efficiently deliver capital to these companies at a profit.2 The second section describes 
the solar energy market on the Mainland. We describe market segments and methods of 
financing investments in these segments in order to motivate the discussion on 
securitisation that follows. Stocks and bonds are just two methods, among many, of 
converting assets and liabilities into tradable securities. The third section describes the 
extent to which Hong Kong’s financial institutions have succeeded in attracting money to 
the Mainland’s solar energy sector. We argue that the lack of a contingency-based 
approach to financial regulation in Hong Kong has led to too little use of Hong Kong’s 
capital markets to bring money to Mainland solar companies through equity, debt and 
other forms of finance. The fourth section describes Hong Kong’s potential role in 
securitising Mainland solar companies’ assets and liabilities. We describe why solar 
assets are particularly amenable to securitisation and why a contingency-based (or 
marketing) approach to financial regulation can help secure Hong Kong’s place as an 
international solar securitisation centre. The fifth section describes the changes to Hong 
Kong’s financial law needed to increase the depth of debt and asset securitisation. Some 
of these changes -- like to HKMA and SFC’s rules -- focus on making marketing sunrise 
industry investments easier. Other changes, like changes in mediation reporting and the 
enforcement of civil judgments on the Mainland, make such investments safer. The final 
section concludes.   
 
We should provide several caveats before we begin. First, we use an inductive rather than 
deductive method of argument – showing how a particular case (the finance of the 
Mainland’s photovoltaic industry) shows us some something interesting about broader 
themes in international financial centre development (and the financial law that guides 
such development). Hong Kong provides a useful case study, as the city-state possesses a 
separate legal system from the Mainland. Such an arrangement provides for a useful 
“natural experiment” showing how technological change occurring across the Hong 
Kong-Mainland border affects the financial law of a jurisdiction quickly harmonising 
                                                 
2 The reader with a background in marketing will recognise this statement as an adaptation of the standard 
definition of marketing. Banks market capital, and international financial institutions market capital 
internationally. Avlonitis et al. provide an empirically-based formulation of Philip Kotler’s classic 
definition of marketing in a financial services context. Authors like Berger et al. have argued that bank 
regulation needs to take into account these important marketing aspects. See George Avlonitis, Paulina 
Papastathopoulou and Spiros Gounaris, An empirically-based typology of product innovativeness for new 
financial services: Success and failure scenarios, 18 J. OF PROD. INNOVATION MANAGE. 5, 2001. See also 
Allen Berger, Richard Herring, and Giorgio Szego, The role of capital in financial institutions, 19 J. OF 
BANK. & FIN. 3-4, 1995.      
with its wider nation-state. Second, we do not discuss the macroprudential aspects of 
financing solar energy projects on the Mainland. The Hong Kong government and many 
other scholars focus very heavily on managing financial system risks.3 In order to limit 
the size of our paper, we also avoid discussing other relevant issues related to our topic. 
Reducing taxation on capital gains and other benefits accruing from solar investments to 
foreigners (particularly US citizens), the development of insurance markets for solar 
energy, changes in Hong Kong’s intellectual property rights regime to encourage R&D, 
and regulations which make solar-related open-ended investment companies easier to 
establish represent some obvious areas of potential discussion.4 However, we avoid these 
topics to focus our paper on the topic at hand. Fourth (and finally) we refer to (and 
advocate) adopting US and UK experience -- an approach which appears more 
“structuralist” than “contingency-based.” We refer to their experience to show how they 
adopted legal changes (like the Dodd-Frank Act or the CROWDFUND Act) to better 
match savers with companies. We do not argue that Hong Kong should follow these 
examples because they represent best practice. Instead, we provide concrete examples of 
laws to illustrate what changes to Hong Kong’s law might look like.  
 
Financial Law as a Technology for Funding New Tastes and Technologies  
 
International financial centres – at their heart – represent a technology for channelling 
capital from savers into growing economic sectors.5 Yet, many policymakers and their 
advisors lose sight of this basic principle as they seek to develop their own international 
financial centres. Figure 1 provides examples of reports offering advice to several current 
or aspiring international financial centres. These reports tend to follow three archetypical 
approaches in analysing an international financial centre’s competitiveness and drawing 
conclusions based on such analysis.6 Following the first approach, many of these reports 
argue that macroeconomic conditions and conditions in specific financial markets help 
determine the depth/liquidity of specific financial sub-sectors (like debt, equity, 
derivatives and so forth). Reports by Deloitte and the World Bank on Moscow and 
Istanbul reflect most strongly this approach.7 Using the second approach, analysts assess 
                                                 
3 For an overview, see Dong He, Hong Kong’s Approach to Financial Stability, 9 INT’L J. OF CENTRAL 
BANKING 1, 2013, available online. 
4 Even citing these issues would require a lengthy footnote. For the reader interested in the general issues, 
see K.H. Solangi, M.R. Islam, R. Saidur, N.A. Rahim, and H. Fayaz, A review on global solar energy 
policy, 15 RENEW. & SUSTAIN. ENERGY REV. 4, 2011.     
5 Several authors have commented on the need for international financial centres as a way of channelling 
savings from some countries toward investment opportunities in others. For a recent overview of thinking 
about this issue, see Philip Lane and Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti, The Drivers of Financial Globalization, 
98 AMER. ECON. REV. 2, 2008.  
6 In practice, most reports include elements of all three approaches. These reports often also include a 
historical review of the development of other financial centres. As most academic authors rightly point out, 
the specific circumstances of each financial centre’s development – and particularly its geography -- makes 
transplanting similar policies in other jurisdictions difficult. Indeed, leaving out the geographical parts of 
the analysis misses much of the reason for the development of an international financial centre in the first 
place. See Roger Lee and Ulrich Schmidt-Marwede, Interurban competition? Financial centres and the 
geography of financial production, 17 INT’L J. OF URBAN & REGIONAL RES. 4, 1993. 
7 See Deloitte, Istanbul International Financial Centre Feasibility Study, 2007, available online. See also 
World Bank, Russian Federation Analysis and Diagnosis of the Financial, Regulatory and Institutional 
Policies Required for Becoming an International Financial Center, 2012, available online. 
legal provisions governing an international financial centre’s banks and broker-dealers – 
and compare these provisions with other centres’ law and/or best practice as promulgated 
by organisations like the Financial Stability Board. Mumbai’s and New York’s reports 
follow such an approach.8 In the third approach, writers focus on the broader aspects of a 
financial centre’s competitiveness – like quality of life, trade facilitation and so forth. 
Authors then draw conclusions based on the centre’s broader competitiveness. 
Assessments like Z/Yen’s regular assessments of international financial centres and a 
recent Dubai report focus heavily on such an approach.9  
 
Figure 1: Advice on International Financial Centre Development Focuses on 
Centres Themselves Instead of their Target Markets 
 
City Focus of development as an international financial centre Focus* Link 
Mumbai Mumbai report focuses on Mumbai as a business process outsourcing 
destination for other international financial centres’ financial institutions. 
Strategy adopted consists of looking at gap between other financial centres’ 
financial law (and other institutions) and Mumbai’s. Also focuses on tax 
policy and infrastructure.  
1/2 * 
Dubai Report focuses on quality of Dubai’s various financial and business markets. 
No consideration of what funding from/for an international financial centre 




Another gap analysis – comparing Hong Kong’s various financial service 
sub-sectors with what they could be. Analysis of general opportunities on the 
Mainland, but no detailed discussion of specific markets.  
2/3 * 
Istanbul Provides overview of macroeconomic indicators, case studies from other 
international financial centres and brief discussion of Istanbul’s regulatory 
and institutional “gap” with other centres.  
1/3 * 
Moscow This World-Bank led assessment provides perhaps the best example of an 
analysis which analyses the depth and growth of various sub-sectors of a 
financial services industry and provides recommendations in terms of 




The report focuses on the country’s national priorities and the way that the 
development of New York, as an international financial centre, “fits” those 
priorities. The solutions offered focus on legal (regulatory) changes – 
without an analysis of the markets New York’s financial institutions serve.   
2/3 * 
                                                
* The numbers represent the report’s focus, according to the three major approaches we describe in the text. 
1=focus on macroeconomics and the depth/liquidity of particular financial services sub-sectors (like bond 
markets), 2= focus on comparing existing regulation with an ideal as represented by other financial centres’ 
law or recommendations by organisations like the Financial Stability Board, 3=focus on broader 
environmental conditions, like a qualified labour force, high quality of life, macroeconomic stability and 






8 See Indian Ministry of Finance, Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on Making Mumbai an 
International Financial Centre, 2007, available online. See also Bloomberg and Schumer, Sustaining New 
York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, 2007, available online. 
9 See Z/Yen, The Global Financial Centres Index 14, 2013, available online. See also Stephen Thomas, 
Kamaldeep Panesar and Christina Makris, Dubai as an international financial centre: Threats and 
opportunities, 2013, available online. 
Such reports omit three aspects of international financial centre development which most 
long-term analysts of these centres (like academics) stress. First, most of these reports fail 
to use the traditional marketing analysis that the banks and broker-dealers in these centres 
might themselves use.10 Such an analysis would focus on customers, their demand for 
financial services and changes in tastes and technologies which create market 
opportunities.11 Second, an international financial centre develops as the result of a 
position in geographical space and located in a broader geography of social, trade, and 
financial networks.12 Surprisingly, most of the pundits we previously described fail to 
account for such a simple thing like geography. Third, these centres exist in broader 
systemic networks. Some financial centres remain small because they do not serve a vital 
role in bridging or bonding other centres together.13 By analysing these centres directly 
(rather than the industries these centres finance), these pundits fail to see how their 
particular international financial centre contributes to a larger structure and flow of 
capital.14  
   
The studies provided by the pundits ignore important findings from academic scholarship. 
Scholars have studied the nexus between financial centre development, technical 
innovation and legal change for a long time. As early as the 18th century, policymakers 
knew that laws governing the way London and New York (among other places) financial 
institutions operated had to change with changing technologies.15 Railroads, engine-
driven boats, electricity and steel required stock-holding organisational forms and larger 
banks to lend to these large industrial undertakings.16 The industrial revolution and future 
                                                 
10 The financial services sector represents far more than simply banks and securities broker-dealers. We 
avoid discussing other organisations, insurance companies, in order to focus our paper. .  
11 Europe Economics’ recent report on London as an international financial centre represents a welcome 
exception. See Europe Economics, The Value of Europe’s International Financial Centres to the EU 
Economy, 2011, available online. 
12 We will describe many of these geographical features – in the specific context of solar company 
investment – throughout this paper. For an overview of the importance of these geographies, see Harry 
Garretsen, Michael Kitson and Ronald Martin, Spatial circuits of global finance, 2 CAMBRIDGE. J. OF REG., 
ECON., & SOC 2, 2009.  
13 von Peter represents a prime example of such analysis. Yet, like many non-academic analysts of 
international financial centres, he focuses too much on the financial aspects of financial flows between 
these centres. He thus ignores the important real economy (and flows of goods and services) that these links 
supposedly support. See Goetz von Peter, International banking centres: a network perspective, 7 BIS 
QUART. REV. 4, 2007, available online.  
14 Tracing out global production networks, authors like Coe et al. show how international financial centres 
emerge and develop to foster the production, intermediation and consumption of new products. Such 
studies – in contrast to von Peter’s -- represent good practice in analysing these centres. See Neil Coe, 
Karen Lai, & Dariusz Wojcik, Integrating Finance into Global Production Networks, 48 REG. STUD. 5, 
2014.  
15 As recently as the 1990s, scholars understood that technology and legal (among other) institutions change 
together. Authors like Nelson launched an entirely new literature in describing the “co-evolution” of 
technology, institutions, and international competitiveness. Unfortunately, without a legal background, 
Nelson had no way of analysing the institutions he described in the abstract. See Richard Nelson, Co–
evolution of Industry Structure, Technology and Supporting Institutions, and the Making of Comparative 
Advantage, 2 INT’L J. OF ECON. OF BUS. 2, 1995. 
16 See Simon Deakin, Legal origin, juridical form and industrialization in historical perspective: the case 
of the employment contract and the joint-stock company, 7 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 1, 2009. See also Marco Da 
Rin & Thomas Hellmann, Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization, 11 J. OF FIN. INTERMED. 4 ,2002. For a 
waves of innovation led to changes in banking, securities and corporate law.17 What 
lessons does the literature hold for thinking about the ways that Hong Kong’s financial 
law can adapt in order to provide an attractive platform for capital going to new 
industries – like the Mainland’s photovoltaic (solar) sector? 
 
The literature divides into roughly five approaches of interest. Figure 2 shows the way we 
have roughly classified the literature. In the social network approach, authors look at 
the way that social relationships between innovators and financiers help determine the 
development of an industry.18 Many of these studies look at networks around successful 
geographically-defined areas, like Silicon Valley.19 Others look at biotech firms and 
Route 128.20 Some studies look only at financial networks – but these are relatively 
rare.21 We use this approach later in our study to show how social relationships used to 
fund the Mainland’s photovoltaic industry are bypassing Hong Kong.  
 
Figure 2: Most Academic Approaches to Thinking About the Nexus Between 
Technological Innovation, Financial Centre Development and Changes in Financial 
Law Look at the Way Legal Rules Are Contingent on Changes in Tastes and 
Technologies 
 
View  Description 
Social Network 
Approach 
Summary: The flow of capital to new technologies depends on the social networks 
that inventors and bankers develop.  
Methods: Social network analysis as the preferred method of analysis.  
Comparative 
Law and Finance 
Approach 
The law shapes financial centre and industrial sector development as much as these 
developments shape the law. Usually focuses on the incentives and institutions (as 
rules of the game) around particular statutes or provisions.  




Summary: Focuses on the role of financiers in fomenting knowledge spill-overs and 
cluster formation. Heavy neo-classical economic focus. 
Methods: Linear regression often the preferred method of empirical analysis.  
Clusters 
Approach 
Summary: Focuses on the way certain industrial clusters develop – usually as the 
result of the convergence of labour, capital, input and rival markets. Takes a business 
school approach. 
Methods: Case studies often the preferred method of analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                 
more descriptive and historical view, see J. Bradford DeLong, Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value? An 
Economist's Perspective on Financial Capitalism, In Peter Temin, INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF INFORMATION, 1991, available online. 
17 For a fuller description see Zorina Khan, Technological Innovations and Endogenous Changes In U.S. 
Legal Institutions: 1790-1920, NBER WP 10346, available online. 
18 For an overview of part of this literature, see Patricia Thornton and Katherine Flynn, Entrepreneurship, 
Networks, and Geographies, In Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch, HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
RESEARCH, 2003. 
19 See Timothy Sturgeon, What really goes on in Silicon Valley? Spatial clustering and dispersal in 
modular production networks, 3 J. OF ECON. GEO. 2, 2003. See also Michel Ferrary & Mark Granovetter,  
The role of venture capital firms in Silicon Valley's complex innovation network, 38 ECON. & SOC. 2, 2009.  
20 See Walter Powell, Kenneth Koput, James Bowie & Laurel Smith-Doerr, The Spatial Clustering of 
Science and Capital: Accounting for Biotech Firm-Venture Capital Relationships, 36 REG. STUD. 3, 2002. 
See also Steven Casper, How do technology clusters emerge and become sustainable?: Social network 
formation and inter-firm mobility within the San Diego biotechnology cluster, 36 RES. POL. 4, 2007.  
21 See Sabine Dorry, Luxembourg's specialisation as a financial centre within the global value networks of 




Summary: Often takes a historical approach – focusing on the way that particular 
events, persons, friendships and animosities shape the development of industries and 
the persons/institutions that finance them. These events shape the future rules-of-the 
game.  
Methods: Historical analysis with a mix of political and legal analysis. 
Legal school Summary: Classical legal scholarship does not allow for the type of positive and 
predictive theorizing needed to develop a theory of technological, financial and legal 
change. As such, they focus on relatively narrow areas of financial law.  
Methods: Legal analysis (sometimes with comparative law thrown in)  
 
The comparative law and finance approach looks at the way legal rules of finance 
evolve in different jurisdictions. By choosing jurisdictions with differing economic and 
business sectors, the literature indirectly tells something about the way that differences in 
legal provisions correlate with (and possibly even affect) the development of economic 
sectors -- and visa-versa. Most of these studies deal with broad issues – like whether legal 
origin affects a particular type of finance (and thus the development of certain sectors or 
the entire economy).22 Some studies have recently looked at how differences in particular 
provisions from labour law, corporate law and civil/bankruptcy law across countries can 
impact on economic development and other factors.23 In this school, as in the others, 
legal change usually allows financial institutions to expand financing of activities 
previously over-regulated by financial law.24 We use tools from this approach as we later 
analyse parts of Hong Kong’s securitisation rules which have resisted change to better 
serve investors and companies.  
 
The endogenous growth approach focuses on the micro-level decisions of entrepreneurs 
to take money, and financiers’ incentives to give it. Usually relying on game theoretic 
models, this approach often explains the simultaneous development of large-scale 
financial centres and entrepreneurial clusters from these micro-level interactions. 
Clustering (in terms of geographical distance, social distance or both) leads financial 
institutions to increase the flow of funds – through better assessing and pooling risks as 
well as matching profiles of payments and reimbursements to the revenue streams 
generated by the borrowers’ (investees’) businesses.25 Such clustering also allows for 
better information flow.26 Michalopoulos and co-authors in particular find a strong 
correlation between new sector development and changes in financial law as, 
“technological innovation and economic growth will eventually stop unless financiers 
innovate”.27 We use tools from this approach in later understanding how Hong Kong’s 
                                                 
22 For an example, see Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, Law and Firms’ Access to 
Finance, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2005.  
23 See J. Armour, S. Deakin, P. Sarkar, M. Siems, and A. Singh, Shareholder protection and stock market 
development: an empirical test of the legal origins hypothesis, 6 J. OF EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 1, 2009.  
24 For an example and discussion, see Rainer Haselmann, Katharina Pistor and Vikrant Vig, How Law 
Affects Lending, 23 REV. FINANC. STUD. 2,  2010.  
25 For an example of such a study, see Thomas Hellmann, Laura Lindsey and Manju Puri, Building 
Relationships Early: Banks in Venture Capital, 21 REV. OF FIN. STUD 2, 2008.  
26 See Joseph Engelberg, Pengjie Gao, Christopher Parsons, Friends with money, 103 J. OF FIN. ECON. 1 
2012.   
27 Their model, which relates most closely to our own question, shows that the rate of technological change 
depends on the rate of financial innovation. In other words, changes in the law governing the rate banks in a 
financial centre give money to talented entrepreneurs depends on market needs, not diffusion of “best 
financial institutions (and its law) have failed to respond to the development of solar 
panel clusters on the Mainland -- particularly around Shanghai and Shenzhen.  
 
The institutionalism-of-capitalism approach focuses on the way that banks and other 
financial institutions have adopted to changes in tastes and technologies over time. Many 
studies focus on the way that financial capital shifts into growing sectors – and the way 
that such capital assists with the rapid rise of new industries.28 Financial institutions 
cluster together, partly to take advantage of a market too large for any one firm to 
handle – and partly because of agglomeration and/or network externalities.29 At the risk 
of over-generalising this large and complex literature, much financial innovation comes 
about as the result of changes in regulations – themselves affected by the needs of 
technological change.30 In a project perhaps closest to our own, Knox-Hayes looks at 
why London and New York serve as financial centres for emerging carbon markets.31 
They find that “London and New York provide not only resources and financial 
infrastructure, but also institutional proximity that develops routines and practices 
between complementary firms.”32 We use tools from this school of thought later in this 
paper to propose changes in Hong Kong’s financial law.  
 
The legal school looks at how technological innovation leads to changes in contracts and 
(in the common law jurisdictions) how court rulings shape the development of financial 
(banking and securities) as well as commercial (civil) law. Some legal innovations come 
from the resolution of these disputes which then become codified into law.33 Others are 
imported from abroad – with varying degrees of success.34 Unfortunately, following the 
                                                                                                                                                 
practice” or other “structuralist” methods. See Stelios Michalopoulos, Luc Laeven, Ross Levine, Financial 
Innovation and Endogenous Growth, NBER WP 15356, 2009. See also Anjan Thakor, Incentives to 
innovate and financial crises, 103 J. OF FIN. ECON. 1, 2012.  
28 For example, see Carlota Perez, TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL: THE 
DYNAMICS OF BUBBLES AND GOLDEN AGES, 2003.  
29 For an example looking specifically at Chinese financial services, see Lin Liang, Shanglang Lin, and 
Yong Li, How Agglomeration in the Financial Services Industry Influences Economic Growth: Evidence 
from Chinese Cities, DP 6, 2014, available online. Brulhart and Mathys argue against multi-industry 
clustering as causing the growth in financial services. They find -- at least in the European context -- that 
clustering in financial services results from scale effects which are independent of clustering in other 
sectors. See  Marius Brulhart and Nicole Mathys, Sectoral Agglomeration Economies in a Panel of 
European Regions, 38 Reg. Sci. & Urban Econ. 4, 2008, available online.  
30 For an example of a recent study, see W. Scott Frame and Lawrence White, Technological Change, 
Financial Innovation, and Diffusion in Banking, FBR OF ATLANTA WP 2009-10, available online.  
31 See Janelle Knox-Hayes, The developing carbon financial service industry: expertise, adaptation and 
complementarity in London and New York, 9 J. OF ECON. GEO. 6, 2009.  
32 Id at 1.  
33 See Christian Kirchner, Evolution of Law: Interplay between Private and Public Rule-Making - A New 
Institutional Economics-Analysis, 4 ERASMUS L. REV. 161, 2012.  For an analysis about a new industry (the 
internet), see Gillian Hadfield, Delivering Legality on the Internet: Developing Principles for the Private 
Provision of Commercial Law, 6 AM LAW ECON REV 1, 2004. .  
34 Many scholars in the 1990s and 2000s obsessed about what factors made “legal transplants” (or laws 
copied from other jurisdictions) more successful. As more than a decade of evidence flows in, we still do 
not really know. All we know is that transplants work worse than hoped for. See Eirini Galinou, Legal 
Borrowing: Why Some Legal Transplants Take Root and Others Fail, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y. J. 1, 2004. 
See also Jeremy Kingsley, Legal Transplantation: Is This What the Doctor Ordered and Are the Blood 
Types Compatible, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L., 493, 2004.   
legal approach, this school can only look at positive rather than normative factors in 
deciding on the desirability of legal change.35 We naturally use legal analysis when 
assessing the changes needed to make Hong Kong a more competitive centre for solar 
company securities finance. However, the school - reflecting the limits of the disciple -- 
provides little normative theory to guide our recommendations. In this way, the legal 
school provides the closest basis for a “structuralist” analysis of international financial 
centres’ financial law.  
 
In the following sections, we look at how changing Hong Kong’s securitisation laws can 
help its financial institutions match foreign (US, EU, ASEAN and other) investors with 
Mainland. We review the current development of the Mainland’s solar panel industry. 
We assess the extent to which Hong Kong-based financial institutions can help provide 
money to this industry (and sunrise industries like it). We specifically discuss how 
securitising this industry’s assets and liabilities can provide a key way of channelling 
such finance. We also discuss how legal change can facilitate such securitised-based 
finance.   
 
Solar Power Investments in China and Hong Kong  
 
How Big is the Market Opportunity? 
 
China represents one of the world’s largest solar energy markets – potentially providing a 
revenue-generating bonanza for potential investors.36 Estimates of current solar 
(photovoltaic) production on the Mainland place the value China’s solar industry at about 
€37 billion -- representing roughly 40% of the world’s solar panel production.37 
Geometrically extrapolating China’s photovoltaic sector production at current growth 
rates leads to market sizes of at least €100 billion by 2017.38 Figure 3 shows several 
major solar projects on the Mainland – and key facts about installed and marginally 
added capacity. Unsurprisingly, much of this capacity has been brought online in the 
Western regions – far from China’s traditional financial centres (like Beijing, Shanghai 
                                                 
35 “Positive” relates to what-is whereas “normative” relates to what should-be. For example, Vedder 
analyses EU renewable energy policy -- looking at how law constrains EU political and administrative 
support for renewable energies (like solar power). In the legal paradigm, no abstract factors (outside of 
values and existing law) drive policy recommendations. See Hans Vedder, EU Law and the Financing of 
New Energy Infrastructure, U. OF GRONINGEN RP 14, 2013, available online. 
36 Throughout this paper, we ignore the difficulties in obtaining the necessary permissions for solar projects. 
We assume that, over time, economic incentives will either drive investors to pay the costs of obtaining the 
relevant permissions, or encourage the Government to reduce the number of authorisations and rules 
governing solar exploitation. For an overview of the relevant rules on the Mainland, see Carolyn Dong and 
Stephen Webb, Solar PV projects in China, DLA PIPER BRIEF, 2013, available online.    
37 See Honghua Xu, Charlie Dou, Sicheng Wang, and Fang Lu, National Survey Report of PV Power 
Applications in China: 2011, IEA Rep., 2012, available online. We describe the value of consumption later 
in this paper.  
38 China’s 12th Five Year Plan backs up these extrapolations, planning for large increases in the production 
and consumption of solar power. See 12th Five-Year Plan for the Solar Photovoltaic Industry, available 
online. For one of the many analysts that see such geometric growth occurring into the foreseeable future, 
see Arnulf Jager-Waldau, PV Status Report 2013, JCR SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY REPORT, 2013, available 
online. 
and Hong Kong). Provinces like Xingjian and Inner Mongolia have the largest amount of 
sun (as measured by mega-joules per meter-squared of solar panel surface). These also 
represent China’s least financially developed regions. As such, China had to rely on 
financial centres to agglomerate and channel financial capital (money) for solar-




Chinese solar production represents a large and growing piece of a global industry.39 
As shown in Figure 4a, Mainland solar production capacity has risen to about 40% of 
global photovoltaic cell production in 2012.40 Such market share has come at the expense 
mostly of German and Japanese producers. Roughly 31 gigawatts of solar power came 
online in 2012 – from solar panels using a variety of technologies to convert solar energy 
into electricity. Figure 4b shows the major technologies used, and Chinese producers’ 
share of global production in the niches where its solar companies have a revealed 
comparative advantage.41 The US has a clear advantage in polysilicon – with 34% of 
global production. The Pacific Asia region (excluding China) produces 62% of the 
world’s TF modules. China exercises a dominant market position in three technologies – 
wafers, C-Si cells and modules. Mainland companies like LDK Solar (which make 
polysilicon) may not have a global advantage (compared with the US). However, JA 
                                                 
39 For an overview of the broader development of China’s solar industry, see Mark Ng, Economic Impact of 
the Photovoltaic Industry in China After the Financial Crisis of 2009, 44 CHIN. ECON. 3, 2011. 
40 See Ranjit Deshmukh, Ranjit Bharvirkar, Ashwin Gambhir, and Amol Phadke, Changing Sunshine: 
Analyzing the dynamics of solar electricity policies in the global context, 16 RENEW. & SUSTAIN. ENER. 
REV. 7, 2012, available online.  
41 “Revealed comparative advantage” refers to cost advantages which we can not measure directly -- and 
thus must infer from gains in market share. For an econometrically derived analysis of such revealed 
comparative advantages in the photovoltaic space across countries, see Bernardina Algieri Antonio Aquino, 
Marianna Succurro, Going “green”: trade specialisation dynamics in the solar photovoltaic sector,  
39 ENERGY POL. 11, 2011.  
Solar (a global leader in the industry) does.42 Such production levels suggest that 
























The figure show s each countries' producers' share of global photovoltaic production. The proportions in the figure 
maybe approximate, as w e converted these data from a cumulative (stacked) line graph.  











Polysilicon: GCL-Poly (29Mw), LDK Solar (10Mw), China Silicon Corp (8Mw) , Dago New Energy (5Mw), 
Sichuan Renesola (3Mw) 
Thin Film: Hanenergy (1.5Gw), Trony Solar (200Mw)
Solar Cell: Suntech Power (1.9Gw), JA Solar (1.7Gw), Yingli (1.6Gw), Trina (1.5Gw), Canadian (1Gw), Jinko (810Mw)
Solar Module: SunTech (2Gw), Yingli (1.6Gw), Trina (1.5Gw), Canadian (1.3Gw), Hanwha (830Mw)
Source: EPIA (2013) and IEA (2011).
Figure 4b: Global Competitive Advantages by Solar Technology Type




The Mainland’s structure of solar panel exports also reveals several things about future 
expected national and international financial flows tied to solar consumption and 
production. Figure 5 shows China’s main solar panel export markets (on the top panel) 
and Hong Kong’s (on the bottom panel). First, the Dutch, Germans and Americans 
receive a large relative amount of solar cell imports from China. These flows suggest 
relatively constrained domestic solar cell production runs (at least compared with a world 
in which China does not export such large volumes and values of solar cells).43 In 
simpler terms, we will see less investment in Dutch, Germany and US producers (an
thus markets) as money flows to Chinese producers.
d 
                                                
44 Second, Hong Kong possesses a 
 
42 For a detailed analysis of the Chinese photovoltaic market, see Thilo Grau, Molin Huo, Karsten Neuhoff, 
Survey of Photovoltaic Industry and Policy in Germany and China, DIW DP 1132, available online. 
43 Several studies show that reductions in Chinese imports would like constrain domestic solar consumption 
in places like the US. Burr, in particular, finds that a 25% tariff on Chinese solar imports chocks off supply 
and reduces consumption by US 30%. See Chrystie Burr, Subsidies, Tariffs and Investments in the Solar 
Power Market, 2012, available online. 
44 As we mentioned in the previous footnote, lower Chinese production might actually also imply less US 
and other foreign production. In practice, we will observe both income and substitution (or trade creation 
solar industry of its own sufficiently integrated with the Mainland to provide a platform
for solar industry related finance. Any cluster of financial institutions specialising in 
solar-industry related finance should draw on (and have local access to) individuals 
specific knowledge in the field. The figure shows Hong Kong clearly has a relatively 
large “touch” to the solar panel industry -- be it indigenous or merely as a re-export 
market. Third, if the Mainland serves as Hong Kong’s largest photovoltaic trading partner, 
its other markets (the US and Japan) represent a tiny fraction of these exports. Hong 
Kong has not developed any large and sustainable solar market of its own worth 
financing. Few opportunities exist to develop trade finance and other services for solar 
trade with other countries. Such numbers indicate that financial services aimed at 




Figure 5: Hong Kong and the Mainland Integrated,  






















Exports to world = $17.5b
Mainland China's Exports of Photovoltaics 
The figure show s the value of Mainland exports of photovoltaics (product code 854140) to a range of countries. 
We only show  the Mainland's largest export markets in 2012. 






















Exports to world = $2.5b
Hong Kong's Exports of Photovoltaics 
The figure show s the value of Hong Kong's exports of photovoltaics (product code 854140) to a range of countries. 
We only show  the Mainland's largest export markets in 2012. 
Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
 
This pattern of development provides Hong Kong investors with potential opportunities. 
First, however deep China’s pockets are – the Chinese Ministry of Science and 
Technology and other state-affiliated parties can not provide enough finance to meet 
all of production and distribution needs. Solar energy currently makes up less than 5% 
of all of China’s electricity production.45 In order to achieve the government’s pollution 
reduction, energy security and other policies, solar energy investments will need to 
                                                                                                                                                 
and diversion) effects as Dutch, Germany and US producers cater to an expanding market. We do not data 
to estimate the size of solar cell producers if China did not exist.  
45 See Furkan Dincer, The analysis on photovoltaic electricity generation status, potential and policies of 
the leading countries in solar energy, 15 REN. & SUSTAIN. ENER. REV. 1, 2011.  
increase by at least another €40 billion.46 If government financing enabled the first wave 
of solar energy generation on the Mainland, private sector investment must enable future 
waves.47 Second, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
will most likely eventually sell shares in China’s state-owned solar companies (and even 
possibly the state power companies that distribute their power).48 Many publicly traded 
Chinese entities (both state-owned and completely privately owned) started as non-traded 
state-owned companies.49 Hong Kong investors will likely profit as privatisation spreads 
to China’s state-owned solar companies as well as its grid power providers.50 Third, 
Hong Kong provides a potential beach-head for further investment on the Mainland. CLP 
Holdings – a Hong Kong power company – has investments on the Mainland and a 
market capitalisation of over HK$160 billion. Three of the five major Chinese power 
companies have subsidiaries listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.51 Hong Kong 
companies like CLP could provide useful partners and investors in China’s lumbering 
solar giants.52 CLP, as an investment for foreign investors like US and EU funds, thus 
provides a potential conduit for further investment in Mainland solar.  
 
Solar power market segments 
 
The photovoltaic industry consists of a range of sub-sectors with their own production 
and financing needs. Figure 6 shows the various companies which contribute megawatts 
to each major part of the solar panel supply chain.53 Generally speaking, the production 
                                                 
46 We rely on investment amounts per gigawatt to arrive at this estimate. For one of many sources 
providing information about capacity additions and the cost of adding such capacity, see REN21, 
Renewables 2014: Global Status Report, 2014, at Figure 14, available online.  
47 The Ministry of Science and Technology, China Development Bank and other government-affiliated 
bodies probably couldn’t continue to offer subsidies and preferred access to capital even if they wanted to. 
Both US and EU authorities have complained and started to impose sanctions against Chinese photovoltaic 
manufacturers for receiving such benefits. See John Deutch and Edward Steinfeld, A Duel in the Sun: The 
Solar Photovoltaics Technology Conflict between China and the United States, MIT REPORT, 2013, 
available online. 
48 At least, the trend has been to develop companies under partial or total state ownership of share capital, 
and then sell part or all of these shares. See Jean Chen, Determinants of capital structure of Chinese-listed 
companies, 57 J. OF BUS. RES. 12, 2004, available online. 
49 For more on China’s build, operate and transfer approach to privatisation, see Henry Sanderson and 
Michael Forsythe, CHINA'S SUPERBANK: DEBT, OIL AND INFLUENCE - HOW CHINA DEVELOPMENT BANK IS 
REWRITING THE RULES OF FINANCE, 2013.   
50 Liu provides an overview of China’s electricity sector, while Nan and Moseley provide and prospects for 
further privatisation. See Zhenya Liu, ELECTRIC POWER AND ENERGY IN CHINA, 2013. See also Yi-jia Nan 
and Mark Moseley, The Expansion of China’s Generation Capacity, 1 PPP INSIGHTS 1, 2011, available 
online. 
51 China Power International Development, Huadian Power International Corporation, and Datang 
International Power Generation Company have Hong Kong listings. They represent independent power 
producing subsidiaries of larger non-traded state-owned enterprises.  
52 From the very limited publicly available data, we show later that Hong Kong institutional investors have 
tended to avoid large stakes in Mainland solar companies.  
53 See Thilo Grau, Molin Huo, and Karsten Neuhoff, Survey of Photovoltaic Industry and Policy in 
Germany and China, DIW WP 1132, 2011, available online. The schema we provide in this paper only 
represents the broadest generalisation of the inputs into solar panel production. For an excellent, detailed 
analysis of these inputs, their costs, and contributions to market prices (in the US context), see Jacob Funk, 
of solar panels requires four major value chain segments – silicon harvesting, the creation 
of silicon ingots and wafers, the creation of solar cells into modules, and assembly of 
modules into electricity-producing units.54 In China, silicon harvesting tends to involve a 
different set of companies than in the other parts of the supply chain.55 Potential investors 
in each segment of the supply chain have a range of companies to choose from. Investors 
interested in across-chain exposure might focus on Baoding and Trina. Investors 
interested in niche suppliers might focus on companies like Xinguang. Many of these 
companies do not trade on public exchanges – making private placement and asset 
securitisation investments the only ways of getting exposure to these companies. 
Concentrated competencies will need to be developed in an international financial 























Figure 6: Manufacuter Size Along the Photovoltaic Supply Chain
Silicon “harvesting” Ingot/ wafer production
cell production Module assembly
The figure shows companies involved in each stage of the solar cell production process (supply chain). The length 
of each line roughly corresponds to capacity production. As a base, Jiangsu Zhongneng had about 2,000 
megawatts. Please see source for more accurate data. 
Source: Grau et al. (2011). 
 
 
As many analysts have already pointed out, China’s solar industry requires consolidation. 
Figure 7 shows the number of companies and employment in the major segments of 
China’s photovoltaic supply chain. A large range of producers and suppliers occupy each 
segment of the supply chain – suggesting the need for consolidation.56 The Chinese 
photovoltaic industry employs easily over 6,000 workers – with many of these in 
“bloated” cells and ingots-wafers segments.57 Dropping prices and increasing debt 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kirkegaard, Thilo Hanemann, Lutz Weischer, and Matt Miller, Toward a Sunny Future? Global 
Integration in the Solar PV Industry, PIIE WP 10-6, 2010, available online. 
54 For a description of the process (and description of the market factors governing each step of the 
production process), see John Deutch and Edward Steinfeld, A Duel in the Sun: The Solar Photovoltaics 
Technology Conflict between China and the United States, MIT Report, 2013, available online.  
55 For an overview and contrasting perspectives from the US, see Michaela Platzer, U.S. Solar Photovoltaic 
Manufacturing: Industry Trends, Global Competition, Federal Support, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV. 7-
5700 R42509, 2012, available online.  
56 Falling margins and increasing probabilities of default of Chinese photovoltaic manufacturers have been 
widely cited signs of overcapacity. See Wayne Ma, China to Promote Solar-Power Consolidation, WSJ 
DEC. 19, 2012, available online.  
57 For a description of such “bloating,” see Abheek Bhattacharya, Clouds Shroud China's Bloated Solar 
Sector, WSJ MARCH 12, 2014, available online.  
burdens have represented clear signals of such a bloat. Yet, at the time of this writing, 
many analysts already believed much of the industry shake-up had already occurred.58  
 
Figure 7: Major Players in a Piece of China’s Photovoltaic Supply Chain 
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The figure shows employment in a range of companies comprising the Mainland’s photovoltaic supply 
chain. We numbers are approximate (please see source for exact data). Companies with asterisks indicate 
they account for a relatively large proportionate share of employment in their sub-sector.  
** indicates one firm has more than 90% of production capacity (measured in megawatts) 
*** usually the same companies.  
Source: Grau et al. (2011).  
 
The development of Hong Kong as a solar-industry financial centre can help alleviate 
these problems in three ways. First, Hong Kong’s “better” M&A regulations could 
provide a forum for richer and prosperous firms to acquire failing firms. Many 
commentators have argued that the Chinese government plans to deal with the problem of 
over-capacity (and too many companies competing) by letting companies fail.59 By 
listing in Hong Kong and using its internationally-savvy financial institutions, many of 
these companies could merge, offer themselves for purchase and/or sell their assets and 
liabilities.60 Second, Hong Kong provides a ready-to-use English-language financial 
                                                 
58 For a detailed analysis, include an analysis of the 180 companies most likely to exit the market, see 
Shyam Mehta, Global PV Module Manufacturers 2013: Competitive Positioning, Consolidation and the 
China Factor, 2012. For a popular media view, see Eric Ng, China's solar sector bounces back: Industry 
consolidation and soaring demand have helped mainland panel makers to return to profitability after a 
painful slump, SCMP 10 MARCH, 2014, available online. 
59 For one example, see Leslie Hook, Suntech clouds China solar sector outlook, FT 19 MARCH, 2013, 
available online. 
60 Estimates on credit and subsidies given to Mainland solar firms top $70 billion in recent years. Reselling 
some of the non-collectible debt at a discount would help reduce the impact on China’s already debt-burden 
budgets and possibly even allow for the continuation of economically-viable but highly indebted Mainland 
media ready to provide coverage and analysis of these companies – including a very 
active presence by Bloomberg and Reuters. Wide spread and in-depth reporting of 
publicly-traded companies might encourage solar company management to take more 
profitable pricing, debt-load, and other decisions.61 Third, only a deep and sophisticated 
financial centre can trade the complex structured and asset-backed securities the solar 
industry likely needs to use to develop.62 As we describe later, Hong Kong provides the 
best venue for developing specialised financial services for the companies occupying 
each segment of China’s solar supply chain.  
 
Solar power financing segments and the varieties of solar securitisation 
 
The photovoltaic market consists of a range of suppliers, producers, intermediaries and 
complementary service providers that bring solar energy to final business and residential 
consumers. Figure 8 shows a partial value chain (more like an ecosystem) that would 
require financing from Hong Kong’s financial institutions – both in China and potentially 
in other jurisdictions.63 The major segments include the R&D companies which create 
the innovations that make solar power an increasing viable method of electricity 
generation, equipment manufactures (like solar cell and module producers), oper
and maintenance companies and distributors (wholesalers and retailers).
ations 
ns 
                                                                                                                                                
64 R&D functio
occur either in publicly funded bodies or often subsumed into the larger photovoltaic 
manufactures who can afford to fund large R&D programmes.65 Increasingly, the market 
 
photovoltaic firms. See Bloomberg, Chinese Zombies Emerging After Years of Solar Subsidies, 
BLOOMBERG SEPT. 9, 2013, available online.  
61 We say “might” because we could not find econometric studies assessing the effect of financial reporting 
on company managements’ decisions. In theory, vibrant media coverage should help the market impose 
discipline on management. In practice, non-public insider information may provide a superiour basis for 
disciplining management. We discuss how to create such a more vibrant information market in Hong Kong 
later in this paper.  
62 Financing arrangements for the solar industry involve not only structured and other kinds of complex 
financial instruments, but supporting financial services like insurance. Hong Kong’s already developed 
insurance markets provide a superiour platform for growing solar-industry related products. For the role of 
insurance in the solar industry, see Bethany Speer, Michael Mendelsohn, and Karlynn Cory, Insuring Solar 
Photovoltaics: Challenges and Possible Solutions, TECH. REP. NREL/TP-6A2-46932, 2010, available 
online. 
63 We underline “value” to highlight the difference between a value chain and a supply chain. We include 
finance provision as part of the value chain (though naturally not part of the supply chains we described in 
the previous section). For a US analysis, see Thomas Maslin, Strategic Analysis of the Downstream of the 
US Photovoltaic Value Chain, 2008, available online. For a China analysis, see also Tomoo Marukawa, 
The Compressed Development of China's Photovoltaic Industry and the Rise of Suntech Power, DPRIETI 
DP 12-E-051, available online.  
64 Mainland data suggest that integration across value chain segments helps increase gross profit margins – 
which hover at about 20% over the range of Chinese photovoltaic producers. See China Greentech 
Initiative, CHINA’ S SOLAR PV VALUE CHAIN, 2011, at 8.  
65 We do not describe the Chinese government’s photovoltaic R&D expenditures to keep this paper 
reasonable short. For a US perspective and description (in order to see where the sector might be heading), 
see Rosalie Reugg and Patrick Thomas, Linkages from DOE’s Solar Photovoltaic R&D to Commercial 
Renewable Power from Solar Energy, 2011, available online. See also Christian Breyer, Christian Birkner, 
F. Kersten, A. Gerlach, Jan Christoph Goldschmidt, G. Stryi-Hipp, D.F. Montoro, and Moritz Riede, 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS IN PV – A LIMITING FACTOR FOR A FAST PV DIFFUSION?, 
available online. 
is opening to small R&D companies looking to receive patent licensing revenues.66 
Equipment manufacturers (the part of the value chain we have spent the most space 
analysing) provide equipment for use at home and export abroad. Operations and 
maintenance companies oversee the installation and upkeep of these residential and 
industrial solar panels (and complexes).67 Solar panel providers deliver panels either to 
residential customers or to industrial size consumers, like utilities, that transfer electricity 
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Figure 8: Each Part of the Solar Power Ecosystem Has Its
Own Assets and Financing Requirements 
The figure shows the solar (photovoltaic) industrial “ecosystem”. Our figure shows the main areas of the solar value chain in order 
to aid the reader unfamiliar with the photovoltaic electricity supply process. We separate out various parts of the supply chain (like 
R&D and equipment manufacturers) while leaving some parts integrated (like silicon harvesters and solar module makers). 
* In the Chinese context, some of these institutional investors may include the Commission for the Supervision and Administration 
of State-Owned Assets. 
** Speculators refer to third-parties who buy securities for later resale at a profit. These are usual not venture or other partners. 
stock of licensing 
(“lease”) agreements






Within this ecosystem stand a number of financial intermediaries who provide funding. 
Institutional investors, mutual funds and banks/broker-dealers hold equity and debt in 
China’s consolidated R&D, manufacture, and operations/maintenance companies.69 In 
2012 for example, roughly $1 billion in new renewables investments appeared on the 
                                                 
66 The solar R&D industry represents an exciting and important future industry – where Hong Kong (and 
other) investors could fund firms similar to today’s biotech firms which mainly develop patents. For an 
overview of this space, see Christian Breyer, Christian Birkner, Jan Meiss, Jan Christoph Goldschmidt, and 
Moritz Riede, A top-down analysis: Determining photovoltaics R&D investments from patent analysis and 
R&D headcount, 62 ENERGY POLICY 1, 2003.   
67 Operations and maintenance represent only one part of this industry. Companies like Europe-China 
Power (a Dutch subsidiary of Hanergy) provides project management and development consulting services. 
For an analysis of the industrial side of this market, see Cedric Brehaut, Megawatt-Scale PV Plant 
Operations and Maintenance: Services, Markets and Competitors 2013-2017, GTM Research, 2013. For a 
more general overview, see Nadav Enbar and Tom Key, Addressing Solar Photovoltaic Operations and 
Maintenance Challenges: A Survey of Current Knowledge and Practices, EPRI WP, 2010, available online. 
68 For an analysis of photovoltaic marketing channels in China and world-wide, see QYR Research Reports, 
Global and China Photovoltaic Solar Panel Industry 2014 Market Research Report, 2013.  
69 We provide data about these holdings in the next section. Broker-dealers hold most shares in the 
Mainland’s solar companies on behalf of ultimate investors – making ultimate economic interests in these 
companies extremely difficult to ascertain.  
Shanghai Stock Exchange and $100 million on the Shenzhen Exchange.70 These 
“bundles of stocks and bonds” (as we have labelled them in the figure) can stay in the 
hands of the institution or transfer to final owners who can represent other companie
retail investors. The other major part of the financing market includes various debt 
obligations and notes of credit as well as receivables (promises to pay for solar panels, 
maintenance and other goods and services). Particularly in the US, a side market in
panel purchase and lease financing has begun to develop in order to provide funds t




                                                
71 In the US, equity has accounted for 
about half of solar companies’ finance – with private equity and venture capital 
comprising much of the remaining share.72 Even in the US, debt accounted for only about 
10% of solar investment finance.  
 
Each of these market segments can use a range of financial securities in order to raise 
funds and pass along risks. Figure 9 shows the range of securities which various 
companies in solar companies’ value chains can use. Simple equities and debt (bonds) 
represent the most prosaic varieties of securities. However, other securities -- like asset- 
backed and debt-backed obligations) represent increasingly useful securities. As we 
describe later, because of Mainland solar companies’ existing capital structures, debt 
instruments would likely swamp trade in equities. Most importantly, solar companies 
(and related solar finance companies) make excellent candidates for securitising their 
assets and liabilities and offering them directly. Such a direct offer provides investors 
with targeted exposure to the risks and returns on those assets (like a machine which 
presses silicon chips for example). Why buy equities which bundle all kinds of 
management, macroeconomic, operational and other risks, when investors can purchase 














70 We could not obtain detailed information about the types of renewables (including solar) and the specific 
types of securities listed. See Frankfurt School-UNEP, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 
2013, 2013, available online.  
71 Increasingly, finance companies provide money to consumers looking to buy or lease solar panels. We do 
not describe this in much detail. For a US perspective, see Bethany Speer, Residential Solar Photovoltaics: 
Comparison of Financing Benefits, Innovations, and Options, NREL/TP-6A20-51644, 2012, available 
online. See also Jason Coughlin and Karlynn Cory, Solar Photovoltaic Financing: Residential Sector 
Deployment, NREL/TP-6A2-44853, 2009, available online. 
72 See Charles Jennings, Robert Margolis, John Bartlett, A Historical Analysis of Investment in Solar 
Energy Technologies (2000-2007), NREL/TP-6A2-43602, 2008, available online. 
Figure 9: Solar Market Funding Instruments and Maximum Contributions to 











For R&D companies, O&M providers, manufacturers as well as the finance 
side (residential finance companies and banks providing loans to utilities), 
stocks still represent the best “base” securitisation to provide access to these 





For companies looking to pay steady income (and investors looking to 
receive a steady stream) while giving away residual risks. Particularly suited 
to solar retail distributors and utility providers.   
$4b 
Senior debt For investors looking for yield while reducing risks. All companies in 




For savers looking for debt instruments which allow them to share company 
risks (like equity holders). Need to pay higher yields attractive for risky 




Solar companies and solar finance companies will have relatively large very 
short-term financing needs. Such paper can also serve as collateral in 








Mainland solar companies have large amounts of receivables and assets (like 
plant, property, IP and so forth). Such securities offer a better targeting of 
risks/returns for R&D license fees and residential and utility-level solar 
payments. Why should investors hold stocks when they can get targeted 





Mainland solar companies have a fair amount of debt (both short-term and 
long-term). Why should banks only be allowed to participate in receiving 
returns on such debt? By hiving off such debt in tradable securities, 
companies can lower borrowing costs. Investors get more targeted loans. 
Best for solar equipment, O&M equipment service providers and others 





Provides useful “state contingent” payoffs ideal for insurance and gambling 
(for speculators). These derivatives and options can help normal equity and 





Solar manufacturers, distributors and even finance firms represent relatively 
capital-intensive enterprises. Paying out 1%-2% of the value of assets for 
insurance can protect from large-scale, low-probability risks.  
$150m
The figure shows various securities that companies in solar company producers’ value chains can use to 
raise funds and pass-off risks. We show estimated maximum achievable market sizes for the securitisation 
of various Mainland solar companies’ assets and liabilities, on the assumption that all equity, debt and 
securitisation of these assets and liabilities trade through Hong Kong intermediaries. We make numerous 
assumptions about investors’ preferences for packaged securities in order allocate certain market sizes to 
particular classes of securities. For example, from the total value of equity finance (priced at market values 
in June 2014), we allocate part of that to preferred (rather than ordinary) shares based on assumptions about 
the overall market’s risk aversion and desire for steady-stream payments.  
Methodology: Our methodology consisted of the following. We obtained market valuations for all 
Mainland solar companies traded in Hong Kong in June 2014 (about $4 billion). We further found the total 
assets and liabilities reported by all non-US listed Mainland photovoltaic producers (as we report in Figures 
28, 33a and other figures later in the paper). We then allocate the total value of equity, debt, short and long-
term assets and liabilities to various tradable securities shown in the figure. Insurance estimates come from 
the estimated premiums paid on the total value of insured assets (including financial assets) which come to 
about 50% of total.  
Source: authors – based on data from WRDS (2014).  
The maximum achievable market size for trade in Mainland solar companies financial 
assets and liabilities in the short-term comes to about $20 billion. Such an estimate 
assumes Hong Kong financial intermediaries can securitize all assets and liabilities of 
non-US listed Mainland solar companies. If Hong Kong companies could generate 1% of 
the value of these financial assets in commissions, fees, capital gains (from sales) and so 
forth, the revenue generated from these assets could amount to $200 million per year.  
Moreover, by specialising in solar finance, Hong Kong’s financial intermediaries can 
provide cheaper and easier financing than rivals in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen.73 
Such specialisation could help ensure Hong Kong’s financial institutions receive this 
lucre.  
 
Such computations also tell us something useful about writing the financial law which 
underpins Hong Kong as an international financial centre. These estimates suggest 
exactly which types of securities policymakers need to regulate (and which to encourage). 
In this case, legal changes which develop Hong Kong’s debt markets appear as a priority. 
We also see that the unique profile of solar companies’ assets and liabilities makes their 
securitisation (and the sale of these securities) a profitable and socially useful function. 
Looking at solar market financial needs provides a much better guide for making 
financial law in Hong Kong than “structural” approaches like resorting to best 
practice.   
 
Hong Kong and the geography of solar finance  
 
Why should Mainland solar companies use Hong Kong-based financial intermediaries 
instead of those located closer to them? Indeed, Chinese photovoltaic production tends 
already to centre on areas of Chinese finance. Figure 10 shows major areas of 
photovoltaic production on the Mainland. As we saw in a previous figure, most of the 
actual electricity generation occurs in China’s western provinces (close areas of high 
solar irradiation). Yet, production tends to occur close to financial and industrial centres 
in China’s eastern provinces.74 The greater Shanghai area clearly represents a cluster – its 
photovoltaic companies developing around a sustainable source of finance – with assets 
totalling 33.9 billion RMB (or about $5.4 million).  The next largest cluster centres on 
Tianjin – geographically close to Beijing (the banking centre of China).75 The third 
largest centre lies around Shenzhen – a third financial centre. The geographical location 
of solar companies on the Mainland generally follows the location of finance.76   
                                                 
73 Arner et al. (2014) provides an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of China’s other major 
financial centres.  
74 For a more detailed description, see Mark Ng, Economic Impact of the Photovoltaic Industry in China 
After the Financial Crisis of 2009, 44 CHINESE ECON. 3, 2011.   
75 As we describe in a separate paper, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong have (to some extent) 
sought complementary financial services – with Beijing focusing on banking, Shanghai on equities and 
debt, Shenzhen on initial public offerings and Hong Kong of international shares. See Arner et al. (2014).  
76 We described several theories of economic geography in the previous section. In this case, government 
policy has played an important role in the sector’s development, with plans dictating where certain solar 
companies locate. For a description of the way Chinese government policies influenced the location of 
solar companies’ activities, see Sufang Zhang and Yongxiu He, Analysis on the development and policy of 
solar PV power in China, 21 RENEW. & SUSTAIN. ENERGY REV. 1, 2013. See also Mo-lin Huo and Dan-wei 
Zhang, Lessons from photovoltaic policies in China for future development, 51 ENER. POL. 1, 2012.  


























The figure shows the asset values (in billions of RMB) of assets held by the Mainland’s solar companies (SIC code 3674).
We have marked the location of each company on the maps shown. 
Source: WRDS (2014).  
 
 
Does the smallness and distance of Hong Kong’s own solar panel industry preclude its 
financial institutions from playing a pivotal role in financing the Mainland’s solar 
industry? Not necessarily. Much research from the US suggests that companies looking 
for capital do not necessarily use the financial institutions in their same city or 
geographical area. Chen et al. for example, find a higher success rate for private equity 
investments in companies located outside the venture capitalist’s own city.77 In 14.5% of 
the cases, these financiers make investments in companies which eventually result in an 
initial public offering located outside the city where the venture capitalist’s headquarters 
lies. Initial public offerings from investments made outside of cities where venture 
capitalists have offices weigh in at about 17% of the total. Moreover, investor networks 
tend to form “barbell” patterns, with a clustering of investors who make geographically 
distant investments.78 If Hong Kong and China follow this pattern, we can expect a 
clustering of Hong Kong-based solar energy investment firms.  
 
The literature suggests that such “barbell” pattern may develop in the geography of solar 
investment between Hong Kong (as a financial centre) and Shanghai (as a solar company 
centre) for several reasons. Figure 11 provides a summary of some of the literature 
pointing to the development of such a pattern. Financial firms -- like all firms -- benefit 
from knowledge spillovers and reduced transactions costs as they locate together.79 
However, authors like Tykvova and Schertler (2010) might argue that a solar energy 
                                                 
77 See Henry Chen, Paul Gompers, Anna Kovner, and Josh Lerner, Buy Local? The Geography of 
Successful and Unsuccessful Venture Capital Expansion, HBS WP 09-143, 2009, available online. 
78 For an early view of this pattern, see Olav Sorenson and Toby Stuart, Syndication Networks and the 
Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments, 106 AMER. J. OF SOC. 6, 2001.   
79 Chen et al. (2009), which we have cited above, provides one of most relevant studies for our purposes. 
For other evidence focusing on London, see Gary Cook, Naresh R. Pandit, Jonathan Beaverstock, Peter 
Taylor, Kathy Pain, The Clustering of Financial Services in London, ERSA WP 04P49, 2004, available 
online. 
financial cluster can not exist in isolation.80 They find evidence of such a “barbell” effect 
-- with a more geographical proximate financial cluster developing and interacting with a 
distant one. As we show later, Hong Kong can clearly serve as the “local” solar financing 
cluster interacting with the large Mainland solar company investment clusters in New 
York and Chicago. Sorenson and Stuart provide another study showing that financial 
cluster development occurs with some geographical distance from the sunrise industries 
they fund.81 Indeed, their “bridging” role in bringing new ideas, technologies and money 
to a sunrise industry cluster, necessitates a fair amount of distance. Hong Kong provides 
the advantage of being not too far, but not too close, to Mainland solar panel 
producers and other value chain members.  
 
Figure 11: Hong Kong Should (in theory) provide a deep financial centre for 
Mainland solar company finance 
 
Factor  Description (as modified to reflect solar investment) 
clustering effects 
Chen et al. (2009) 
Knowledge spillovers occur as firms with competencies in solar finance cluster. 
Location clearly affects financiers’ sizes and/or number of deals done. Suggests that 
Hong Kong solar finance companies need to amass both size (scale and diversity) in 







Local investors will look for international investors with greater experience and 
deeper pockets. Local investors will bring local knowledge and proximity. Suggests 
complementary between Shanghai and Shenzhen local investors and Hong Kong 
financial institutions as “foreign” partners. Or Hong Kong could serve as the “local” 






Probability of investment declines with distance. Beyond a certain point (around 10 
miles) the marginal decrease in probability is close to zero. Such a finding means 
that investees happy to take money from a partner 100 miles as much as one 1000 
miles away. Implies that Mainland solar companies may see little difference 
between Hong Kong-based and Nebraska-based investors.   
“portfolio effects”  
Devigne et al 
(2013) 
Companies in a venture capitalist’s portfolio may exhibit complementarities over 
time. Solar panel investors with already existing investments in integrated circuits, 
electricity and other sectors would like build up investing competencies hard to 






Venture capitalists balance positive and negative rivalry effects. On the one hand, 
intense rivalry encourages financiers to focus more intently on solar companies’ 
needs. On the other hand, intense rivalry among investors – and large amounts of 
funding opportunities -- encourages the development of investee unfriendly contract 
terms.   
culture and 
institutions effect 
Dai et al. (2012) 
More investment occurs with similarities between investors’ and investees’ culture 
and institutions. Implies Hong Kong preferred because of similar culture. Yet, Hong 
Kong’s institutions more similar to New York and London -- making uncertain as to 
whether a “bonding” or “bridging” effect exists.  
winner takes most 
effects 
Wojcik (2010) 
Securities centres tend to displace banking and insurance centre concentration.  
Larger securities centres tend to displace smaller centres. Suggests that Hong Kong 
needs to develop solar finance competencies quickly to compete effectively against 
Shanghai and Shenzhen.   
                                                 
80 See Tereza Tykvova and Andrei Schertler, Geographical and institutional distances in venture capital 
deals: How syndication and experience drive internationalization patterns, ZEW DP 11-022, 2011, 
available online. 
81 See Olav Sorenson and Toby Stuart, Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of Venture 
Capital Investments, 106 Amer. J. of Soc. 6, 2001.  
The figure shows statistically significant effects (at the 95% level or “better”) from a range of studies 
analysing the geography of investment. We translate their findings from other industries in other countries 
(usually the US) to the Hong Kong context into a solar industry context. As usual, readers should interpret 
such comparisons cautiously, as effects observed in other countries and sectors may not apply to Hong 
Kong.   
 
Other effects militate against Shanghai or other financial centre serving the Mainland’s 
burgeoning solar industry. One of these effects includes the development of “financing 
finickiness” among financiers located too close to the sunrise industry. Using Silicon 
Valley as an example, Bengtsson and Ravid find a “California Effect” which discourages 
sunrise industries there from obtaining funding locally.82 If a similar “Hong Kong Effect” 
operates like in California, we can expect Hong Kong to be the preferred location of solar 
finance. Indeed, again if the US experience serves as any guide, Hong Kong companies 
specialising in financing the Mainland’s solar companies might develop a competitive 
advantage due to their already existing portfolios.83 From this perspective, Hong Kong 
companies already fund Mainland science, technology and other companies. Such pre-
existing holdings can complement new investments in solar -- increasing returns across 
the portfolio. Most of these studies imply that Hong Kong needs to race to develop a 
size and scale needed to offer solar investments before Shanghai and Shenzhen do. 
 
Yet, not all the evidence point inextricably toward Hong Kong’s role as a solar financing 
centre. A number of scholars point to the important role culture and institutions play in 
the development of a financial centre focused on particular sunrise industries.84 Hong 
Kong shares a similar culture to the Mainland’s - and increasingly institutions which 
“harmonize” with Mainland institutions.85  Such an explanation however, ignores the 
complementary nature of Hong Kong’s institutions. As we explain later in the paper, 
Hong Kong may represent an ideal solar financing centre because of differences in its 
legal and other institutions with the Mainland. Moreover, Hong Kong may lose out if 
Shanghai and Shenzhen if its lawmakers do not develop its securitisation markets. 
Wojcik has noticed the trend that securities markets tend to push out insurance and 
banking markets.86 As securitisation develops, companies and investors move their 
banking and insurance business to shadow banks (which provide the same services 
through securitised lending and insurance). Hong Kong has quickly lost its regional role 
as a securities centre.87 Thus, securitisation represents Hong Kong’s best bet to grow 
                                                 
82 See Ola Bengtsson and S. Abraham Ravid, The Geography of Venture Capital Contracts, 2009, available 
online. 
83 See David Devigne, Tom Vanacker, Sophie Manigart, and Ine Paeleman, The role of domestic and cross-
border venture capital investors in the growth of portfolio companies, 40 SMALL BUS. ECON. 3, 2013.  
84 See Na Dai, Hoje Job and Sul Kassicieh, Cross-border venture capital investments in Asia: Selection and 
exit performance, 27 J. OF BUS. VENTURING 6, 2012.   
85 Hong Kong administrators have already begun the process of “harmonising” (to take a word from the EU 
context) Hong Kong laws and institutions with those in the Mainland. Such harmonisatiion has not been 
without controversy. See Simon Denyer, Beijing reminds Hong Kong residents that it remains ‘the real 
boss’, WASH. POST JUNE 11, 2014, available online. 
86 See Dariusz Wojcik, Securitization and its footprint: the rise of the US securities industry centres 1998–
2007, J. OF ECON. GEO., 2011. 
87 Arner et al. (2014) documents these trends in detail.   
a scale of solar company finance needed to solidify its position as an international 
financial centre.  
 
The geographical profile of investment in the larger Chinese photovoltaic companies 
suggests that Hong Kong has not built up significant investment competencies in this 
sector.88 Figure 12 shows the location and holdings of major mutual fund and 
institutional investors in the New York-listed Jinko Solar (a Shanghai-based photovoltaic 





                                                
89 We show the number of shares held by mutual funds and institutions rather 
than brokers and custodians.90 Of the 13% of total company shareholders who report 
their holdings publicly, Hong Kong-based investors hold a relatively large proportion of
the companies assets (about 12%).91 However, institutional investors from other cities 
hold more than 75% of these shares. Hong Kong companies’ relatively meagre hold
represents both a benefit and cost to Hong Kong as an international financial centre. On 
the upside, having less Hong Kong-centred investment in Jinko benefits the company -- 
as it draws from range of different holders able to bring new perspectives (and gain 
diversification in return). On the downside, if Jinko represented such a good investment, 
why don’t more Hong Kong investors take more and larger stakes? Hong Kong 
institutions and funds are either unwilling or unable to invest in solar companies like 
Jinko to the same extent as their foreign rivals. In either case, Hong Kong investors 
clearly do not serve as a value-adding intermediary for local and foreign Mainland 
solar company investors.   
 
 
88 Academics have long known that certain investment centres build-up particular competencies in making 
sunrise industry investments. Investment usually represents a vector by which companies gain access to 
new skill sets, markets and risk appetites. For a discussion involving equity investment, see Marco Pagano, 
Ailsa Roell, and Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?  
57 J. OF FIN. 6, 2001. For a venture capital perspective, see Henry Chen, Paul Gompers, Anna Kovner, and 
Josh Lerner, Buy Local? The Geography of Successful and Unsuccessful Venture Capital Expansion, HBS 
WP 1420371, 2009.  
89 We provide some data on the most concentrated shareholders in various Mainland solar companies later 
in this paper. We do not provide full data to keep the paper focused on our main argument. We encourage 
readers to look up the data for themselves to confirm that this case represents the broader whole.  
90 Two pieces of public information exist on a company’s shareholders – holdings by professional fund 
managers and (in Hong Kong) holdings by custodians/broker-dealers. The data in the figure show the sliver 
of shares held by institutions which must publicly report their holdings. They hold roughly 13% of all of 
Jinko’s traded shares.  
91 Central Asset Investments represented the main holder of Jinko’s equity among Hong Kong domiciled 

























Figure 12: Why Don’t More International Investors Get Exposure to 








key The figure shows the number of shares held by funds and institutional investors in Shanghai-
based Jinko Solar. The numbers next to city names indicate the number of funds. Only one 
investors runs money out of the city if no number appears next to the name. 
Source: Capital IQ (2014).
Pitttsburg
 
If Hong Kong develops as one end of the “barbell” it will likely serve as a pass-through 
conduit for real investors located in other jurisdictions. Continuing with our Jinko Solar, 
we see one example of such a pass-through. Figure 13 shows the nationality of Hong 
Kong-based custodians holding Jinko Solar’s shares. By number of custodians, Hong 
Kong national broker-dealers represent the majority. However, by shareholding, US and 
UK firms registered and domiciled in Hong Kong hold the majority of Jinko’s shares. 
Hong Kong serves as a pass-through for other international investors rather than as 





















Figure 13: More Native Hong Kong Broker-Dealers Serve as Custodians
for Jinko Shares, but they Hold Far Less of a Stake 
The f igure show s the number of broker-dealers in Hong Kong dealing in Jinko Solar securities, as arranged by their 
"native country". We also show  their combined stake in Jinko Solar. For example, the 5 US "native" f irms held about 









Underlying economics suggests a regionalisation strategy 
 
Hong Kong’s needed leadership as a solar industry finance centre comes into focus when 
considering the size of future regional solar consumption. Outside of Europe, Chinese 
markets represented the largest markets for photovoltaics (roughly 35% in 2012).92 Yet, 
these amounts only represent the tip of the iceberg. Figure 14 shows the potential value of 
solar energy consumption in the Asian region alone over the next ten years.93 In other 
words, the figure assesses the likely customer spending on photovoltaically-generated 
electricity over the next 10 years, given a set of assumptions which we chose in order to 
make economics of the market easier to understand. China represents the largest market – 
at $470 billion in potential revenue over the next decade.94 Russia and India represent the 
next 2 largest markets with about $140 billion in spending between them. Spending in 
Hong Kong should come to $430 billion – a paltry figure in comparison. All together, 
the value of photovoltaic energy revenues in Asia alone could top half a trillion 
dollars. Despite claims to the contrary, China’s large energy needs mean that the sun 































$1.3b $1.3b $1b $940m $540 $430
The figure show s the estimated present value of revenues earned by solar energy providers in each of the jurisdictions 
using several relatively simple rules-of-thumb to arrive at these market sizes. We assumed that solar energy consumption 
in each of these jurisdictions came to 5% of total energy consumption (expressed in giga-w atts). We used average
prices of about 20 US cents per kilow att to arrive at top-line revenues. We exclude Asian jurisdictions w ith 
suff iciently developed f inancial markets (Japan, South Korea, and Taiw an). We exclude Macao because of its small size. 
We assume a 5% sector grow th rate and a similar discount rate on revenues. The "catchment area" in the title refers to 
attractive Asian foreign markets for Hong Kong f inancial institutions (as described in Arner et al., 2014). 
Sources:  CIA Factbook (for energy consumption), electricity prices averaged from national electricity provider data 
provided online).  
 
 
                                                 
92 See European Photovoltaic Industry Association, Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaics 2013-2017, at 
Figure 18, available online.  
93 The figure uses rule of thumb values for solar energy consumption and the price per kilowatt in order to 
keep the paper relatively simple (so it does not turn into a doctoral dissertation sizing solar electricity 
consumption markets regionally). We refer in the figure to a study of Hong Kong’s attractiveness as an 
international financial centre. See Douglas Arner, David Donald, Say Goo, Richard Hu, Chen Lin, Bryane 
Michael, Frank Song, Wilson Tong, Chenggang Xu, Dariusz Wojcik, and Simon Zhao, Assessing Hong 
Kong as an International Financial Centre, 2014, available online. 
94 The growth (or marginal) change in these market sizes come to about $155 billion by 2018. Other market 
size estimates confirm our own estimates. For example, see Matthew Feinstein and Chen Liu, Market Size 
Update 2013: Return to Equilibrium, 2013.  
95 See Knowledge@Wharton, Why Is the Sun Setting on China’s Solar Power Industry?, 2013, available 
online. 
Yet, these amounts only represent the beginning. Solar energy represents less than 5% of 
most of the world’s energy production (and in most Asian countries represents even 2% 
or less).96 If countries like the Philippines, India, the Philippines and others manage to 
expand access to electricity beyond current levels (rather than simply replace coal, gas 
and oil with solar), market sizes could be much bigger. Many countries politicians are 
already looking for ways to increase their production (and thus consumption) of 
photovoltaically generated electricity.97 Thus, the market for solar power could be 
much, much bigger if financial institutions in a place like Hong Kong could figure 
out ways of providing flexible and low-cost finance to solar technology producers 
and users. Figure 15 shows electricity usage across the Asia region. As household 
incomes increase, the price of solar electricity declines and taxes rise on tax carbon-
emitting electricity production methods, the markets shown in the figure will become 
more profitable. However, both consumers and producers will need ways of financing 
such growth.98 If Hong Kong’s financial institutions can help lower the costs of 
electricity and provide finance which makes access to electricity more wide-spread, Hong 







                                                 
96 See REN21, Renewables 2014: Global Status Report, 2014, at Figure 14, available online. 
97 To that end, the IEA has produced a roadmap to help countries – like those we show on the map – to 
expand their use of solar energy. See IEA, Technology Roadmap: Solar photovoltaic energy, 2012, 
available online. Many analysts assume that solar energy would replace electricity generated from coal, oil 
and other sources. Yet, according to the latest data available, roughly 70% of the Philippines’ population 
has access to electricity and 75% of India’s has access. As such, the market for solar-generated electricity 
could expand by serving consumers without access to electricity of any kind.   
98 For more on the way that financing methods affects both supply and demand for electricity in developing 
countries, see Mahirah Kamaludin, Electricity Consumption In Developing Countries, 2 ASIAN J. OF SOC. 
SCI. & HUMANITIES 2, 2013. 
Once solar energy costs reach parity with other forms of electricity, solar could provide 
far more than 5% of the region’s (or world’s) energy needs. Current estimates place such 
cost parity at the end of the decade.99 At present, solar power electricity in China is 3 
times more expensive than the cheapest alternative (hydropower at 4.21 cents per 
kilowatt hour) and up to two times more expensive than the next most expensive form of 
electricity generation (biomass at 11.90 cents per kilowatt hour).100 Affirming 
Reichelstein and co-authors’ analysis, Zhao and co-authors find that if cost decreases 
continue on their current trajectory, solar power should reach parity with the cheapest by 
the end of the decade.101 Most authors agree that solar energy costs will come down to 
represent the cheapest forms of electricity generation – making photovoltaics the 
preferred method of electricity generation. Once photovoltaic reach cost parity with other 
forms of electricity generation, the total market potential over the decade could easily 
reach $1-$2 trillion. If Hong Kong financial institutions provide even 10% of that 
finance, such finance would increase the size of Hong Kong’s portfolio assets under 
management by 30% -- but still not even getting Hong Kong close to the league of 
Japan or Germany as an international financial centre.102     
 
Hong Kong financial institutions can also play a role in helping Mainland solar 
companies regionalise. A number of commentators have pointed to Chinese companies’ 
setting up production facilities in other Asian countries, as labour costs increase on the 
Mainland.103 Figure 16 shows the factors driving such regionalisation – by showing the 
various components of China’s photovoltaic cost advantage vis-à-vis US producers.104 
Equipment and materials discounts, economies of scale, low labour costs, subsidies and 
tax holidays represent the various components of China’s photovoltaic sector cost 
advantages. As the Mainland economy heats up, discounts, labour-cost advantages, 
subsidies and tax holidays will likely disappear. The Mainland’s solar companies will 
thus look for countries providing these advantages – like Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia 
and other low-cost jurisdictions. Interesting the Mainland’s cost of finance (both debt and 
equity) serve to reduce its cost advantages. To the extent Hong Kong’s financial 
institutions can provide cheaper debt and equity finance to Mainland solar 
companies, such finance would help promote the Mainland’s solar competitive 
advantage.  
 
                                                 
99 See Stefan Reichelstein and Michael Yorston, The Prospects for Cost Competitive Solar PV Power, 2012, 
available online.  
100 Zhen-yu Zhao, Shuang-Ying Zhang, Bryan Hubbard, Xue Yao, The emergence of the solar photovoltaic 
power industry in China, 12 RENEW. & SUSTAIN. ENER. REV. 1, 2013. 
101 See Id at Figure 6.  
102 Our estimate of $1-$2 trillion comes from doubling the net present value of financial transactions tied to 
financing solar electricity (as shown in Figure 14) and increasing penetration in the financing of electricity 
markets in the region (Figure 15). Our estimate of portfolio assets under management comes from Figure 
2.2a of Arner et al. (2014).  
103 Even as early as the 2000s, academics noticed increasing Chinese outsourcing to Southeast Asian 
countries. See Stephen Frost, Chinese outward direct investment in Southeast Asia: how big are the flows 
and what does it mean for the region? 17 PAC. REV. 3, 2004.  
104 See Alan Goodrich, Douglas Powell, Ted James, Michael Woodhouse, and Tonio Buonassisi, Assessing 
the drivers of regional trends in solar photovoltaic manufacturing, ENERGY ENVIRON. SCI 6.,2013, 









































Figure 16: Drivers of China's Competitive Advantage Suggest China 
Will Need to Follow Regionalisation Strategy
The f igure show s the relative proportions of China's 28 cent cost advantage in 2012 for producing a w att of electricity 
betw een a 2 gigaw att per year Chinese photovoltaic factory and a 500 megaw att US factory. The original f igures sums 
its up bes by noting that the cost advantage "cannot be explained by indigenous factors such as low  labour costs
Source: Goodrich et al. (2013) at Figure 2. 
 
 
Hong Kong’s value as an international financial centre consists of bringing low-cost 
capital to high photovoltaic-cost jurisdictions. Figure 17 provides a “heat map” for solar 
energy funding – showing where the cost of capital is cheapest and where the cost of 
solar electricity is highest.105 As we have previously note, an international financial 
centre represents a technology for bringing low cost capital to fund expensive new tastes 
and technologies. As shown in the figure, the US and UK represent jurisdictions with 
some of the lowest costs of capital in the photovoltaic space. Countries like China, India, 
and Hong Kong itself represent areas where the cost of producing solar energy remains 
relatively high. The role of international financing institutions (like banks and broker-
dealers) consists of helping to provide capital which brings down the cost of such 
electricity – through economies of scale, financing of research and development, funding 
licensing agreements and so forth. Given Hong Kong’s slightly higher cost of capital, 
the best strategy consists of intermediating in funding relationships between the 
US/UK and the Mainland as well as other large electricity users in the region.  
 
                                                 
105 See Janosch Ondraczek, Nadejda Komendantova and Anthony Patt, WACC the Dog: The Effect of 
Financing Costs on the Levelized Cost of Solar PV Power Contents, HAMBURG U. SGCRU WP FNU-201, 









Figure 17: Solar Energy Funding Needs Show How An International Financial Centre Can Bring 
Money from Low Cost Capital Centres to High Cost Electrictiy Providers
cost of       electricity 
capital            cost4%
UK                        4%              -7%
Japan                   4%              -8%
US                        6%              -1%
Hong Kong           7%               2%
China                    8%               6%
Germany               9%               9%
Russia                 11%             15%
India                    12%             16%





The figure shows the weighted average cost of capital to the solar industry in each country, the difference between each 
countries’ comparatible (“levelized”) cost of electricity and the extent of subsidies required to make the sector 
competitive. We have relabelled this estimated subsidy as a gap, in order to highlight the way that capital can (and 
should) flow from low cost-of-capital jurisdictions to areas with large solar energy gaps (requiring large subsidies).
Source:  Ondraczek et al. (2013).  
 
How can Hong Kong’s financial institutions intermediate (by putting themselves in the 
middle of) financing relationships between UK/US financiers and the Mainland’s solar 
companies. As we have shown previously, many Mainland solar producers list in the US 
- and a number of US funds and institutions buy Mainland shares (listed anywhere) for 
resale in solar-branded funds. How can Hong Kong financial firms step into funding 
chains? Hong Kong’s financial institutions need to provide financial services which 
American and British funders can not easily provide. Hong Kong’s stock exchange and 
bonding trading is shallower than the US and UK’s. Instead, Hong Kong institutions can 
help Mainland solar firms “squeeze” more return out of their assets. Securitization 
probably represents the most important way of squeezing more risk-adjusted 
returns out of Mainland solar company assets (and liabilities).106 .  
 
Securitising Mainland Solar Assets through Stocks, Bonds and More Exotic 
Securities  
 
Hong Kong attracts less interest from solar equity investors than expected 
 
Solar equity markets provide for a profile of risks and returns potentially useful for 
international investors. From a regulatory viewpoint, lawmakers in an international 
financial centre care about whether regulations help encourage equity prices to move in a 
way which helps allocate capital to companies efficiently.107 They also care about 
                                                 
106 Other services include advising solar companies (like private equity firms do), providing insurance and 
other services not easily available on the Mainland. We focus on securitisation to keep our paper focused 
on a critical area of finance – not only for solar firms themselves, but also for Hong Kong’s development as 
an international financial centre.  
107 For these criteria and the extent to which various countries’ stock markets fit into these criteria, see Ana 
Carvajal and Jennifer Elliott, Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulation: A Global 
Analysis, IMF WP 7259, 2007, available online.  
whether such prices contain information about companies’ risks as well as potential 
returns. Moreover, they want regulation which promotes the depth needed to ensure 
valuations do not excessively reflect investors’ income rather than companies’ 
fundamental value.108 A cursory glance at solar companies’ equities prices shows no 
obvious signs that listing in Hong Kong reduces a solar companies’ prospects for 
attracting investors (or investors’ prospects of profiting from their investments).109  
 
A prima facia view of Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar companies’ equity prices fail to 
uncover obvious problems in the way the Hong Kong stock exchange likely allocates 
capital to these companies.110 Figure 18 in particular provides an overview of the way 
solar companies’ equities prices in recent years have reflected the underlying 
fundamentals driving the supply and demand for solar company shares (across countries 
and across the industry). From around 2012, the value of the NYSE Bloomberg Global 
Solar Energy Index (reflecting photovoltaic companies’ share prices) has risen with the 
value of equity markets in general. Yet, even during a time of rapid equity price inflation, 
the global solar index has fallen. Such a fall reflected sectoral over-capacity and supply 
as well as supply-side factors.111 Since the second quarter of 2013, the index has risen 
significantly – potentially providing gains to investors who bought in there (but still not 
recovering losses for those buying at the beginning of 2011).  
 
                                                 
108 Few economists have recently conducted rigorous econometric analysis of the factors that drive Hong 
Kong equity returns. For two examples, which clearly show that factors other than companies’ fundamental 
value, drive equity returns, see Michael McKenzie & Olan Henry, The Determinants of Short Selling in the 
Hong Kong Equities Market, U. Melbourne Econ. Dept. RP 1001, 2007, available online. See also 
Alexandros Garefalakis, Augustinos Dimitras, Dimitris Koemtzopoulos and Konstantinos Spinthiropoulos, 
Determinant Factors of Hong Kong Stock Market, 62 INT’L RES. J. OF FIN. & ECON. 1, 2011, available 
online. 
109 Our study broadly supports other findings about the quality of Hong Kong’s financial markets. See 
Fabian Lipinsky and Li Lian Ong, Asia’s Stock Markets: Are There Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons? 
IMF WP 14/37, available online. 
110 Evidence suggests that investors use London for liquidity purposes and Hong Kong for information 
purposes. See Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, Ghon Rhee, Where does price discovery occur for stocks 
traded in multiple markets? Evidence from Hong Kong and London, 1 J. OF INT’L MON. & FINANCE 18, 
2006  
111 In other words, equity prices broadly reflected investors’ changing perceptions of discounted cash flows 
coming from solar equities. To trace changes in equities prices with changing supply and demand 
conditions, see IEA, A Snapshot of Global Photovoltaic Market 1992-2012, available online. 
 
 
Price changes in Mainland solar shares listed in Hong Kong exhibit no obvious 
differences from those listed in New York. Figure 19 provides a look at the potential risks, 
returns and liquidity of trading in several Mainland solar companies’ shares. As shown, 
risk (as represented by these shares’ beta) has no obvious correlation across exchanges. 
Price-to-sales (revenues) ratios also seem higher for Hong Kong listed shares – though 
the small and non-random nature of this sample almost surely accounts for such 
differences.112 Average volumes traded also seem more influenced by each companies’ 





                                                 
112 Such a finding is consistent with other findings. Interestingly, Li and Chen show that developments on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) affect those on Hong Kong’s exchange, but the converse is not 
true – suggesting that new information and innovations occur in New York, making it the “better” 
exchange. See Shuangfei Li and  Shou Chen, The Transmission of Pricing Information of Dually-Listed 
between Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchange, 2 J. SERV. SCI. & MANAGE. 1, 2009. 
113 A rigorous approach toward analysing these differences might consist of testing similarities in means 
between these two groups, using a range of parametric or non-parametric statistics. Given the small sample 
sizes and the range of variables which likely confound the relationship between listing venue and these 
equities’ risks/returns, we do not include these more complex statistical analyses.  
No obvious differences exist in the market capitalisations of Mainland solar shares listed 
in New York as opposed to Hong Kong. Figure 20 shows the distribution of the roughly 
$9 billion in market capitalisation in the photovoltaic sector across the range of Mainland 
solar companies. The Hong Kong-listed Hanergy and Xinyi have market capitalisations 
in excess of the other companies. However, companies like Canadian and Trina have 
market capitalisations likely to equal or surpass their Hong Kong-listed rivals in the 
future.114 Price-to-earnings ratios vary significantly across companies, appearing slightly 
higher for US-listed firms than Hong Kong-listed ones. However, no obvious differences 




















The f igure show s the market capitalisation of a range of Chinese solar company in the US and Hong Kong. The 
numbers in the black boxes above each bar show  the most recent price-to-earnings ratio (in late May 2014). 
Source: Bloomberg (2014).  
Black bars represent companies 
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Solar investment “touching” Hong Kong falls far short of what it should – given Hong 
Kong’s geographical and cultural proximity to the Mainland.116 Given Hong Kong’s 
close proximity with the Mainland, Hong Kong seems the likely choice of venue for a 
“foreign” listing aimed at tapping capital outside the Mainland. Yet, as we have seen, 
only a handful of solar companies list in Hong Kong. Far fewer list on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges.117 Those listed on these exchanges have had rather public 
difficulties.118  
                                                 
114 Hong Kong listed companies have attracted about $1 billion more in funding than US-listed shares (at 
about $5 billion).   
115 Price-to-earnings ratios reflect companies’ potential performance as well as general market sentiment. 
When these ratios remain too low over the longer term, such levels may signal inefficiencies in the stock 
exchange’s operation. For a discussion in the Mainland context, see Alan Huang and Tony Wirjanto, Is 
China’s P/E Ratio too Low? Examining the Role of Earnings Volatility, 2010, available online. 
116 A number of authors have commented on the trend for international portfolio investors to invest in 
markets with similar language, culture and history. See Raj Aggarwal, Colm Kearney, and Brian Lucey, 
Gravity and culture in foreign portfolio investment, 36 J. OF BANK. & FIN. 2, 2012. See also Selen Guerin, 
The Role of Geography in Financial and Economic Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Trade and Portfolio Investment Flows, 29 WORLD ECON. 2, 2006.  
117 Finding English-language information about sharing trading on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges 
proves a far more difficult task – given the far fewer English-language intermediaries writing about these 
solar companies.   
118 Trading for Chaori Solar – listed on the Shenzhen exchange – has recently been suspended. Himin Solar 
delayed listing plans on the Shanghai Exchange amid bribery allegations. Hareon Solar and EGing 
 
Similarly, Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar companies seem to have few institutional 
investors at home (in Hong Kong). Figure 21 shows the geographic dispersion of 
investors in Hanergy – a Mainland solar company listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Hanergy’s largest investors (in terms of number of shares held) reside in New 
York, Chicago and San Francisco.119 Yet, large funds and institutional investors span the 
globe from Topeka Kansas (Security Investors, LLC) to Nuremburg Germany (CATUS 
AG Vermögensverwaltung). Investment seems to follows the already established clusters 
of competence in collective investment creation and marketing in Chicago, Boston, 
Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Paris and Tokyo; more than any affiliation based on geography 
or competencies in the solar sector specifically. However, new bases in Fresno, San 
Francisco and Austin (centres of the US’s high tech boom which generated significant 
investable funds) represent new investment centres. Investment centres locate around 
places that have seen a technological wave (boom) in the past.  
 
San Francisco
Figure 21: Even Hong Kong Listed Firms Have Mostly Few 
Investor Anchors at Home
Hanergy Solar
The figure shows the share of funds and institutional investors in Shanghai-
based Jinko Solar. The numbers next to city names indicate the number of 
funds. Only one investors runs money out of the city if no number appears 
























Hong Kong’s investors also hold relatively small shares of Mainland solar company 
investments compared with foreign investors. Figure 22 shows the concentration of 
holdings in these large Chinese solar manufacturers in funds’ and institutions’ portfolios. 
As shown, Hong Kong ranks third – with a higher overall percent of asset holding than 
New York and London. However, Singapore and Chicago-based investors have taken 
higher stakes in the major Chinese solar panel producers than Hong Kong-based 
institutions and funds.120 By number of offerings, Chicago remains the undisputed 
                                                                                                                                                 
Photovoltaic (on the Shanghai exchange) as well as Jiawei Photovoltaic (on the Shenzhen exchange) 
represent companies that have done okay so far.  
119 A specific break-down of these holdings include: Guggenheim Solar (7%), Guggenheim Funds 
Investment Advisors (4%), Guggenheim China Technology ETF (3%), Market Vectors Solar Energy ETF 
(7%), Van Eck Associates Corporation (4%), iShares Global Clean Energy (4%).  
120 We do not trace the final (ultimate) ownership interest in these companies. It could be that Hong Kong 
investors use Chicago-based or Singapore-based funds or institutions to make these investments. 
Conversely, institutions and/or funds domiciled in Hong Kong may represent ultimate economic interests in 
champion – with 59 different incorporated funds and institutions offering shares in the 
Mainland’s solar companies. Both Shanghai and Shenzhen represent markets with few 





























Figure 22: Singapore and Chicago-Based Investors Have More Concentrated Holdings 
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The f igure show s the sum-of-squares of the percent of total assets held by various funds and instititutional 
investors in Hanergy, Xinyi, Canadian, Trina, Jinko, JA Solar, Yingli, Handw ha, Comtech Solar, and Trony (several of
China's largest photovoltaic companies). The sum-of-squares procedure increases the w eight of funds w hich 
have more concentrated holdings. The numbers above each bar show  the number of funds or institutions from 
that city invested in these Chinese solar companies. We show  the top 20 cities w ith more than at least 3 funds 
(w ith the exception of Shanghai, w hich w e show  to compare w ith Hong Kong). Shenzhen-based investors had 
neglible holdings of these shares. 
Source: Capital IQ and authors (2014). 
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These data point to three things about Hong Kong’s financial law. First, Hong Kong 
markets, while efficient from a technical point of view, generally do not market to 
foreigners as well as possible. If Hong Kong had superiour methods of marketing 
Mainland solar companies’ shares to US and other investors, they would not need to go 
through Chicago, San Francisco and New York-based intermediaries.121 Something about 
Hong Kong law must discourage Hong Kong financial intermediaries from developing 
such marketing competencies...or using them. Second, Hong Kong-based investors do not 
have sufficient incentives to take larger stakes. Mainland solar companies provide 
interesting enough risks and returns for Hong Kong-based funds to buy and hold. Yet, we 
observe relatively low holdings -- and the evidence suggests that some of these shares 
pass-through Hong Kong on their way abroad. Something about Hong Kong’s financial 
                                                                                                                                                 
New York or London. Without more detailed data, we can not guess as to which financial centres’ ultimate 
investors hold shares in these companies.  
121 US investors would still prefer to buy securities from a US-based broker-dealer. However, if Hong Kong 
financial institutions had superiour marketing abilities, they could package solar companies and sell them to 
US retail brokers. In this case, we would observe Hong Kong-based intermediaries ranked among the most 
concentrated brokers-dealers, instead of US firms.  
law (amid a range of other factors) must be causing Hong Kong investors to prefer other 
kinds of investments. Third, as we discuss later, something about Hong Kong’s financial 
law clearly discourages Hong Kong intermediaries from packaging both existing 
securities -- and creating new ones -- for sale at home and abroad. We show later than 
funds like Market Vectors and Guggenheim have positioned themselves prominently in 
Mainland solar equity investment relationships with exchange-traded funds, open-ended 
and close-ended funds. Hong Kong must (and does!) discourage such fund development 
in the city.  
 
Gains from packaging solar shares into Hong Kong mutual funds 
 
No Hong Kong financial institution has stepped forward as a specialist investor in the 
Mainland solar cell sector. As we show shortly, Guggenheim Solar and the Market 
Vectors Solar Energy represent the two largest funds on record investing in Mainland 
solar companies.122 Figure 23 shows the major Hong Kong based custodians for shares of 
Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar companies. For example, Standard Chartered served as 
custodian for about 17% of Hanergy’s shares at the end of May 2014. Of the publicly 
traded shares, 355 different institutions served as custodians – ranging from Standard 
Chartered largest share to Futu Securities’ smallest. Kingston Securities represented the 
“go to” broker for Solartech shares – holding shares in street name for 51% of its shares 
at the end of May 2014. Yet, roughly 428 different organisations held Solartech’s shares. 
No one intermediary holds a large stake in Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar companies.  
 





Major custodians  
(percentages reflect proportion of shareholding)  total* 
Hanergy  
Standard Chartered (17%), CITIC Securities (15%), Haitong (11%), HSBC 
(10%) 355 
Solartech Kingston Securities (51%), Bank of China (8%) 428 
Singyes Solar 
HSBC (22%), Standard Chartered (12%), BOCI Securities (11%), Deutsche 
Bank (6%) 205 
Trony BNP Paribas (37%), ICBC (12%), HSBC (8%) 415 
Comtec JP Morgan (19%), HSBC (11%), Guotai Junan (9%) 323 
Xinyi HSBC (9%), Standard Chartered (4%) 401 
Jun Yang 
HSBC (16%), Bank of China (15%), Standard Chartered (10%), Fordjoy 
(8%) 506 
* total custodians refer to the total number of institutions listed.  




                                                 
122 We say “on record” as information about shareholders can be notoriously difficult to obtain. US funds 
disclose far more information about holdings than Hong Kong and other countries’ funds. As such, the 
dominance of these funds may simply reflect reporting (visibility) rather than actual importance. As we 
discuss throughout this paper though, public transparency and disclosure represents an important way to 
attract funding to sunrise industries like solar.  
The initial data suggest that US-based funds are inserting themselves as key 
intermediaries in bringing these shares to retail investors. Figure 24 shows the network of 
broker-dealer holdings of Mainland solar company shares. Hong Kong broker-dealers 
like HSBC and Standard Chartered hold a relatively larger value of Hong Kong-listed 
Mainland solar companies’ shares than US broker-dealers with specific solar offerings 
like Blackrock (iShares), Van Eck (Market Vectors), and Guggenheim. Yet, these broker-
dealers have positioned themselves in investment networks more centrally (with 
centrality defined as holdings in the widest number of Mainland solar companies).123 
They hold relatively large concentrations of these companies’ shares and hold larger 
ranges of solar companies’ shares than Hong Kong-based intermediaries. Clearly 
Guggenheim Solar and Market Vectors Solar ETF represent go-to funds for investors 

























































Figure 24: Foreign Funds Centralise Solar Investment Competencies
in a way Hong Kong based funds do not
Source: based on Capital IQ and Webb-Site (2014) for shareholding. 
 
Something about Hong Kong financial law clearly impedes the packaging and 
distribution of solar investments. Lack of regulations allowing for the establishment of 
open-ended investment vehicles clearly represents one part of the problem. However, 
simply following the “structuralist” approach to financial sector development would not 
                                                 
123 We do not provide social network statistics (like centrality, modularity and so forth) in order to keep our 
discussion simple. Even a non-quantitative look at the investment networks around Mainland solar 
companies listed in Hong Kong clearly shows the centrality of foreign collective investments, followed by 
relatively central roles played by HSBC and Standard Chartered as larger holding broker-dealers. 
Quantitative analysis also confirms our qualitative network diagram more generally, Hong Kong has not 
become a more central exchange. See Nicola Cetorelli and Stavros Peristiani, Prestigious Stock Exchanges: 
A Network Analysis of International Financial Centers, 37 J. OF BANK. & FIN. 5, 2013, available online. 
solve the problem.124 Namely, introducing laws which make creating mutual funds -- or 
undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) in the EU 
context – would not solve the problem. Local securities firms have incorporated these 
mutual funds abroad and sold them in Hong Kong for a long time. The problem lies in 
marketing – as no Hong Kong institution has the incentive or demonstrated the 
competencies needed to identify foreign investors potentially interested in solar 
investments – and provide them with such investments at a profit.125 A marketing-based 
contingency view of financial centre development is required.  
 
Intermediation of Hong Kong-based financial institutions custodial and ultimate 
ownership holdings of Mainland solar company investments could provide investors with 
cost-effective exposure to these companies. As we showed above, investors used over 
700 different Hong Kong-based broker-dealers to purchase shares in the major Mainland 
solar companies. Each of these broker-dealers had to find out about the companies, make 
suitability determinations and potentially even find customers (if they took the shares on 
their own accounts). Each of these 700 had to conduct research on these solar companies 
and/or provide for third-party research for their clients -- a significant duplication of time 
and effort. A mutual fund (or other solar intermediary) making these investments could 
provide better monitoring, buy shares in larger quantities, and provide for the advantages 
widely noted in the literature.126      
 
A Hong Kong-based mutual fund could provide diversification even while keeping 
current broker-dealers holdings. What if a Hong Kong broker-dealer pooled all existing 
investments in Mainland solar companies into a solar mutual fund? Figure 25 shows the 
proportional holdings of such a solar mutual fund (which we call the Bauhinia Solar Fund 
only to make the idea more concrete). The fund shown in the figure assumes that Hong 
Kong-based broker-dealers in such a scheme hold the same value in the fund as their 
percentage overall holdings for individual Mainland solar companies. The figure also 
assumes their customers want more diversified holdings of Mainland solar companies’ 
equities -- thus accept swapping their current shareholdings for equivalent shares of the 
Bauhinia Solar Fund. Broker-dealers, like Chief Securities, could offer their customers 
greater diversification without having to buy individual shares in each Hong Kong listed 
solar company directly.  




                                                 
124 At the time of this writing, the Government and outside parties have submitted a range of proposals for 
creating the legal framework allowing for the establishment such open-ended investment vehicles in Hong 
Kong.    
125 We have used the canonical definition of marketing to reinforce the idea that Hong Kong’s weaknesses 
stem from marketing rather than legal “gaps.”  
126 No data exist on the effectiveness of concentrated shareholding specifically in the solar industry. 
However, a range of findings show that institutional investors and mutual funds add value. For a discussion 
of the issues, see Massimo Massa, Why so many mutual funds? Mutual funds, market segmentation and 
financial performance, INSEAD WP, 1998, available online. 
 
 
Figure 25: A Bauhinia Solar Fund Could Help Allocate Fragmented Investments in 
Hong Kong’s Solar Companies More Efficiently 
 
Share* Companies 
6%+ Chief Securities, Shanghai Commercial Bank, Bank of East Asia, Wing Lung Securities, 
Masterlink Securities, Fordjoy Securities and Futures,  Chiyu Banking Corporation 
5%-6% RHB OSK Securities, Guoyuan Securities Brokerage  
4%-5% Enlighten Securities  
3%-4% Industrial Securities  
2%-3% SG Securities  
1%-2% Boom.Com, Quam Securities, China Everbright Securities, Merrill Lynch Far East, Ubs 
Securities, Ping An Of China Securities, Wing Hang Bank, Hsbc, Standard Chartered, Kgi 
Securities, First Shanghai Securities, Deutsche Bank, Huatai Financial Holdings. 
0.5%- 
1% 
Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse Securities, Citic Securities Brokerage, Tiger Securities Asset 
Management, Hang Seng Securities, HSBC Broking Securities, Grand Investment (Securities), 
China Merchants Securities, BOCI Securities, Bank of Communications Trustee, Haitong 
International Securities, Citibank, CCB International Securities.  
0.2%-
0.5% 
Hantec Securities, Bank Of China, Cinda International Securities, DBS Bank, Fu Yip 
Securities and Investment, Shun Heng Securities, South China Securities, FB Securities, ABCI  
Securities, CSC Securities, Emperor Securities, China Galaxy International Securities, Hang 
Seng Bank, Fulbright Securities Ltd, Guosen Securities Brokerage, Skyway Securities 
Investment, Celestial Securities, Tung Tak Securities.  
0.1% and 
less 
all other 288 brokers and intermediaries 
The figure shows the proportional holdings of various Hong Kong broker-dealers in a hypothetical mutual 
fund which would merge all existing investments in Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar companies. We first 
add the value of all Hong Kong broker-dealer holdings in Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar companies. We 
report each broker-dealers’ proportional holdings of that aggregate value, given the value and distribution 
of each broker-dealers’ current holdings.   
 
If existing shareholding patterns serve as a guide to investors’ preferences, the market 
could support at least 4 solar mutual funds – though two funds could probably serve to 
match existing preferences for holding Mainland solar assets. Each Hong Kong broker 
dealers’ clients might desire a different mix of Mainland solar companies. Figure 26 
shows the proportions of Hong Kong broker-dealers’ holdings of various Mainland solar 
companies. Firms with clients like China Merchant’s have most of their holdings in 
Hanergy. In contrast, Bank of Singapore’s clients have invested (on a proportional basis) 
more heavily in Singyes Solar. BNP Paribas’ clients have invested in Trony, while 
Macquarie’s client’s in Xinyi. Many of these broker- dealers’ clients will want 
concentrated holdings in just one company.127 However, to the extent they want 
diversification, Hong Kong’s broker-dealers can provide such diversification more 
cheaply through local intermediation.128  
                                                 
127 We assume in the figure that each individual client holds a “representative” (proportionate) share of the 
allocation/distribution of solar companies held by the custodian broker-dealer in the aggregate. For 
example, if Xinyi Solar represents 25% of the Wing Hang’s total holdings of Mainland solar stocks and 
Comtec another 25%, then we assume each client would want a 25% share of their individual portfolio in 
Xinyi and another 25% in Comtec. Naturally, many individual clients will want allocations which differ 
from the aggregate proportions held by the broker-dealer itself.  
128 We stress local because we have talked about geography. Using a US-based mutual fund makes less 



























Figure 26: At Least Two Portfolios to Match Hong Kong 
Intermediaries' Solar Investment Profiles
The f igure show s the share of investment of each broker-dealers holdings in individual Mainland solar companies as 
a share of their holdings of all solar companies. For example, Macquuarie's clients held more than 75% of the value of
their Mainland solar shares in Xinyi and the rest in Hanergy. 
Source: based on data compiled from Webb-Site (2014). 
 
 
If each custodian’s aggregate holdings represents individual investors’ portfolio 
preferences, four solar mutual funds can adequately match existing preferences for 
holding Mainland solar equities. The first fund would match Standard Chartered and 
China Merchants holdings -- with its focus on Hanergy. The second fund would replicate 
Bank of Singapore’s and ABN AMRO’s holdings -- with their focus on holding higher 
proportions of Singyes. Most of the large broker-dealers’ holdings most closely match the 
proportion of investment holdings intimated by these two funds. As such, these two funds 
would probably represent most of collective investments in Hong Kong-listed Mainland 
solar companies. A third fund could match JP Morgan’s relatively even (by comparison) 
distribution of Mainland solar companies’ holdings. The forth fund could spread holdings 
relatively evenly -- like we observe Wing Hang’s and China Merchant’s holdings of 
Comtec, Singyes, Trony, Jun Yang and Solartech. Investors could buy individual shares - 
replicating holdings Macquerie’s concentrated holdings in Xinyi and BNP Paribas’ 
holdings of Trony outside of a mutual fund structure.129 Clearly, investors could mix-
and-match these funds to replicate the allocations present in existing broker-deale
portfolios. For example, if Deutsche Bank bought shares of the mutual fund which 
focused on the “first fund” and “second fund,” such holdings would replicate its existing 
custodial holdings. Hong Kong financial law should provide better incentives to 
provide such packages. 
rs’ 
                                                
 
Solar companies have enough debt to develop active bond and ABS markets 
 
Hong Kong could serve as a solar company corporate bond hub if investors had more and 
better information about the fixed income opportunities present. Solar fixed-income 
provides sufficient yields to make investors potentially keen on the sector. Figure 27 
shows the yields of various solar companies.130 With yields above 5%, Mainland solar 
 
129 Mutual funds which invest in only one or two securities would provide few benefits and impose 
additional and unnecessary costs on investors. As such, not every holding distribution profile shown in the 
figure represents a viable mix for a separate mutual fund.  
130 The graph does not represent a yield curve for any company or the sector in general. Lack of 
information forced us to plot several different companies and maturities without controlling for factors like 
companies’ corporate debt could provide an attractive option for both institutional and 
retail investors. Some of this yield reflects a risk premium – both around the solar 
industry in general and investing in Chinese-based manufacturers. Yet, yields drive 
demand for investments. Clearly a financial centre like Hong Kong able to offer large 

















Figure 27: Premia Built into Solar Bonds Could Reflect Anything 
The figure show s the range of bid yields for a range of solar bonds (mostly Yingli). We managed to f ind valid quotes 
for 14 bonds, despite clicking on over 75 issues reported by Thompson Reuters. 
Source: Thompson Reuters. 
 
 
The underlying assets and liabilities of Mainland solar companies (excluding those listed 
in the US) come to over $70 billion. Figure 28 shows total assets and total liabilities for 
the roughly 60 Mainland photovoltaic producers we could find financial data for.131 Total 
assets (as shown on the y-axis) came to $43 billion at the end of 2012. Total liabilities 
came to $28 billion. These assets and liabilities reflect the span of potential securities 
which Hong Kong intermediaries could offer. As we will describe in more detail shortly, 
both solar assets and liabilities can be securitised and sold to third-parties. Solar 
companies’ debt in particular represents a fertile ground for securitisation. Undoubtedly, 
the banks and other intermediaries holding the loans of Mainland solar companies would 
happily part with some of these loans’ risk in exchange for a receiving a slightly lower 
interest rate.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
liquidity or default risk. In many cases, we found incomplete information, large differences between ask 
and bid prices and even negative yields.    
131 We limited our search to Standard Industrial Classification code 3674 in order to avoid including 
companies which did not provide solar energy equipment. As such, our data does not represent the entire 
industry. We include US listed companies in the figure -- but generally exclude these US-listed companies 
in our later analysis. We exclude these companies as US financial firms are clearly (as we show throughout 
the paper) better at securitising and selling assets of all kinds. Thus, these companies would not want to 


















Figure 28: Chinese Solar Companies Have Enough Assets and 
Liabilities to Create Fixed Income Products Galore
potential size of debt instruments
The figure show s the value of total assets and total liabilities (in millions of US dollars) for Chinese solar companies (SIC 
code 3574). Black dots represent Chinese listed companies or private companies. Green dots show  total assets and
liabilities for Chinese solar panel companjes listed in the USA. 
Source: WRDS (2014). 
 
 
Hong Kong’s inability to provide information about even bonds (much less other more 
exotic types of debt instruments) makes the city an unlikely venue for debt securitisation 
and trading. Finding information on Mainland solar debt instruments proves an almost 
impossible task. The HKMA and SFC provide aggregate information about bond 
purchases and sales. However, sources of information about specific bonds remains 
lacking. Interestingly, lack of information on bond availability correlates with geography. 
Figure 29 shows the differences in the way each jurisdiction’s major exchange lists bonds. 
The UK clearly serves as best practice – with an ease in finding and using bond 
information clearly applicable for all kinds of investors.    
 
Figure 29: Differences in Public Accessibility of Information about Exchange-
Traded Debt Instruments 
 
The London Stock Exchange 
provides a one-stop shop for bond 
investors. Investors can download 
data, prospectuses and other 
analytical information. Special site 
apps allow for customisable analysis. 
The NYSE provides a platform for 
finding information about bonds. The 
java app did not work when we tried 
it. However, bond information 
appears all over the internet – 
suggesting vigorous contracts with 
info-mediaries who redistribute bond 
information through sites like 
Morningstar and Yahoo.  
The HKMA Moneymarkets Unit 
provides information on bonds, but 
without a search and without 
integration with intermediary price 
providers. As such, the investor must 
go to the site to find non-
downloadable information.  
 
Why does the Hong Kong exchange – and its regulators like the HKMA and SFC – fail to 
provide the same level of service as the other exchanges? The “structuralist view” (which 
we described earlier in the paper) of Hong Kong as an international financial centre 
wrongly views Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the HKMA and SFC staff as too stupid (for 
lack of a better word) to adopt more advanced web-based software. Such a silly view 
assumes either regulators do not know about the difficulties the lack of such software 
poses, do not know how to hire the workers needed to put such a system in place or do 
not know how to pass regulation needed to collect and disseminate such information.  
 
A “contingency-based view” of financial regulation in Hong Kong clearly provides a 
better explanation for Hong Kong’s lagging bond information reporting practices. First, 
the government remains split on whether to focus its marketing efforts on the Mainland 
or in the US/EU. Only recently have “road shows” started – and any internet presence 
directed specifically at non-Hong Kong residents is clearly lacking. Such an attitude 
reflects Hong Kong’s geography – with close ties to the Mainland. Second, jurisdictional 
issues between the SFC and HKMA may weaken incentives for one of these 
organisations to take the lead in requiring the collection and dissemination of bond prices. 
If bond trading succeeds in Hong Kong, it is unclear who would get the credit. As such, 
neither the HKMA nor SFC have a strong incentive to require the Hong Kong Exchange 
to develop public information in bond trading. Regulations which encourage the 
regulators to adopt a marketing perspective (as we describe in this paper) would 
improve trading in Mainland solar liabilities and other kinds of securities in Hong 
Kong. 
 
Securitising other solar company assets 
 
Solar panels themselves represent a $100 million dollar financing opportunity for Hong 
Kong financial institutions ready to work in this market. Figure 30 shows the potential 
electricity generated in various Mainland administrative regions – according to the 
sunlight that region receives. As shown, much of the electricity (and thus demand for 
solar panels) falls in the West.132 New solar panel production in 2015-2016 should equal 
roughly 20 gigawatts (according to the national plan and estimates from sources we have 
                                                 
132 In practice, the actual demand for these panels may lie in the Eastern provinces (which want the 
electricity generated and profits from that generation). We simplify away the issue of cross-country power 
transmission for now -- as very long-distance electricity transport remains relatively under-developed.  
already cited). We conservatively estimate average cost to the customer of about $5 per 
watt.133 If an average solar panel produces 200 watts, then 20 billion watts (or 20 
gigawatts) requires the equivalent of 100 million solar panels. One-hundred million 
panels represent 100 million assets which residential or commercial customers can either 
buy outright or lease. Of course, these simplistic and potentially misleading estimates 
conceal almost as much as they reveal. Nonetheless, for our purposes, such an estimate 
suffices for understanding the order-of-magnitude of the potential financing opportunities 
posed to Hong Kong-based financial intermediaries.   
  
Figure 30: Solar Panel Sales and Leases Could  
Represent a $100 Million Opportunity 
 
 
Hong Kong (and other) finance companies can provide value to solar electricity 
consumers because of the geographical and inter-temporal (across time) mismatch 
between solar production and incomes. Figure 31 shows the distribution of GDP per 
capita across the Mainland’s various administrative units. As shown. most solar 
production should occur in the West (given sunlight intensities). However, most of the 
country’s income lies in the Eastern provinces. Moreover, like any investment, a 
residential investment of about $20,000 pays itself back only over a number of years (15 
or more depending on the amount of sunlight the area receives). Finance providers help 
investors in Chinese Western regions raise money they do not possess. They also help 





                                                 
133 The figure shows the amount of sunlight various Chinese regions receive. To arrive at our $1 billion 
market size, we started with estimated new solar panel production in 2015-2016 (of about 20 gigawatts). 
We then arrived at an average cost to the customer of about $5 per watt, based on global trends and 
assuming a constant geometric decline in solar panel prices based on historical experience. See K. Branker, 
M. Pathak and J. Pearce,  A review of solar photovoltaic levelized cost of electricity, RENEW. & SUSTAIN. 
ENER. REV.15, 2011. . 
 
Figure 31: The Mismatch Between Solar Supply and Finance Across Space and 
Time Make the Sector Ripe for Financial Intermediation 
  
 
Packaging solar panel assets into bundles (based and risk and resold to other investors) 
can help improve returns and match risks. More risk-tolerant investors will want higher 
returns (and thus willingly assume higher levels of risk) from photovoltaic asset 
investments than highly risk averse ones.134 How might Hong Kong-based financial 
institutions slice the Mainland’s roughly $100 million in solar panel assets into tranches? 
Figure 32 shows the possible tranches associated with a broader offer of Mainland solar 
panel assets (both residential and commercial).135 Just like in the US, Mainland solar 
panel producers can sell (or lease) the panels to retail-facing companies on the 
Mainland.136 Just like in the US, finance companies (or the producers themselves) can 
sell securities having these panels (and their associated income streams) as collateral.  
Breaking these panels assets (and their income streams) into securitised tranches 






                                                 
134 Fink describes how US law and practice in solar securitisation helps match securitized tranches with the 
risk-return profiles of photovoltaic investors. See Andrew Fink, Securitize Me: Stimulating Renewable 
Energy Financing by Embracing the Capital Markets, 12 U. OF NH LR 1, 2014, available online.  
135 We have treated residential and commercial solar panels similarly to make our analysis easy to 
understand. Naturally, photovoltaic technologies have large differences in materials, operation, size, lay-out 
and other features within and between residential and commercial sectors. Providing readers with more 
detailed (and thus accurate) estimates increases our argument’s complexity enormously, without adding 
extra insight.  
136 We ignore the possibility of Mainland companies creating subsidiaries or affilitates with would sell and 
lease solar panels in other markets like India, Thailand and other promising markets we have previously 
identified.  









Series 1 uses solar panels with safest collateral, 
high income and low government debt 
regions  
$40m 1% 7% 
Series 2  $20m 3% 9% 
Series 3  $15m 5% 12% 
Series 4  $13 7% 14% 
Series 5  $7 12% 17% 
Series 6 collateralises panels without collateral and 
with high debt governments/households  
$5 20% 35% 
The figure shows a hypothetical asset-backed securities offer in Hong Kong for a series of Mainland solar 
panel asset-backed securities. We have allocated panel values to each of six possible series. Series differ 
depending on the risk of solar panel purchasers defaulting on solar panel loans (or outright purchase) or 
lease agreements. The yield reflects the extra financing costs solar panel users need to pay (and thus 
interest going to the holders of these asset-backed securities).   
 
Hong Kong financial institutions can create value by securitising other kinds of assets as 
well. On the asset side of Mainland photovoltaic company balance sheets sit receivables, 
plant, property and equipment, investments in partner companies and so forth. Pawning 
off these assets (or revenue flows attached to these assets) in packaged securities can help 
improve photovoltaic companies’ balance sheets.137 Selling liabilities can also help 
improve cash flow while potentially saving on financing costs (we previously showed 
that the cost of capital for Mainland solar electricity providers is relatively high). In 
general, the prospects for securitising various forms of Mainland solar assets look 
promising. The overall securitisation market looks poised to reach 3 trillion RMB in the 
next 4 years.138 Mainland Chinese law makes securitisation difficult – providing strong 
incentives to cut up and sell such assets in Hong Kong instead.139 While surrogate 
methods of securitisation exist on the Mainland (like the creation and sale of 
covered bonds), Hong Kong provides a much better venue for slicing, dicing and 
selling these types of solar-backed securities.140 
 
Mainland photovoltaic producers’ securitizable assets and liabilities (like accounts 
receivables and payable) come in at 650 billion RMB. Figure 33a shows the value of 
                                                 
137 In theory, Mainland photovoltaic companies might improve their balance sheets by keeping the 
underlying assets and selling off residual cash flows from those assets. Short-term cash flow would 
improve (at the expense of future cash flow) – increasing book and market values of these companies in the 
near-term.  
138 See Daniel Ren, Market for asset-backed securities could reach 3tr yuan by 2018, SCMP 2 JUNE, 2014, 
available online. 
139 Asset securitisation remains extremely new on the Mainland. Much rulemaking about securitisation 
focused on inter-bank credit asset securitisation. See E&Y, Securitization in China, 2014, available online. 
140 We do not focus on the legal technicalities of Chinese financial law (and particularly the comparative 
advantages of securitisation as opposed to the issue of covered bonds) in order to focus on our paper’s main 
topic. For a discussion of covered bonds as a superiour method of offer asset-backed securities in China, 
see Steven Schwarcz, Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered Bonds, 39 J. CORP. L. 129, 2014.  
some of these assets and liabilities. Of these, some of the most risky solar companies (as 
measured by ratios of total liabilities to total assets) represent more than half of the total 
value of such securitizable assets and liabilities.141 Securitising assets and liabilities from 
the safer and less leveraged photovoltaic companies can provide guaranteed cash flow 
and hive off collection risk to risk neutral.142 Selling assets and liabilities from the more 
highly leveraged photovoltaic companies can provide higher yields to investors – and 
even reduce the risk of bankruptcy of some of the more highly leveraged companies. 
Figure 33b shows the value of one of the most tangible types of asset which Hong Kong 
financial institutions can securitise – namely plant, property and equipment. The value of 
these “hard assets” alone comes to $7 billion. The figure also shows rates of return on 
assets (as measured by retained earnings) for companies binned into each risk category. 
Companies with the lowest liabilities-to-asset ratios also had the highest returns – of 
roughly 13% at the end of 2012. Yet, the medium-leveraged photovoltaic companies had 
the highest returns – of about 17%. Investors who could sequester particular assets from 
this group would have returns (and thus risks) different from simply investing in 
photovoltaic companies individually or as a group.   
 
                                                 
141 We measure riskiness of investing in the these solar companies underlying assets and liabilities by total 
liabilities-to-assets ratios as a simple measure. Building more advanced risk models would exponentially 
increase the complexity of our paper -- without adding any insights. The reader should keep in mind though 
that the risk measure we use represents a simple “heuristic” to help us spin our argument.  
142 Chinese law still poses obstacles to the collection of such receivables. As such, we talk about a future 
situation where the various issues around contracting for third-party ownership of receivables liabilities has 
been settled. See Jon Woo-Jung, The Assignment of Receivables under the Chinese Contract Law and Some 
Suggestions, 3 PEKING U. J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 2012.  
Figure 33a: Range of Mainland Solar Companies’ Assets and Liabilities Provide the 








tranche Why interesting for investors 
Current Assets Total 
(millions) 6,210 8,470 15,475 24,590 
Current assets provide potential basis for 
collateralisation against short-term debts 
and offer revenue streams 
Long-term assets ex. 
PPE 320 1,740 1,675 4,595 
Long term assets provide long term 
collateral as well as revenue streams 
with different profile of risks and returns 
Accounts Payable 315 1,250 3,325 10,520 
Payables can be factored. Also 
securitisation of these payables allows 
for potentially lower financing costs 
Capital Expenditure 580 760 2,310 5,560 
Capital expenditures provide for collateral 
as well as basis for lending at below-
prime interest rates 
Cash 4,545 4,670 6,530 7,360 
Attractive for cash management services 
and other financial advisors 
Cost of Goods Sold 910 4,410 7,905 23,590 
Securitisation (known as "shadow 
banking") can provide resources for 
expanding scale of production 
Financing Activities - 
Net Cash Flow 520 775 2,200 5,650 
Some companies provide financing and 
others accept -- both providing 
opportunities for financial intermediaries 
Notes Payable - Short 
Term borrowing 37 280 2,430 11,390 
Provides for higher interest rate and 
higher risk lending opportunities 
Total Gross PPE  1,424 8,220 14,955 30,010 
Provides lower risk collateral for 
securitisation 
Receivables total 864 2,250 4,280 9,940 
Provides another basis for factoring - with 
various forms of receivables possessing 
differing degrees of risk 
The figure shows the total value of non-US listed Mainland solar companies' selected asset and liability in 
millions of RMB (SIC code 3674) at the end of  2012. We divided companies into potential tranches based 
on risk of default as proxied by total liabilities-to-assets ratios. We used total liabilities to asset ratios of 
10%, 25%, 50% and 75% as the thresholds for defining which companies' assets belonged to which tranche. 
Returns to assets show the weighted average of each companies' retained earnings in 2012 expressed as a 















































Figure 33b: Value of Plant, Property and Equipment Assets in Non-US Listed Mainland 
Solar Sector Tops US$7 Billion 
Return on assets in 2012
The f igure show s the total value of non-US listed Mainland solar companies' plant, property and equipment (SIC code 
3674) at the end of  2012. We divided companies into potential tranches based on risk of default as proxied by total 
liabilities-to-assets ratios. We used total liabilities to asset ratios of 10%, 25%, 50% and 75% as the thresholds for 
defining w hich companies' assets belonged to w hich tranche. Returns to assets show  the w eighted average of each 
companies' retained earnings in 2012 expressed as a percent of total assets (w ith each companies' proportion of total 
assets in each tranche as the w eighting factor). 
Source: WRDS (2014), w ith calculations by authors.  
 
 
The use of securitised receivables provides an excellent illustration of how Mainland 
solar assets can contribute to a balanced portfolio. Figure 34 shows “risks” of investing in 
Mainland solar companies (with risks defined as the variance in the streams of such 
receivables). We compare these risks with the correlation between these receivables and 
the Hong Kong market index. Companies in the integrated circuit-photovoltaic space 
provide total receivables which positively and negatively vary with the Hang Seng Index 
(as well as those whose receivables had little or no correlation with the Index). Moreover, 
Mainland photovoltaic companies’ receivables have risk profiles which may make them 
useful investments for foreign investors. These companies’ total receivables had a 
correlation coefficient of 0.43 with the FT North American Index and -0.50 with the FT 
Japan Index in the last 10 years. Such data mean that for North Americans, securities 
which provide exposure to Mainland photovoltaic companies’ receivables would offer a 
partial hedge against market risk. In Japan, these receivables would have provided an 
extremely effective hedge. Hong Kong-based financial institutions able to package 
these securities and sell them to these American and Japanese investors would have 
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Figure 34: Investments in Solar Receivables Have Profile of Variance of Interest
to all Types of Investors
low risk accenturators
high risk hedgers
higher risk diversifiers 
lower risk internationalisers
The figure show s the risk profile of various non-US listed Mainland solar companies' receivables. We show  the standard 
deivations of these receivables, as a typical measure of the riskiness of these cash flow s over time (betw een 2003 and 
2013). We also show  how  the value of these receivables varies w ith the Hong Kong stock market (as measured by a 
simple Pearson correlation w ith the MSCI Hong Kong index over the same period). We also put companies' receivables 
into four groups, depending on the attractiveness of the variance in the value of these receivables to potential investors. 
We describe each of these groups in the text. 












Hong Kong as a Mainland Solar Company Securitisation Centre 
 
Why securitise solar assets? 
 
The decrease in global asset securitisation – combined with the potential of solar 
company asset securitisation – provides amble opportunities for Hong Kong investors.143 
Figure 35a shows the value of asset-backed commercial paper, collateral debt obligations 
and asset-backed securities world-wide.144 Until 2009, the value of these securities easily 
amounted to over $1 trillion. After the crisis, the value of new securitisations has fallen. 
Such securitisation can only deepen Hong Kong’s financial markets. Asset-backed 
securities and obligations represent an important part of the swap trades which provide 
short-term liquidity to banks and companies alike. Hong Kong holds roughly $94 billion 
of US government agency asset-backed securities and about $1 billion of corporate 
ones.145 Yet, we “make” very little of these asset-backed securities (outside of the 
mortgage sector) by ourselves. The total value of these securitized assets weigh in at less 
than half of their pre-crisis level. If Hong Kong financial institutions can originate and 
sell these types of securities, they can profitably participate in the recovery of a 































Figure 35a: Global Collapse in Securitisations Represents an Opportunity for Hong Kong
The f igure show s the issuance of "private label" securitisation by type. 
Source: Kiff  et al. (2009) at Figure 2.2
 
 
                                                 
143 Securitisation in general provides many advantages for companies like those in the Mainland’s 
photovoltaic industry. Skarabot, as early as 2002, showed that asset-backed securities may return more 
money to investors in a bankruptcy than typical equity shares. Gorton and Souleles show that asset-backed 
securities may match far more closely with individual investors’ risk and reward appetites than other types 
of securities. Unlike under an equity shareholding arrangement, investors in asset-backed securities can 
pick exactly which assets (and thus market opportunities) they want exposure to. See Jure Skarabot, 
Securitization and Special Purpose Vehicle Structures, available online. See also Gary Gorton and Nicholas 
Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, In Mark Carey and Rene Stulz, THE RISKS OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 2004, available online. 
144 See John Kiff, Andy Jobst, Michael Kisser, and Jodi Scarlata, Restarting Securitization Markets: 
Policy Proposals and Pitfalls, In IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING THE 
FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD, 2009, available online.  
145 See Federal Reserve Board, Value of foreign holdings of U.S. securities, by major investing country and 
type of security as of June 30, 2012, at Table 6, available online. 
 
Within the asset-based securitisation sector, solar securities probably have the most room 
to grow. Figure 35b shows the value of solar structured assets, compared with other kinds 
of structured securities in the US.146 Auto loan, credit card and student loan 
securitisations make up the bulk of such securitisations in the US– with potential solar 
securitisations representing only a fraction of the market total. If solar-backed assets 
growth to the same level as level as securitisations on assets like human capital (student 
loans) or equipment, and if Mainland markets look anything like their US counterparts, 
the market for solar-backed securities should grow by at least $20 billion. 
HMoreover, the experience from securitising and selling solar-backed securities can help 
Hong Kong’s financial institutions grapple with the complexities of selling proven 
lucrative assets like auto loans and credit card asset-backed securities (originated on 
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Figure 35b: Small Size of US's Solar Asset-Backed Securities Market Represents
Blessing for Hong Kong?
The f igure show s the estimated size of US asset backed securities markets. The Solar ABS market estimate ref lects 
estimates of potential origination once the market develops.  
Source: Low der and Mendelsohn (2013) at Figure 5. 
 
 
Yet, Hong Kong’s financial institutions have a long way to go before they can hope to 
compete in the creation and sale of asset-backed and debt-backed securities. We know 
very little about how much of these securities Hong Kong financial institutions actually 
make.148 Yet, some data do exist. Figure 35c shows the number of single security asset-
backed securities issued in Hong Kong (as a proxy for the importance of Hong Kong’s 
structured securities internationally).149 As shown, Hong Kong securitisation comes in far 
below those of other international financial centres on the sale of single-stock derivative 
contracts. Reassuringly however, China ranks even lower. As such, Hong Kong’s 
                                                 
146 See Travis Lowder and Michael Mendelsohn, The Potential of Securitization in Solar PV Finance, 
Technical Report, NREL/TP-6A20-60230, 2013, available online.  
147 Market sizes in Hong Kong are too small to make such securitisation very profitable for Hong Kong 
situated assets. Thus, the rapid development of Hong Kong’s securitisation sector relies on access to 
Mainland markets (and underlying assets like credit card and auto debt).  
148 The HKMA provides regular monitoring of debt, derivatives and structured securities. However, they 
include mortgage-backed securities in their analysis – leaving the analyst unable to figure out the volume of 
“productive assets” be securitised, structured and sold. See HKMA, Results of surveys on selected debt 
securities and off-balance sheet exposures to derivatives and securitisations, 2013, available online. 
149 See Daniel Bergstresser, The retail market for structured notes: Issuance patterns and performance, 
1995-2008, HBS WP, 2008, available online. 
financial institutions can compete in the cross-border sale of securities written on 
Mainland assets and liabilities -- though their competition will likely come from UK 































Figure 35c: Hong Kong Way Behind on Equity Securitisations
The figure show s the number of observations of single stock underlying securitized transactions as reported by 
Datastream betw een 1995 to 2008. 
Source: Bergstresser (2008). 
 
 
Despite its large potential, solar securitisations appear unlikely on the Mainland for the 
foreseeable future. Mainland regulators have made significant progress in putting 
regulations in place which govern such securitisation – after a significant hiatus in the 
post-crisis period.150 Despite Schwartz’s plea to open the Golden Sun Demonstration 
Project’s assets for securitisation, such prospects seem remote.151 A number of issues 
remain – including institutional support, credibility, and an adequate regulatory structure 
putting into practice regulations like Administrative Measures on Pilot Projects of Credit 
Assets Securitisation as well as the Regulatory Measures on Financial Institutions 
Undertaking Credit Assets Securitization (among others).152 Even in the US, the recent 
sale of “sunshine-backed bonds” shows the market has a long way to go.153 If Hong 
Kong can tap these markets during the Mainland’s adjustment period, 
securitisation markets will likely stay with Hong Kong.  
 
Securitisation lowers solar companies’ costs, making funding through securitisation a 
preferred method of finance for many types of solar assets and liabilities. Figure 36 
shows the levelised cost of solar-generated electricity under a range of financing 
options.154 Debt financing – and specifically financing through selling asset-backed 
obligations – results in cheaper solar finance than traditional finance. Equity, while 
                                                 
150 See Takeshi Jingu, Significance of Restart of Asset Securitisation in China, NRI WP 176, 2013, 
available online.  
151 See Louis Schwartz, Securitization of Solar Assets in China, available online. 
152 For an overview of some of these rules, see Yuwa Wei, Asset-Backed Securitization in China, 6 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 225, 2007. 
153 Tracy Alloway, Sunshine-backed bond to go on sale, FT, 2013, available online. See also Diane 
Cardwell, Bonds Backed by Solar Power Payments Get Nod, available online. 
154 Levelised cost of electricity refers to the price which electricity providers need to charge in order to pay 
their inputs and give investors a market rate of return. For the figure, see Michael Mendelsohn and David 
Feldman, Financing U.S. Renewable Energy Projects Through Public Capital Vehicles: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Benefits, NREL/TP-6A20-58315, 2013, available online. 
providing cheaper money, can also actually increase the cost of capital to photovoltaic 
cell producers (if the US experience applies to the Mainland). These findings suggest that 
simply listing on the Hong Kong Exchange may not improve Mainland solar companies’ 
competitiveness (by lowering their cost of capital). Hong Kong financial law and 
government policies needs to find ways of encouraging financial institutions to 
create and trade debt and debt-based securities in order to provide competitive 
























Figure 36: Equity and Debt Solar Finance Provides for Cheaper Electricity 
than Traditional Finance
The f igure show s the range of levelized costs of electricity under traditional, debt and equity f inancing in the US. See 
the original for exact definitions. Source: Mendelsohn and David Feldman (2013) at Figure ES-1. 
Residential solar Utility-scale solar
 
 
Many analysts agree that securitisation represents the best form of finance for solar 
investments. Unlike conventional bank or stock investments, the sale of securitised assets 
would allow for a larger investor base and better targeting of risk-return profiles.155 If the 
US experience serves as any guide, the Mainland solar energy provision and financing 
markets will likely segment along geographical lines. Figure 37 shows the development 
of solar finance companies across the US.156 We focus on finance companies -- rather 
than solar panel or electricity distributors -- in order to discuss the consumer financing 
side of the industry. As shown, some companies (like Sun Edison) and Clean Power 
Finance offer services nationally. Yet, we see a range of companies which specialise on 
regions (groups of states) -- like Solar City, Skyline Innovations, and Tioga. Others focus 
only on one state -- like BGE Hone and CT Solar Lease. Such differentiation between 
solar finance providers strongly suggests differences in consumers’ preferences and needs 
across states which one or more national finance providers can not serve (at least not yet). 
If each of companies we list in the figure issues stocks, bonds, and asset-backed securities, 
this would generate 57 different issues.157   
                                                 
155 For a fuller discussion, see Samantha Jacoby,  Solar-Backed Securities: Opportunities, Risks, and the 
Specter of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 2014, available online. 
156 See Steve Horton, Solar Finance: List of Solar Finance and Leasing Companies, available online. See 
also Samantha Jacoby,  Solar-Backed Securities: Opportunities, Risks, and the Specter of the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 2014, available online. 
157 Namely, we assume that Amberjack Solar would have its own traded shares, bonds and asset-backed 
securities (3 different issues), BGE Home similarly (for 3 more) and so forth. Naturally, if these companies 
issue preferred shares, different types of debt instruments and different types of asset-backed securities, the 
number of issues can easily exceed 100 types of instruments that investors can buy to gain exposure to the 
risks and returns in the solar finance sector.  
Figure 37: Niche Solar Finance Companies Provide Access to Geographically 
Specific Risks as well as Differing Risk/Return Profiles 
 
Solar   Financing 
Company 
Available   in:  Solar   Financing 
Company 
Available   in: 
Amberjack   Solar MA,   NJ  Solar   City CA,   MA, MD, WA 
BGE   Home MD  Soltage CT,   MA, NJ 
BrightGrid   Solar AZ,   CA,CO, HI, NJ  Skyline   Innovations AZ,   CA, FL, Mid-Atlantic 
states 
Citizenre AR,   CT, DE, GA, HI, LA, MA, 
MD, ME, MN, NH, NJ, NY, OK, 
OR, RI, VA, VT, WA, WY 
 Sun   Edison Nationwide 
CentroSolar AZ,   CA, NJ  SunPower AZ,   CA, CO, HI, MA, NJ, 
NY, PA 
Clean   Power 
Finance 
Nationwide  Sun   Run AZ,   CA, CO, HI, MA, NJ, 
OR, PA 
Constellation   En
ergy/ BGE Home 
MD  Sungevity AZ,   CA, CO, DE, MA, 
NY, NJ, MD 
CT   Solar Lease CT  Technology   Credit 
Corporation 
MA 
First   Light Solar 
(FLS Energy) 
NC,   SC, GA and TN  Tioga AZ,   CA, CO, CT, HI, MA, 
MD, NJ, NV, OR, OR, PA 
Mercury   Solar – 
Financing 
CT,   MA, NJ, NY, PA  Vivint   Solar NY,   HI, UT 
GroSolar PA    
Note: Solar production in 2012 reached the following levels: California (983Mw), Arizona (709Mw), New 
Jersey (391 Mw), Nevada (226), Massachusetts (123), North Carolina (122Mw), Hawaii (114), Colorado 
(103), Maryland (80), New York (56), others (434). Total equals 3341 Mw.  
Sources: Horton (2013) and Jacoby 2013 at Fig. 2.  
 
The geographical spread of solar finance companies in the US suggests three things for 
Hong Kong as it develops its solar securities markets. First, Hong Kong’s financial 
institution can create literally hundreds of different securities from the likely range of 
solar R&D, producer, operations, finance and other parts of the value chain. In the US 
example, we argued that ambitious securitizers could produce 57 different issues of solar 
finance-based securities. For Hong Kong-based financial firms looking to do the same for 
Mainland-based producers and financiers, we could expect similar numbers.158  
Second, providing securities based on the securitised assets and liabilities of these kinds 
of solar financing firms could provide Hong Kong, Mainland and international investors 
with focus on particular geographical markets they want to take solar risks and returns in, 
while offering diversification. Third, we could even see securities aggregators issuing 
mixtures of these securities in different combinations as pre-packaged products. Let’s 
continue with our example as illustrated above. If investors wanted exposure only to 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland, they could buy a pre-packaged fund with 
securities only from GroSolar, Technology Credit Corp., and BGE Home. Diversity in 
the underlying tastes and technologies of solar financing alone suggest Hong Kong-
based financial institutions could offer literally hundreds of different securitised 
                                                 
158 China has fewer provinces than the US has states. However, the diversity between Chinese provinces 
(and thus differences in tastes and technologies) greatly exceeds that of the US in general (though of course 
US states have large differences in types of consumers within states and even buildings!).  
products. 159  
 
A financial centre also provides the analytical tools which can help keep Mainland 
photovoltaic companies’ cost of capital low. Solar project costs of capital usually rise if 
finance clients (the households and companies using the solar panels) default on their 
loans/leases and if the company must keep excess capital to cover obligations implicit in 
its asset-backed securities.160 Having some Hong Kong financial firms which focus on 
solar investments can help ensure solar-backed risks are correctly priced -- thus 
lowering Mainland solar companies’ cost of capital. Figure 38 shows the wedge 
between the rate that investors want and the rate that photovoltaic manufacturers must 
pay for capital.161 These wedges increase as default rates among solar panel users 
(borrowers) increase and as companies need to increase the value of panels they bundle 
into securities.162 If companies or financiers miscalculate these values, costs of capital 
























Figure 38: Excess Capital Costs Paid on Solar Projects Due to Early Contract




The figure show s the cost of capital to photovoltaic producers for a 5% early contract termination rate and the effect 
of over-collateralisation. Solar projects need to over-collateralise (or pledge the value of solar assets in excess of 
the value of the securities) in order to receive a suff iciently high credit rating. 






                                                 
159 We exclude in our discussion “covered bonds” – which provide guarantees of repayment in case of 
default or non-payment in the underlying assets. Some analysts have suggested that Chinese securities laws 
make recovery easier for covered bonds than securitised assets. As our paper is already complex enough, 
we do not want to explore this issue further. See Robert Freedman & Patricia Hammes, US Solar: Of PPA 
Securitisations, horizons & hurdles, INFRASTRUCTURE J. , 2011, available online. 
160 A wide variety of factors determine the cost of capital. We talk about those factors that policy can affect. 
See Geoffrey Klise, Jamie Johnson, and Sandra Adomatis, Valuation of Solar Photovoltaic Systems Using a 
Discounted Cash Flow Approach, Appraisal J., 2013.  
Geoffrey Klise, Jamie Johnson, and Sandra Adomatis, 
161 For a calculation of the range of values, see Alafita and J.M. Pearce, Securitization of residential solar 
photovoltaic assets: Costs, risks and uncertainty, Energy Policy, 2014, available online.  
162 Asset-backed securities posses solar panel as underlying assets. The prices of these panels may vary 
depending on age, supply and demand and other factors. An asset-backed security traded for $1,000 which 
allows investors to recover $1,100 worth of solar panels at current prices will naturally have a better rating 
than one which allows investors to recover only $900 worth of underlying solar panels.    
Hong Kong provides additional opportunities for securitising solar assets which are 
unavailable in the US. First, Hong Kong-based (and/or listed) solar financing firms have 
a stronger implicit guarantee of bailouts in case of financial difficulty. The international 
media reported extensively on Chaori Solar’s default.163 Yet, at roughly the same time, 
LDK Solar received loans from China Development Bank (a state-owned and controlled 
financial institution) after its bond default.164 While Chaori’s default tests the 
Government’s resolve to support solar companies, no one believes the Chinese state has 
completely removed implicit support for solar companies.165 Such a guarantee thus 
should cover Hong Kong investors putting their money in these companies. Second, 
Hong Kong financing and securitisation firms can offer economies of scale in 
securitisations which US investment firms would find hard to match.166 As we previously 
showed, the solar financing market in the US still rests at a nascent stage – with markets 
divided by state. These Chinese experience shows vividly that scaling-up can occur 
quickly -- offering a potentially larger market China than even the US or the EU. Third, 
and related to these points, the lack of customer credit histories represents a far less 
problem for Hong Kong investors than US investors. Credit rating agencies – like 
Standard & Poor’s – have noted that lack of credit histories for solar assets make these 
assets hard to rate (and thus price).167 Given implicit guarantees by the Mainland 
government and potential to attract investors who best know the risks, the risks seem 
remote.168  
 
Hong Kong provides a superiour venue for selling solar securities than the US for other 
reasons as well. First, the reliability of long-term cash flows has bedevilled the US solar 
market for some time.169 With rental contracts at 20 years and average home ownership 
tenures at 13 years, the mismatch between ownership tenure and lease period creates a 
risk. However, such moves are less frequent on the Mainland. Second, solar panel 
producer and operations companies achieve significant cost-savings (and thus higher 
profitability) from larger scales. We already provided data showing China’s strong 
advantages in certain export markets and parts of the solar supply chain. We also showed 
data indicating that the largest Chinese solar companies split their listings between Hong 
Kong and New York. As the Mainland solar industry consolidates, having a single source 
                                                 
163 See Bloomberg, China Gets 1st Onshore Bond Default as Chaori Doesn’t Pay, 2014, available online. 
164 See Bloomberg, LDK Solar Gets 2 Billion Yuan Bank Loans After Bond Default, 2014, available online.  
165 Recent declarations by the State Council (China’s supreme executive body) clearly signal the 
government’s resolve to continue to support the industry. See Sydney Morning Herald, China reaffirms 
support for solar PV industry, 2014, available online. 
166 Borod worries that that even the US’s potentially large market for securitised solar assets would not 
achieve sufficient scale to attract demand and sufficiently lower origination costs. Citing Bloomberg in 
2011, he claims that bond values for securitised rooftop solar panel contracts would come to only about 
$430 million. The securitisation of all commercial rooftop contracts only bring about $730 million in new 
solar bonds. These amounts come to much less than the values we presented earlier for securitisations on 
the Mainland. See Ronald Borod, The Devil in the Details of Solar Securitization, 39 PRACTICAL 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE STRATEGIES 7, 2013, available online. 
167 See Andrew Giudici, Jeong-A Kim, Brian Yagoda,  Will Securitization Help Fuel the U.S. Solar Power 
Industry? 2012, available online. 
168 Increasing Hong Kong’s securities markets will, hopefully, attract more Mainland institutional investors 
who can monitor risks more closely.  
169 See Borod at 2.  
of equity, debt and securitised debt funding (namely Hong Kong) could provide benefits 
for aggregators and specialists working in Hong Kong.170 Third, solar financing could 
benefit from standardized documentation and systematized due diligence – both of 
technological specifications as well as the financing documents underpinning the 
installation of that technology. Such standardisation is much easier in a city-state than a 
country spanning 50 different legal systems and hundreds of solar entities (namely the 
US). If Hong Kong can quickly settle on such standards for the Mainland before US firms 
can agree on such a standard, Hong Kong standards could even affect the trajectory of 
market development. Fourth, the US Dodd-Frank Act requires the sponsor to hold at least 
5% of the risks associated with any securitisation.171 Hong Kong does not require such 
potentially costly risk-retention -- making Hong Kong a more attractive jurisdiction.  
 
Lessons of the Minibond Scandal for Developing a Hong Kong Solar Market 
 
Despite the promise of photovoltaic securitisation in Hong Kong, many investors do not 
think of Hong Kong as a securitisation centre due to recent scandals – particularly the 
Lehman Minibond scandal. Why should investors invest in securitised assets in Hong 
Kong when such investments have a poor track record? A recent review of securitisation 
sums up the current situation, “securitisation professionals are continuing to have to look 
elsewhere in the region for deals given the extremely low level of activity in Hong 
Kong.”172 The financial crisis – combined with the Lehman mini-bond crisis – led to 
regulators’ and buyers’ wariness of structured investments – including asset-backed 
securities of all types.173 Such wariness comes from lumping together asset-backed 
securities with structured products. Asset-backed securities (like solar bonds) use assets 
as collateral and as underlying producer of the revenue streams ultimately thrown-off by 
the securities themselves. To take an example from a recent SolarCity solar bond, “the 
trust estate [the legal entity used to hold the underlying asset] will consist primarily of all 
rights, title, and interest of the issuer in a portfolio of solar assets, including customer 
agreements, solar equipment, permits, manufacturer's warranties, and cash flow 
associated with the ownership of such assets” (bracketed material ours).174 Solar Funding 
I and Solar Funding II also represent examples of securities (in this case debt-securities) 
using secured assets to back a medium-term note.175 Structured finance usually involves 
the use of derivatives whose pay-offs depend on particular events – like the continuing 
existence and operation of a particular solar company or asset.176 Packagers often 
structure these securities like bets -- in order to provide investors with “pure” exposure to 
                                                 
170 Borod refers to this as an “aggregation facility.”  
171 See Borod at 2.  
172 See Adrienne Showering and Paul McBride, Securitisation in Hong Kong, In Stephen Jaques, GLOBAL 
SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 2008, 2008, available online.  
173 We do not have the space to describe the Minibond scandal. For an overview, see Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, An overview of the Lehman Brothers minibonds saga, available online.  
174 For an analysis of the instrument, see Xilun Chen and Weili Chen, SolarCity LMC Series I LLC (Series 
2013-1), available online. 
175 For these notes’ prospectus, see Solar Funding I and II, 2010, available online.  
176 For more, see Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek and Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured Finance, 
HBS WP 09-060, 2008.  
certain risks (and rewards) that holding assets and liabilities directly can not provide.177 
Solar assets might be structured through “tranching” asset-backed securities (like 
receivables) into groups with differing risk profiles (as we have illustrated in the 
examples in the previous sections). In theory, underwriters can write derivatives which 
pay (or don’t pay) depending on any risk chosen in the structured product document.   
 
Yet, the Minibond crisis illustrates our thesis – that Hong Kong’s policymakers must 
focus on structural issues (how to encourage the marketing of productive investments in 
the real economy) rather than simply tweak financial law governing the process of 
securities sales. The marketing materials themselves provide a perfect illustration of how 
the structured product promoters did not market to the right people with the right product. 
Figure 39 shows an example of an ad used to market the Lehman minibonds.178 The ad 
illustrates our paper’s thesis – that policy should encourage banks and broker-dealers in a 
financial centre to focus on targeting the right investors with the right products. Financial 
sector policy (and thus law) encouraged marketing minibonds to the general public – 
rather than target individuals who could use their profile of risks and returns to 
complement other portfolio holdings.179 Structured products did not cause the mini-bond 
crisis. The nature of the minibonds and the marketing process itself caused the scandal.  
 
Marketing     
The minibonds’ buyers had no reason to want to buy the 
probability of a bank’s default. Profile of risks and returns 
couldn’t complement anything in existing portfolios. 
Product
The “product” was a bet that a group of banks would not go 
banktrupt. Difficult to see how channeling money to this 
financed productive activity. 
Why wine? 




portfolio preferences security for notes never
really identified 
why have a complex
contigent-state of the world
pricing scheme?
these notes are bets
that companies (usually
banks) stay alive 
Figure 39: Minibonds Sold Speculative Bets, Not Shares of Productive Investment
 
                                                 
177 For example, a solar-backed structured product could pay 5% if the underlying solar assets yield 9% or 
nothing if they yield less. Such a bet allows investors to increase their risks (and thus returns) -- while 
offering the securities’ originators the opportunity in profit in case the assets are only mildly profitable.  
178 We provide a superficial description of the problems associated with these advertisements in order to 
focus on our own paper’s thesis. For a detailed discussion of the problems with the advertising regime in 
place at the time, see Andrew Godwin, The Lehman Minibonds Crisis in Hong Kong: Lessons for Plain 
Language Risk Disclosure, 32 UNSW L. J. 2, 2009, available online.  
179 The SFC, looking for legal rather than structural problems, cited misrepresentation in the sales process, 
the complexity of the structured products themselves and lack of suitability assessment as the main drivers 
of the scandal. Their response consisted of increasing the hurdles to purchase, while remaining faithful to a 
regulatory regime based on disclosure rather than ex-ante rules. If policymakers stepped back and asked 
what the sale of structured products hoped to achieve in the broader financial system, their 
recommendations might have been more similar to the ones we make in this paper. See SFC, Issues Raised 
by the Lehman Minibond Crisis: Report to the Financial Secretary, 2008, available online. 
The nature of the minibonds (and other structured products) sold show how the very 
philosophy of Hong Kong’s structured products market has moved away from 
intermediating funds and towards betting. Figure 40a shows the types of Lehman Brother 
structured products offered during the Minibond crisis; while Figure 40b shows the 
companies which had to go bankrupt in order for the bonds not to pay off.180 The value of 
Lehman Minibonds equalled roughly the annual turnover of the Las Vegas Sands 
(casinos). Each of the series amassed large amounts of investments in securities without 
any solid underlying assets. Moreover (as shown in the second part of the figure), 
investors in Hong Kong bet primarily on banks located thousands of miles away. 
Standard Chartered, HSBC, Citigroup and Bank of America represented the most 
frequent “reference entities” which investors would wager would not go bankrupt. 
Hutchinson Whimpoa represents the only “productive” (from the perspective of making 
goods and services) company on the list.181 Financial regulation did not represent the 
core problem of the crisis. Financial and other institutions which stoked demand 





















Figure 40a: Hong Kong's Structured Investment Market Focused on Linked Noted
Rather than Securitisations of Actual Assets
The f igure show s the value of outstanding Lehman Brothers products distrubuted by banks. The size of the f igures 
alone show s w hy structured products should slice-and-dice real assets -- as their total comes to about 20.2 billion 









Number of investment accounts
 
                                                 
180 See Legislative Council, Report of the Subcommittee to Study Issues Arising from Lehman Brothers-
related Minibonds and Structured Financial Products, 2012, available online. 
181 Economists see the resources spent by banks and other sectors like security services as “transactions 
costs.” In this view, these intermediaries produce nothing directly – instead allow for other sectors of the 







































Figure 40b: Hong Kong's Structured Products were Bets that these Companies
Would Not Go Bankrupt 
The f igure show s the number of times a company appears as a "reference entity" in series 16-36. Minibond holders
receive no pay-off if  these reference entities go bankrupt -- in effect making the minibond a bet rather than 
channeling money to productive investment. Source: SFC Website.
 
 
 The Government’s “structuralist” approach (focusing on best practice sales processes 
and legal provisions) – rather than taking a “contingency-based” view of the marketing of 
structured products in general – will not help develop Hong Kong’s financial markets.182 
The Legislative Council and Securities and Futures Commission have claimed that 
“many lessons have been learnt” from the crisis. Figure 41 summarises the major 
regulatory changes based on the lessons from the Minibond scandal.183 In order to make 
our discussion more concrete, we focus our discussion of these proposed changes on their 
likely effect on the development of vibrant financial markets in solar (photovoltaic) assets. 
Many of the Government’s proposed reforms will likely make the offer of 
photovoltaic structured instruments more difficult – without increasing investors’ 
safety. 
 
Figure 41: Selected Proposed Reforms Still Don’t Focus on Real Economy 
 
Item Description and Impact on Solar 
Single SFC 
Handbook 
Adoption of single rulebook presumably consolidates rulemaking and increases 
compliance. In itself, a cosmetic remedy.   
Key Fact 
Statements 
Plain-language, fact statements will allow investors to more easily assess 
investment risks and returns. A glance at these statements show, despite plain 
English, still long and complex.  
Oversight of 
product arrangers 
Product arrangers should be based in Hong Kong and overseeable by SFC. Such an 
action focuses on enforcement, and not on SFC’s role in promoting development of 




Prohibits these classes of arrangers from engaging in activities if they have 
disciplinary action against them. Naturally, this would help solar market 
providers – particularly if plan to make requirements easier for retail access to solar 
securities.  
Collateral Securitised issuers would need to hold collateral against securitisations. Collateral 
would raise costs and hurt securitisations.  
Investor Requires testing of investors’ product knowledge and risk profit (suitability). For 
                                                 
182 Linklaters provides an excellent overview of the proposals made in response to the Minibond crisis and 
the Government’s focus on sales processes and potential fraud.  See Linklaters, Legco Report – Impact on 
Providers and Distributors of Structured Financial Products, 2012, available online.  
183 See Alan Ewins, Catherine Husted, Juliana Lee and Joyce Woo, The Lehman Aftermath: Hong Kong 
and Singapore Regulatory Reforms in the Structured Product Markets World, 5 CAP. MAR. L. J. 3, 2010.  
classification mis-selling would help. But wouldn’t help protect investors who want to take 
genuine risks.  
Disclosure of 
commissions 
Securitised products’ distributors should disclose commissions. Such disclosures 
probably very important if target retail and international investors in a special 
regime (as we propose in this paper).  
Post-sale 
obligations 
Requires on-going communication of updated financial information, potential risks, 
liquidity and so forth.  
Cooling-off period Provides investors with chance to change their mind (within a certain number of 
days). Probably good for solar investors – as risk of losses low and need investors 
which understand their purchase.   
Safe harbours Hong Kong has had difficulty in defining safe harbour areas. As we describe in this 




Given increased SFC surveillance, can move to post-vetting system – fining firms 
marketing solar products which violate requirements.   
 Based on Ewins et al. (2010)  
 
Most commentators rightly – if maladroitly – point out that a regulatory regime which 
discouraged the production and use of simple and useful information helped add fire to 
the scandal. Godwin represents one of the most vocal academics arguing for the simplest 
possible descriptions of the securitised products that investors buy.184 Most 
commentators further point out that the SFC’s proposed rules will not increate the clarity, 
simplicity and usefulness of investor information.185 Neither will the HKMA’s 
recommendations – which aim at everything -- from producing “health warnings” la
on documents, producing audio recordings of sales meetings and detailed customer risk 
assessments.
bels 
rs’ portfolio needs.   
                                                
186 Nothing in the recommendations addresses the fact that structured 
product information materials do not tell investors what assets they are buying and 
whether they match the investo 187
 
Current structured products materials on file with the SFC probably reduce participation 
in structured products without necessarily improving investors’ knowledge of the 
mechanics of the investment. Figure 42 shows a sample of investor materials from the 
SFC’s List of Investment Products. As shown from this random sample, the informational 
materials – while written in simple English – still provide a great deal of information 
without simple overviews of how the investment works. These voluminous materials use 
plain English. However, they clearly seem written in a way which protects the writer 
from liability, rather than informing clients what their money is used for.  
 
184 See Andrew Godwin, The Lehman Minibonds Crisis in Hong Kong: Lessons for Plain Language Risk 
Disclosure, 32 UNSW L. J. 2, 2009, available online. 
185 See Will Shen, When Complexity Impairs Disclosure – A Critique of SFC’s Proposal to Strengthen the 
Disclosure Regime after the Lehman Minibonds Incident in Hong Kong, 23 EURO. BUS. L. REV. 6, 2012.  
186 HKMA, Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues Concerning the Distribution of 
Structured Products Connected to Lehman Group Companies, 2011, available online. 
187 The SFC’s recommendations encouraged investment advisors to conduct suitability checks, in part 
based on observations from authors like Chang et al. – who find that investors buy more structured 
products when investment advisors do not check for suitability. As we argue, investors should not merely 
be “suitable.” Structured products should contribute a risk-return profile to their existing portfolio in a way 
that adds value to the investors’ portfolios and provides the company which securitised its assets some 
competitive market advantage. See Eric Chang, Yongjun Tang and Miao Zhang, Suitability Check and 
Household Investments in Structured Products, 2013, available online. 
 
Figure 42: Structured Product Investment Materials in Plain English, But Still 
Don’t Describe the Actual Investments  
 
Instrument Information and structure  
Non-Principal Protected Unlisted Daily Accrual Equity 
Linked Investments Linked to a Basket of Securities 
with Call Feature and Optional Knock-In Feature  
Product booklet –                            229 pages 
 
DBS Bank Ltd.  Programme Memorandum –             29 pages 
Non-Principal Protected Unlisted Callable Equity 
Linked Investments Linked to a Single Security 
Financial Disclosure Document –   177 pages 
Product Booklet –                            148 pages  
China Construction Bank Programme Memorandum –             25 pages 
Non-principal Protected Unlisted Callable Equity-
Linked Investment Contracts with Potential Cash 
Distribution linked to a Basket of Stocks 
Financial Disclosure Document –    245 pages 
Offering Circular –                            51 pages 
Societe Generale Product Document –                         175 pages 
Non-Principal Protected Unlisted Bull Equity Linked 
Investments Linked to a Single Security 
Term Sheet –                                        7 pages 
Product Booklet –                                57 pages 
HSBC Programme Memorandum –              206 pages 
Non-Principal Protected Unlisted Equity Linked 
Investments linked to a Single Stock 
Financial Disclosure Document –     383 pages 
Information Memorandum –               23 pages 
Bank of China Product Booklet –                              168 pages 
The figure shows a random sample of structured products as reported in the SFC’s List of Investment 
Products. We chose from structured investment products, excluding structured deposits. We do not give 
page counts for product addenda.  
 
As we shall see in the next section, lack of specific information is not specific to 
structured products. Hong Kong markets in general provide far less useful information to 
investors than the US or UK. Hong Kong’s financial law dictates the incentives to 
produce investment information. Judging by the quality and reader-friendliness of such 
information, such financial law falls behind that of the US and UK.  
 
Developing information markets for Mainland Solar Securities  
 
Deep “investment information markets” can promote the development of Hong Kong as 
an international financial centre – not only for solar securities but for all kinds of 
securities.188 Financial law which promotes the generation of insightful, reader-friendly 
and useful company analysis would likely have three effects on the depth of Hong 
Kong’s financial markets.189 First, increasing the amount of information simple enough 
for retail investors would likely increase demand for Hong Kong securities by 
professional, institutional investors. Professional investors and institutional investors are 
people too. They often look at the same information sources (like Seeking Alpha and the 
                                                 
188 We refer to investing information “markets” throughout this paper -- as the production and consumption 
of such information clearly follows market principles. The value of such information depends on its supply 
and demand and commands a price (even if payment for such information often occurs during the sale of 
the investments themselves).  
189 More and better information about Hong Kong securities can only benefit investors and companies 
themselves. For proof of this self-evident statement (albeit from a US context), see Brian Bushee, John 
Core, Wayne Guay, and Sophia Hamm, The Role of the Business Press as an Information Intermediary, 
48 J. OF ACC. RES. 1, 2010.      
Wall Street Journal) and other information sources that retail investors do.190 Broadening 
information sources about Hong Kong-traded securities and companies (and solar 
companies in general) can only enhance overall financial market liquidity and promote 
efficiency.191 Second, having lots of people writing about Hong Kong-listed and traded 
securities makes secondary market sales easier and priced better.192 Lack of information 
leads to selling “lemons,” adverse selection and moral hazard in offering and buying 
securities.193 Having vibrant information markets in Hong Kong-traded securities would 
reduce investors’ reliance on any one source of information -- and possibly even improve 
investors’ performance.194 Third, observing how others react to information can provide 
as much – if not more – information to investors than financial statements, earnings 
reports and major company events.195 Wide-spread media coverage of securities can help 
bring inside or little-known information in the public’s view, increasing the information 
content of share prices.196 Hong Kong’s securities regulatory regime based focuses on 
disclosure rather than authorisation. For disclosure to work (discipline companies), 
information needs to be shared and discussed.   
 
At first glance, the quality of information investors receive about Hong Kong-listed solar 
companies (and companies in general) seems comparable to its larger international 
financial centre peers like New York. Figures 43 show that while the quantity of 
information about Hong Kong-listed solar companies roughly equals those listed 
elsewhere, the quality of such information differs. Figure 43a shows the depth of 
information about major Mainland solar companies listed in Hong Kong and New York. 
As shown, the number of internet references to various solar panel companies looks 
                                                 
190 Indeed, institutional investors spend more of their time looking at financial media, making the value of 
such information even greater. Barber and Odean find that institutions may consume more of such 
information and use it better. See Brad Barber and Terrance Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect of 
Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 2, 
2008.      
191 Returns to investors on stocks which the media generally does not cover exceed those which the 
financial media covers. This implies that investors have special information. Thus, expanding the amount 
of information to retail investors about securities would remove these profitable (and unfair?) information 
asymmetries. See Lily Fang and Joel Peress, Media Coverage and the Cross-section of Stock Returns, 64 J. 
OF FIN. 5, 2009.   
192 Numerous studies find that webboard and other postings have a statistically significant (albeit small) 
effect on equity prices. See Werner Antweiler and Murray Frank, Is All That Talk Just Noise? The 
Information Content of Internet Stock Message Boards, 59 J. OF FIN. 3, 2004.  
193 For an example of this problem in the mortgage-backed securities financial services segment, see Chris 
Downing, Dwight Jaffee and Nancy Wallace, Is the Market for Mortgage-Backed Securities a Market for 
Lemons? 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 7, 2009.   
194 In the US, information aggregators have started to consolidate ratings from a wide range of analysts into 
“consensus forecasts.” Acaedmics have not yet definitively established whether the performance of such 
consensus estimates and analysis based on the aggregation of analysts’ analyses beats individual estimates. 
Yet, the high demand for such aggregation in the US shows that investors value these services. See  
195 For one study, see Timothy Pollock, Violina Rindova, and Patrick Maggitti, Market Watch: Information 
and Availability Cascades Among the Media and Investors in the U.S. IPO Market, 51 ACAD. MANAGE. J. 2, 
2008.   
196 See Paul Tetlock, Does Public Financial News Resolve Asymmetric Information? 23 REV. FINANC. STUD. 
9, 2010.  
similar between Hong Kong-listed and non-Hong Kong listed solar companies.197 Figure 
43b shows the depth of information provided by solar companies listed in Hong Kong 
and in other jurisdictions. As shown, most US-listed solar companies have some form of 
web-casting of financial, operational and other results. Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar 
companies often provide very little information. Figure 43c represents one example of the 
general trend in Hong Kong to provide very succinct information about companies. The 
information provided by both the companies themselves and their analysts consists of 2-3 
line announcements about earnings or major news events. The telegraphic analysis 








































































Figure 43a: A Hong Kong Listing Does Not Dampen General Discussion 
about Solar Shares
The f igure show s general media citations about each company in 2013. Dark green bars show
citations in the w orld's English language press, w hile dotted black bars show  Google cites (in thousands). 





















Figure 43b: Hong Kong Listed Companies Never Provide Webcasts and Deep 
Information about Business that Gives Investors Deep, Insightful Information
The f igure show s the extent and depth of Mainland solar companies' f inancial reporting to investors. Companies 
receive one point for providing w ebcast presentations of their f inancial reports and investor conferences, one point
for additional presentations about their recent performance, and one-tenth of a point for the number of analysts
covering the company. Source: company w ebsites. 
US and other listed Hong Kong listed
 
 
                                                 
197 As with previous examples, given the unscientific nature of the data used, we do not conduct more 
sophisticated statistical tests of similarities and differences between these two groups.  
198 Market practices respond to incentives given by law (and other institutions). If we observe market 
equilibrium practices as providing very short analytical and informational pieces, we assume market actors 
behave according to the incentives they face.  
 Figure 43c: News About Hong Kong-Listed Mainland Solar Companies Usually 
Telegraphic Flashes Instead of Deep Analysis 
The availability of information and the geographical location of investors using an 
international financial centre likely go hand-in-hand. Figure 44 shows an example of an 
information source about securities traded in three major international financial centres – 
and the extent of foreign interest in those shares (as proxied by web visits). As shown, 
Hong Kong websites cater mostly to local or Mainland investors and readers. The US and 
UK both have significant foreign interest in their securities. US and UK regulators and 
intermediaries thus have incentives to provide fuller and more accessible information to 
these foreign constituencies. In contrast, Hong Kong intermediaries focus on domestic 
investors (and to a limited extent on Mainland investors), whom they can communicate 
with verbally and in meetings. As a result, they do not need to produce the range of 
publications and analysis that UK and US intermediaries do.  
 
Figure 44: English-Language Internet Resources for US Traders 
 
US UK Hong Kong 
Seeking Alpha 
Foreign Visitors: 33% 
Share*: India (15%), Canada 
(12%), UK (6%), Netherlands 
(4%) 
Fool UK 
Foreign Visitors: 42% 
Share*: US (36%), India 




Foreign visitors: 22% 
Share*: China (41%), Macao 
(14%), Taiwan (7%), US 
(7%). 
Bloomberg 
Foreign Visitors: 53% 
Share*: India (9%), UK (8%), 
Canada (6%), Japan (6%). 
 
Financial Times 
Foreign Visitors: 82% 
Share*: US (34%), India 
(8%), Japan (4%), France 
(4%).  
Economic Times 
Foreign visitors*: 10% 
Taiwan (50%) 
* Share represents the share of foreign visitors calculated by dividing the proportion of website visitors 
from a certain location by the “foreign visitors” (100% minus the share coming from that website’s own 
jurisdiction).  
Source: Alexa (2014). 
 
Yet, the generation and intermediation of information about asset-backed securities like 
solar company assets, liabilities and panels can particularly benefit both investors and 
issuing companies. Figure 45 shows the superiour returns that securitising and tranching 
assets (like solar assets) can earn because of the information thrown-off (and 
diversification achieved) in the process.199 Demarzo’s logic (expressed in the solar 
context) is as follows. Imagine a financial intermediary called Bauhinia Solar Finance has 
invested in all kinds of solar assets -- like panels, machines and so forth. Bauhinia Solar 
Finance wants to sell securities in these assets. Potential investors in New York, London 
and Hong Kong however do not know which assets will likely pay-off. The management 
of Bauhinia Solar Finance however does know. Pooling these assets naturally destroys 
the value of this information --- they can no longer know how the whole asset pool will 
perform. However, investors may find pooled and tranched securities more attractive. 
They know diversification will protect them from Bauhinia egregiously selling them 
assets they know won’t perform. Securitising the assets provides more liquidity -- as 
markets for these securities are generally more liquid than markets in share-panel revenue 
sharing schemes and other revenue participation schemes. Investors in these tranches 
should - in theory - know much more about the assets in the security than the large 
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Figure 45: Tranching Securities Throws Off Information Which Investors Can Use to 
Improve Yields 
The figure show s expected issuer returns on pooling assets and selling tranches w hen the seller has better information 
about the assets than buyers do. Source|: DeMarzo (2003). 
 
 
DeMarzo’s model provides important insights for Hong Kong’s policymakers about the 
way securitisation and tranching can deepen information markets for Hong Kong-traded 
securities of all types. In theory, securitisation should provide more information about the 
kinds of assets companies invest in.200 Pooling assets and tranching them requires 
originators, intermediaries, investors and rating agencies to take decisions about asset 
qualities. Yet, in practice, we observe intermediaries adding complexity into the 
securitisation, tranching and trading process so as to hide information about their 
financial transactions.201 Despite the inherently information emitting nature of selling 
                                                 
199 See Peter DeMarzo, The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation, 18 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 2005.   
200 Asset securitisation should unbundle assets lying in a corporate portfolio and provide returns attached to 
those assets to specific investors. Thus, in principle, securitisation can provide more information than 
simple debt or equity investments. See Edward Iacobucci and Ralph Winter, Asset Securitization and 
Asymmetric Information, 34 J. OF LEG. STUD. 1, 2005.   
201 See Mei Cheng, Dan Dhaliwal and Monica Neamtiu, Banks’ Asset Securitization and Information 
Opacity, 2008, available online. 
structured securitised products, financial law and custom provide intermediaries 
with strong incentives to structure these products so as to hide information. The 
mini-bond scandal happened because regulators failed to provide market actors with 
incentives to package in an easy-to-understand way and release the information generated 
by the naturally information-generating process of securitising, tranching and selling 
structured and securitised products.  
 
The US provides an example of a jurisdiction realigning the incentives financial law 
gives to release information contained in a securitisation process. Academics like Booth 
have chronicled the way that inflexible financial law can retard the development of 
sunrise industries like solar energy.202 She militates for wide sweeping changes in 
financial law to accommodate “community solar” (namely financing arrangements which 
allow communities to invest in solar projects and receive the benefits collectively). She 
describes several channels for such change -- including changing state “Blue Sky” laws 
and relaxed SEC crowdfunding rulemaking. She also encourages increased and easier use 
of Regulation D (offerings to “accredited investors”), the Intrastate Exemption (which 
allows relaxed offering rules as long as securities are marketed only intrastate), as well as 
the repeal of the non-solicitation rule and an expansion of Blue Sky laws.203 At the risk of 
over-simplifying her argument -- the best way to encourage the development of solar 
financing consists of encouraging companies to provide complete and informative 
information, and rely on anti-fraud rules (rather than elaborate prescriptive rules) to guide 
and discipline market actors. Delimatsis also argues for relaxed financial rules governing 
the finance of sunrise industries like renewable energy.204 These two voice represent 
examples of a chorus of academic and professional commentators who argue that 
financial law needs to adapt to the needs of new technologies (like solar energy and 
broader investor participation in it). The solar sector best illustrates how a sunrise 
industry can provide incentives which encourage financial regulators to adapt 
“contingently” (to use our term and in contract to the “structuralist” approach).  
 
What would the final solar energy investment scheme look like?  
 
An information rich environment can improve the sales and liquidity of all kinds of 
financial services markets – including markets for solar-backed assets and liabilities.205 
As we have argued, financial policy (and thus law) should encourage the generation of 
information which help financial service providers match solar assets and liabilities to 
investors’ current portfolio needs. Before we can describe the kinds of legal changes 
needed to bring about a “better” market for sunrise industries (like solar), we need to 
                                                 
202 See Samantha Booth, Here Comes the Sun: How Securities Regulations Cast a Shadow on the Growth 
of Community Solar in the United States, 61 UCLA L. REV. 760 (2014), available online. 
203 For Regulation D, see 17 C.F.R., at sec. 230.504–6, 2013.For the Intrastate Exemption, see 15 U.S.C. 
sec. 77c(a)(11), 2012, [also called the Section 3(a)(11) exemption after the original piece of legislation].  
For state Blue Sky law exemptions (also known as Rule 504 exemptions), see 17 C.F.R. sec. 230.504(b)(2), 
2013. 
204 See Panagiotis Delimatsis, Promoting Renewable Energy Through Adaptive Prudential Regulation in 
Financial Services, TILEC DP 2010-017, 2010, available online. 
205 In this section, we ignore the legal issues to focus on what an idealised solar investment service might 
look like. We discuss legal issues in a later section.  
describe what such a market would look like. Figure 46 provides an example, based on 
California’s experience, of investment information provided by crowdfunder Mosaic. 
Mosaic has received about $20 million from private investors and from the US 
government to develop solar-related investments worth in excess of $100 million.206 
While Mosiac currently aggregates small amounts of money for small investors, 
there is no reason why such a scheme can not apply on a large-scale.  
 
Figure 46: Offering Solar Investments Based on California-Based Mosaic’s 
Experience 
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Source: Mosaic (2014). We have no business or investment relationship with this company and receive no 







206 See Andrew Herndon, Solar Mosaic’s Crowdfunding Beats Treasuries With 4.5% Return, Bloomberg, 7 
Jan, 2013, available online. See also Wendy Koch, U.S. solar projects get lift from online tool, USA Today, 
17 June, 2014, available online.  
Tthe Mosaic example shows three attributes of market design (particularly for securitised 
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assets) which improves the quality of financial information in that market.207  First, 
crowdfunding platforms like Mosaic show exactly which assets “investors” purchase
what they will be used for.208 Second, they facilitate the trade of assets rather than stocks 
and bonds. Investors using the Mosaic platform obtain stakes in hard assets, not opaque 
companies which bundle assets and liabilities together.209 Third, a solar platform like 
Mosaic encourages public discussion about specific assets and the development of the 
solar industry in general. Proof of viability also encourages market entrants – deepening
the market (and thus improving the quality of markets).210 These principles emerge most 
clearly in crowdfunding -- yet, there is no need to confine these principles to small-scale, 
community investment. The development of a Mosaic-like entity in Hong Kong 
represents a public good which could help improve the quality of market 
information and participation in those markets.  
 
A
geography and market-factors.211 The crowd-funding platforms (like Mosaic) which h
developed in California show the importance of geography and focusing on market needs,
instead of focusing “best practice” financial law or adopting Financial Stability Board 
recommendations. New technologies in California, combined with heavy-handed 
business regulation, have led to the crowd-funding movement which entered feder
and later California law.212 Financial law in the US (in particular) is redefining “who” 
(and more important “what”) is a broker-dealer in response to this sunrise industry.213 
Indeed, most commentators argue that regulations requiring open websites and 
transparency serve as a sin qua non for any rulemaking in this area.214 Innovatio
 
207 We take these three attributes from the broader policy literature. Many governments have started 
consultations for developing a crowdfunding policy, as crowdfunding increases participation and 
ctive 
 more 
transparency of certain types of speculative investments. However, we want to focus on broader attra
elements of the developments in crowdsourcing policy (and law) which be applied to financial law
generally. See Kristof De Buysere, Oliver Gajda, Ronald Kleverlaan, Dan Marom, and Matthias Klaes, A 
Framework for European Crowdfunding, 2012, available online. 
208 We put the word investor in quotes as many crowdfunding platforms treat investments as charitable 
contributions in order to circumvent securities regulations. See Edan Burkett, Crowdfunding Exemption - 
ounced 
 Plans 
Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Secrutiies Regulation, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 2012.  
Crowdfunding Exemption - Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Secrutiies Regulation, A,  
209 Mosaic has already encouraged large solar companies to follow its example. SolarCity has ann
plans to offer Mosaic-style asset-backed obligations to investors. See Christopher Martin, SolarCity
to Offer Asset-Backed Debt to Retail Investors, BLOOMBERG 15 JAN., 2014, available online.  
210 At the time of this writing, SunFunder and Crowdsun had entered the market to compete with Mosaic. 
Literally hundreds of start-up solar crowdfunding sites have arisen in response, including of RE-volv and 
 
ncial centres with a contingency-based view.  
start of the crowd-funding 
 
INGS BUS. L.J. 183, 2014.   
gues that such law must require open and plentiful 
Everybody Solar.  
211 We put the word contingent in quotes as we contrast what we call the structuralist view of financial law
in international fina
212 We do not have space to describe the background to the law. However, we should highlight that many 
observers point to a café in Silicon Valley (Oakland California) as the 
movements. See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40
Sec. Reg. L. J. 3, 2012.  
213 See Shekhar Darke, To Be or Not to Be a Funding Portal: Why Crowdfunding Platforms Will Become 
Broker-Dealers, 10 HAST
214 Bradford provides excellent proposals for the provisions for any future crowdfunding regulation. He, 
like most authors writing about crowdfunding law, ar
California (and elsewhere where proponents of crowdfunding seek to raise funds) cre
new and little-understood technologies. Crowd-funding offers the natural advantage of 
producing and offering extensive information about these new investments at the same 
time as presenting the opportunities to invest in the assets themselves. In such an 
information-rich environment, regulators have less need to adopt specific requirem










    
215 Such an information regime 
might help tackle the lack of transparency and other issues which have stinted th
growth of Hong Kong’s structured products and other securities.  
 
M
become China’s solar investment hub. As we discussed in a previous section, financial
centres providing funds to sunrise industries tend to agglomerate in different areas than 
where these new sunrise industries themselves agglomerate. Figure 47 shows the locatio
of Mosaic investors – as compared with the solar panel assets they fund. Mosaic sits in 
Oakland, California – close to many of its investments. Yet, other investments lump 
together in the US Southwest and Northeast. In general, many of the largest US 
contractors’ headquarters – like SolarCity (in San Mateo) sit in Northern Californ
financing companies like Solar World (Camarillo) sit in Southern California. Funds in 
Southern California fund Northern California solar ventures, and visa-versa. The 
undisputed financial centre for solar assets has yet to be established. Yet, if history
as a guide, such a centre will sit not-too-close and not-too-far from the solar companies 
themselves.216 Even if Shanghai and Shenzhen develop financial centres with 
superior solar financing competencies, a place will still exist in the Mainland’
ecosystem for a Hong Kong solar investment centre. 217 
 
                                                                                                                                             
information disclosure. Comparing Mosaic (a crowdfunded asset-backed asset site) with MarkIt (a 
proprietary site providing information about asset-backed and other securities) shows how promising the 
development of asset-backed securities markets following the Mosaic example can be. See Steven Bradford, 
Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2012.  
215 Many of these community-based funding schemes produce so much information that academic authors 
strain to describe what information companies must provide. For authors like Ellenoff, regulatorily required 
information consists of the basics like financial information. See Douglas Ellenoff, Making Crowdfunding 
Credible, 66 VAND. L. REV. 19, 2013.  
216 Cumming and Dai show, in their study of US venture capital, that “local bias” (venture capitalists invest 
in companies in their own city) only under limited circumstances. See Douglas Cumming and Na Dai, 
Local bias in venture capital investments, 17 J. of Empir. Fin. 3, 2010.  
217 Studies like Florida’s show that any jurisdiction developing one or more large sunrise industries will 
have more than enough room for several financial centres. However, his study (like many in this branch of 
the literature) ignores the interactions across financial centres which are required to fund sunrise industries, 
like solar electricity generation. In contrast, Hochberg and colleagues show how financial centres can 
specialize – with generalists locating in one geographical area and specialist funds in others. See Richard 
Florida, Startup City: The Urban Shift in Venture Capital and High Technology, available online. See also 
Yael Hochberg, Michael Mazzeo and Ryan McDevitt, Specialization and Competition in the Venture 
Capital Industry, 2011, available online. 
 
 
Such a regime encourages investors to learn about these products, and the broader solar 
market.218 Figure 48 provides several examples of online infomediaries which 
consolidate experts’, users’ and other information about specific securities (mostly 
equities). These services allow users (both anonymous and registered) to read and discuss 
analysis by other users and by mainstream media outlets. These services rely on three 
public goods which government policy can help put in place. First, these services receive 
real-time updates about changes in securities prices. If Hong Kong were to have similar 
services, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange would need to develop web-apps which third-
parties could query and download – preferably free of charge. Second, public policy 
would need to provide free infomediary services until they build a large enough mass of 
potential paying users to use a fee-plus-free model of information provision.219 Seeking 
Alpha charges for PRO users and Yahoo offers investment reports and other services for 
a fee. By attracting the attention of a large market, a publicly supported platform can 
crowd-in sellers of company information and analysis.220 Third, policy should encourage 
financial institutions as well as individuals to put their analysis and other information 
online. Far fewer research reports cover Hong Kong companies than US companies. For 
services like Thompson Reuters, their reports on Hong Kong companies tend to be far 
briefer and less insightful than those which cover US companies. Again, a body like the 
                                                 
218 A regime which encourages the creation, dissemination and discussion of new investments does not 
need to run counter to an international financial centre’s existing law and regulatory traditions. For example, 
the UK Financial Conduct Authority has proposed a range of measures aimed at promoting crowdfunding 
which follows the UK’s and EU’s existing legislation and regulatory traditions. See UK Financial Conduct 
Authority, The FCA’s regulatory approach to crowdfunding (and similar activities), 2013, available online.  
219 Under free-and-fee based pricing, fees collected from those with the highest income, lowest price 
elasticity of demand, and most demanding customers would help pay for free services provided to the 
public.  
220 Many scholars have written about the economics of selling digital goods (like information about 
securities traded in Hong Kong). Selling information goods often requires versioning of free and paid 
content. For the bible of information marketing and economics, see Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, 
INFORMATION RULES, 1998. 
Financial Services Development Council can encourage financial institutions to release 
more of their research to the public.221  
 
Figure 48: What Would Infomediary Discussion of Hong Kong-listed Solar Assets 
(and Liabilities) Look Like? 
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information in easily to 
digest forms. Yahoo, 
Google, and other 
aggregators all provide 
financial news – giving 
information about US 
securities. They offer far 
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Hong Kong securities. 
Even retail brokers like 
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221 Releasing research represents the typical collective action problem. If HSBC (for example) releases 
analysis for free while other institutions (like Standard Chartered) do not, investors value HSBC’s analysis 
less. By agreeing as a group to release parts of analyst reports, allow limited blogging by staff and so forth, 
coordination between financial institutions can help increase the market for financial information in Hong 
Kong.   
little information about 
Hong Kong shares.  
Information aggregators 
like Morningstar (and 
others) provide value-
added services that 
Yahoo and Google do 
not. By increasing 
demand for Hong Kong 
securities information, 
the Financial Services 
Development Council 
can make infomediaries 
like Morningstar 
profitable in the Hong 
Kong context.  
 
Information provision about these investments in Hong Kong – at least in the short-
term – represents a public good. Developing deeper information markets clearly requires 
policy intervention by the Financial Secretary.222 The market is not big enough for 
private companies and organisations (like the ones we have mentioned) to attract 
investors. As such, Hong Kong policy needs to encourage the development of th
of infomediaries (like Mosaic, Seeking Alpha, and so forth)
ese kinds 
.  
                                                
 
Why can’t Hong Kong get there from here? 
 
The best way to encourage the development of solar-related finance in Hong Kong 
consists of focusing on the needs of solar companies and their financiers. Many have 
already argued that the Government needs to take a pro-active role in encouraging the 
development of the sector.223 Yet, developing a large solar panel production cluster in 
Hong Kong seems unlikely.224 Hong Kong’s financial institutions should focus on 
funding Mainland initiatives rather than (or in addition to) Hong Kong ones. Jian-ming 
Zheng (a property tycoon) made headlines recently by pledging about US$530 million to 
 
222 Many think of a stock exchange and the associated organisations providing market information as the 
pinnacle of free-market principles in action. In fact, these institutions have traditionally emerged as self-
regulating public organisations (and later as the result of public policy) to solve collective action and 
coordination problems. See Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J. of L. & 
Econ. 2, 2000.   
223 For example. see Stephen Thompson, Why Hong Kong should be China's green-energy leader, and what 
we can do, SCMP 11 MAY, 2014, available online. See also Anthony Dixon and Lu Lin, Hong Kong must 
warm to the benefits of solar power in future energy mix, SCMP 1 APRIL, available online. 
224 For more on the recent failure of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen large-scale solar project 
after one of the largest investors (DuPont Apollo) pulled out, see Chi-fai Cheung, Sun sets on joint Hong 
Kong-Shenzhen solar project, SCMP 21 MAY, 2014, available online. For the success of Mainland 
endeavours, see Eric Ng, Solar farm taps crowd funding for 10m yuan project, SCMP 20 FEB., 2014, 
available online. 
buy Mainland solar-related assets.225 Bloomberg reports his state in Shunfeng 
Photovoltaic International rose more than 2,900% -- clearly showing the profitability of 
investing in Mainland solar assets.226 Yet, Hong Kong securities laws have not helped 
investors like Zheng -- and millions of others -- make these kinds of investments.  
 
Part of the problem revolves around Hong Kong’s legal conceptions of what constitutes a 
security investors should want to invest in. During the recent 5-10 years, the US and UK 
have modernised parts of their securities law to promote the development of sunrise 
industries – prompting some scholars to engage in a rethink about the nature of securities 
themselves.227 These changes take into account new tastes in investing (such as investing 
directly in assets rather than in stocks and bonds which give investors only indirect access 
to assets and liabilities they may be interested in). These legal changes also take into 
account the fact that some new industries (like internet or renewable energy assets) may 
require new securities that pass through risks and returns more effectively than traditional 
stocks and bonds.228 What are some of these changes – and what can Hong Kong learn 
from international financial centres’ experiences?  
 
In the next section, we review several seemingly disparate pieces of legislation. Dodd-
Frank looks different than the JOBS Act. However, both seek to increase disclosure and 
information about assets – a principal which not only protects investors, but (as we have 
shown in our discussion of solar) can increase market depth and liquidity for sunrise 
industry assets and liabilities. In the first part, we review changes in reporting about 
special purpose vehicles and collective investment companies “stuffed” with asset-
backed asset securities. We show how a disclosure regime can help improve markets by 
giving infomediaries information. The second section talks about legal changes to/for 
infomediaries and funding portals. The third section talks about changes in the security of 
collateral placed in these company vehicles. At present, investors can not go after the 
assets. The fourth section talks about changes in Hong Kong’s advertising regime. We 
argue for a special regime – modelled after the JOBS Act – promoting informational 
rather than demand-raising ads.  The fifth section talks about how a solar industry (or any 
sunrise industry based on asset-backed securities) needs to improve collections on the 
Mainland. We describe how to improve those collections. The sixth section describes 
changes to credit agencies. The traditional credit agencies can help investors form 
                                                 
225 Ehren Goossens and Benjamin Haas, Hong Kong property tycoon betting big on solar rebound, 
BLOOMBERG 2 APRIL, 2014, available online.  
226 Id.  
227 See Thaya Knight, Hui-wen Leo, Adrian Ohmer, A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer on Securities 
Crowdfunding and Title III of the Jobs Act, Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law, 
Vol. 2, p. 135, Fall 2012. See also Joan Heminway, What is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era? 
7 Ohio St. Entrepren. Bus. L.J. 335 (2012) University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 204 
228 Preliminary data has already come in showing that securitisation of non-financial firm assets may 
provide “better” sequestration of individual risks and rewards in a company (as measured by the returns on 
these securities). Securities which provide investors with better isolation of risks and returns should 
experience higher demand – and thus higher returns as investors bid up their prices. See Michael Lemmon, 
Laura Xiaolei Liu, Mike Qinghao Mao, and Greg Nini, Securitization and Capital Structure in 
Nonfinancial Firms: An Empirical Investigation, J. OF FIN. (forthcoming), available online. See also Faten 
Sabry and Chudozie Okongwu, Study of the Impact of Securitization on Consumers, Investors, Financial 
Institutions and the Capital Markets, 2009, available online. 
decisions about asset-backed securities. But new forms, like crowd credit ratings, are 
better. The seventh section culminates in a sunrise investment promotion ordinance 
(SIPO). The last section describes the Financial Services Development Council’s role in 
promoting sunrise industries. While we talk a lot about crowdfunding of asset-backed 
securities and other structured products, we want to focus on the principles which 
Hong Kong’s regulators can apply across all sizes and types of investment.229  
 
Financial Law in the Service of Demand for Sunrise Industry (and Solar) Securities 
 
Special purpose vehicles and issuers in asset-backed sunrise industry securities  
 
Recent changes in financial law have recognised that new technologies require new rules 
around the treatment of securitised assets and liabilities. Traditionally, asset-backed 
securities have been except from registration, as they have been sold in private 
placements to accredited and qualified-institutional investors. Yet, supporting our paper’s 
thesis that law is “contingent” on investors’ needs, as asset-backed securities become 
more useful to investors of all kinds, US law has adapted.230 The Dodd-Frank Act – and 
related SEC rulemaking in particular -- has put in place reforms aimed at increasing 
information disclosure about asset-backed securities and other types of securitised 
products.231 Figure 49 shows some of the provisions aimed at increasing the transparency 
of the asset-backed securities market in the US.232 As shown, most of these provisions 
encourage investors to produce information (or invest in the production of such 
information) about asset-backed security-related investments.233 Proposals and new rules 
require the disclosure of asset-level information, computer-readable loan-level 
information, required reporting when securities trade hands, information about 
repurchases, and requirements to disclose representations and warrantees. New proposals 
also encourage giving investors the tools they need (like waterfall simulations) showing 
which assets and tranches might not be paid in case the underlying assets do not pay-off. 
                                                 
229 The convergence of new (looser) rules on advertising and participating in securities transactions and 
crowdfunding in the US occurred because of new information technologies (the internet) and the need to 
stimulate post-crisis job growth. The principles contained in the JOBS Act or CROWDFUND Act though 
do not necessarily need to apply only to small size transactions and other features which characterise 
crowdfunding.  
230 See Aron Zuckerman, Securitization Reform: A Coasean Cost Analysis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 303, 2011. 
231 Hahn provides a competent overview of the changes. Generally speaking, readers interested in looking 
at specific parts of the Act related to asset-backed securities should consult section 943 and the SEC’s rules 
related to implementing the section. See Robert Hahn, Dodd-Frank Act - Securitization-Related Final Rules, 
67 BUS. LAWYER 3, 2012. See also US Congress, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 124 STAT. 1376–2223, at sec. 943. See also SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) adopted final rules to implement Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) related to asset-backed securities (ABS), RELEASE NOS. 33-9175; 34-
63741. 
232 For an overview, see SEC, Asset-Backed Securities, 2014, available online. 
233 The US has championed increasing the production of such information in fora like the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The Organisation has recently promulgated a set of 
principles aimed at increasing asset-backed securities-related disclosures. We will illustrate how putting the 
IOSCO principles into action in the specific case of solar investments could help improve liquidity in Hong 
Kong’s solar asset-backed securities markets. See IOSCO, Principles for Ongoing Disclosure of Asset 
Backed Securities, 2012, available online.  
The new proposals and rules encourage the production of information by removing the 
requirement to have an investment grade from a recognised credit rating agency. As we 
discuss below, investors may develop their own risk assessments, pay for third-party risk 
assessments and talk with other investors. Such requirements create markets in asset-
backed securities information.234  
 
Figure 49: Reporting on Asset-Backed Securities Can Only Deepen Demand for 
Solar Securities in Places Like Hong Kong 
 
Provision Description Reference 
Asset-level  
Information 
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to create rules governing the 
disclosure of asset-level information. The new rules remove a 
previous exemption from disclosing for certain kinds of asset-
backed securities.   
Dodd-Frank s. 942 





Ratings reports should describe the representations and 
warrantees made in the offering documents.  




Offering institutions must report  asset-level information and 
grouped account data in XML (eXtensible Markup Language) 
as an “asset data file” downloadable on the EDGAR site.  




Requires issuers to provide a computer program which 
models the security’s flow of funds (or “waterfall”); helping 
investors analyze the offering and monitor performance.  
SEC Rel. 33-9244 
Lengthening 
decision deadlines  
Investors should have a “reasonable” amount of time to assess 
the offering before the close of the offer.  
SEC Rel. 33-9117 
Issuer review of 
assets 
Issues should review the assets underpinning an asset-backed 
security. 
SEC Rel. 33-9176 
Remove 
requirements for A 
rating 
Issuers no longer need to show an “investment grade” from a 
ratings agency to qualify for reducing reporting requirements. 
SEC Rel. 33-9245  
Allow investors to 
talk with other 
investors 
Any “shelf registered” securities (with reduced reporting 
requirements) must require the issuer/offerer to share investor 
information -- allowing investors to communicate with each 
other.  
SEC Rel. 33-9244 
Required reporting 
when securities 
trade hands  
Known as “Exchange Act reporting”, these rules a Dodd-
Frank provision which requires asset-backed securities to 
report, just like other securities under the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act.  






Requires securitizers to buy-back securities if they made an 
inaccurate warrantee or representation.  
SEC Rel. 33-9175 
Information about 
repurchases 
Securitizers must provide a table, reporting a security’s 
history of fulfilled and unfulfilled repurchase requests 
(aggregated for all of the securitizer’s asset-backed securities) 
if investors are required to repurchase assets.  
SEC Rel. 33-9175 
The table provides an (over)simplified description of US asset-backed securities’ disclosure-related 
rulemaking. See the original citation for specifics.   
Source: US Securities and Exchange Commission (2014) and American Bankers Association (2012), 
available online.  
                                                 
234 We do not discuss provisions aimed at reducing systemic risk (most importantly by requiring originators 
to retain part of the securities they package and sell).  
The US’s new rules on asset-backed securities show the “contingent” way financial law 
evolves in a leading international financial centre. US regulators have focused on rules 
which increase investors’ access to information about asset-backed assets – making 
markets deeper as well as safer. Traditionally, US law has exempted asset-backed 
security issuers from stringent information filings with the SEC, as long as these issuers 
maintained an investment grade rating.235 Three new developments (which we briefly 
described in the figure above) will encourage investors and third-parties to generate a 
multiplicity of reviews and assessments. First, issuers of asset-backed securities need to 
assess the underlying assets for any registered asset-backed security - and ensure the 
accuracy of statements made about those assets.236 Second, transaction documents 
require credit risk managers to review the underlying assets in order to obtain reducing
filing paperwork conditions (a “shelf filing”) with the SEC.
 
w 
d securities.   
                                                
237 Third, much of the 
information required to be disclosed will sit on publicly available databases -- providing 
the “fodder” for a range of independent assessments.238  Hong Kong law should follo
the US in increasing requirements which increase the number and depth of 
assessments of asset-backe
 
Hong Kong engaged in few of these reforms – making its asset-backed securities markets 
opaque and thus less liquid.239 In general, Hong Kong regulations govern disclosures and 
advertising relate to listed and unlisted structured products.240 Both pieces of regulation 
follow the general principle that advertising should “not be false, biased, misleading or 
deceptive and should include appropriate risk warnings.”241 The Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC) has recently concluded perfunctory work on reforming Hong Kong’s 
structured products.242 Yet, nothing in the SFC’s Guidelines and Codes comes remotely 
 
235 The Investment Company Act of 1940 generally requires companies selling investment products to 
register as an “investment company.” Such registration brings with it numerous regulatory requirements to 
register and follow certain rules. Rule 3a-7 of the Act allows asset-backed securitizers to avoid registration 
if they sell securities only to accredited investors, qualified institutional buyers (among other conditions). 
See Investment Company Act, at Rule 3a-7, available online. For an overall of the proposed changes to the 
rule, see also Orrick, ABS Issuers and the Rule 3a-7 Exclusion from the Investment Company Act, 2011, 
available online. 
236 SolarCity’s recent offering shows the amenability of solar-backed assets to such assessments. The 
offering documents report the results of engineers’ assessment of the underlying assets. See see Xilun Chen 
and Weili Chen, SolarCity LMC Series I LLC (Series 2013-1), available online. 
237 See Bingham, SEC Issues Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Treatment of Asset-Backed 
Issuers Under Rule 3a-7 and Section 3(c)(5) of the Investment Company Act, 2011, available online. 
238 See PwC, FSR Insights: 20 questions about the status of Regulation AB 2.0, FSR INSIGHTS, 2014, 
available online. 
239 Many academics have focused on inadequate disclosure as the Achilles-heel of Hong Kong’s regulations 
governing asset-backed securities and securitised products. See Will  Shen, When Complexity Impairs 
Disclosure – A Critique of SFC’s Proposal to Strengthen the Disclosure Regime after the Lehman 
Minibonds Incident in Hong Kong, 23 EURO. BUS. L. REV. 6, 2012.  
240 The relevant regulations sit in two pieces of regulation -- SFC Handbook for Unit Trusts and Mutual 
Funds, Investment-Linked Assurance Schemes and Unlisted Structured Investment Products and the 
Guidelines on Marketing Materials for Listed Structured Products, 
241 See SFC, Guidelines on marketing materials for listed structured products, available online. 
242 For a review, see Morrison & Foerster, HK SFC’s New Regime on Unlisted Structured Investment 
Products, 1 MORRISON & FOERSTER NEW BULLETIN 10, 2010, available online. 
close to imposing the same kinds of disclosure US law does.243 Hong Kong regulators 
have seemed relatively content to follow the “structuralist” approach to reform – by 
adopting Financial Stability Board recommendations – rather than make 
regulations “contingent” on market needs.244  
 
Imagine if Hong Kong had a US-style disclosure regime governing its asset-backed 
securities? Figure 50 shows a hypothetical screen shot from a database (infomediary) 
presenting information about an investment in the solar-backed assets we described in the 
previous section. The screenshot shows most of the information required by the US 
rulemaking we described previously. If Hong Kong adopted US-like regulations, 
investors would know which assets they purchase, latest trades, reviews from other 
investors and other information. Without explicit SFC mandates to provide such 
information, the information markets needed to develop Hong Kong’s markets for 
sunrise industry securitised products will never develop.   
 
* Includes reports recommended under IOSCO’s event-based reporting criteria. 
The figure shows an example of what solar asset-backed securities sold in Hong Kong might look like if Hong Kong followed the approch to 
disclosure taken in the US and as recommended by the IOSCO.  
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Figure 50: Hypothetical Displayed Information about Solar Asset-Backed
Security If Hong Kong Adopted US and IOSCO Style Disclosure Provisions 
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The US experience teaching us three things about the way Hong Kong’s financial law can 
develop “contingent” to the needs of sunrise industries. First, legal change which makes 
for a first-tier international financial centre may not occur explicitly because 
policymakers want to develop sunrise industries. US lawmakers focused mostly on 
investor protection which adopting the relevant Dodd-Frank Act and relevant SEC rules. 
Yet, most analysts understood the need to change the entire trajectory of the development 
                                                 
243 For a general review of recent rulemaking, see Linklaters, Reform of Structured Products Marketing 
Regime, 2011, available online. For a highly approachable review of Hong Kong’s structured products 
disclosure requirements, see    Godric Chan, Richard Mazzochi, and Urszula McCormack, Anatomy of a 
structured product sale in Hong Kong - are you missing anything?, KING & WOOD MALLESONS ALERT, 
2012, available online.  
244 For a review of Hong Kong’s work on these standards, see FSB, 2013 IMN Survey of National Progress 
in the Implementation of G20/FSB Recommendations, 2013, available online. 
of US financial law -- based on new tastes and technologies.245 The Act provided 
securities market actors a much-needed impetus to adopt new information technologies 
and focus on retail investors.246 Second, Hong Kong regulators have failed to adjust 
regulations governing securitisation because they mistakenly see Hong Kong citizens as 
their constituents. As we argued in this paper, an international financial centre matches 
investors from outside Hong Kong (US and EU) with investments also outside Hong 
Kong (on the Mainland). “Importing” some of the Dodd-Frank Act (and JOBS Act) 
reforms would help ensure Hong Kong’s regulations cover investors who have already 
expressed preferences for such regulation.247 Third, legal provisions requiring increased 
disclosure would be useless without legal changes allowing infomediaries to collect and 
share such information. Rules need to encourage third-parties like broker-dealers to 
solicit interest based on investors’ needs rather than simply promising high-yields.248 
Intermediaries determine the quality, quantity and user-friendliness of information about 
asset-backed and other types of securities.249 
  
Infomediaries and funding portals for sunrise industries 
 
A vibrant market for solar asset-backed securities can develop only when law develops 
around investors’ needs – and particularly around providing information. We previously 
provided the example of Mosaic Solar, showing how more information can help improve 
the depth and liquidity of asset-backed and securitised products markets.250 The changes 
                                                 
245 Some have argued that Dodd-Frank represents a “paradigm shift” in the way of thinking about financial 
regulation. See Ronald Borod, Did Dodd-Frank Hit or Miss the Securitization Bull’s Eye?, 38 WTE 3, 
2012, available online.  
246 A Marxist might Dodd-Frank as the legislative response to dialectical forces militating for change in the 
US’s “economic superstructure.” The rest of us might just argue that the crisis provided a much-needed 
excuse to modernise the US’s financial regulation. For a discussion, see David VanHoose, Systemic Risks 
and Macroprudential Bank Regulation: A Critical Appraisal, NFI PB 2011-PB-04, 2011, available online. 
For a more technocractic discussion of the technological aspects involved, see Rumman Iqbal and Rohit 
Sadhu, The Dodd-Frank Act: Impact on Derivatives Technology Infrastructure, WIPRO WP, available 
online. 
247 In other words, investors in the US (and increasingly EU) have already voted for Dodd-Frank and JOBS 
Act reforms -- showing their desire for these reforms. As Hong Kong broker-dealers accommodate these 
groups of investors, why not give them the rules they already said they want in other political arenas? 
While most academics criticize the way Dodd-Frank acts on those political preference, even the most 
strident academics do not dispute the Act’s desired goals. See John Coffee, The Political Economy of 
Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1019, 2012. 
248 Some scholars have claimed at Dodd-Frank represents an attempt to achieve broader public policy 
objectives. Putting investors back in touch with the companies (and assets) they fund certainly qualifies as a 
public policy objective. See David Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act's Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using 
the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 2011. 
Dodd-Frank Act's Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy 
Issues, The;, M.  
249 For this “epistemological” study of the way intermediaries shape investors’ information set, see Henry 
Hu, Too Complex to Depict - Innovation, Pure Information, and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1601, 2012.  
250 Offering memoranda usually do not make for gripping reading. However, Mosaic Solar’s highlights all 
the major issues involved in the sale of securitised solar assets. The offering document also shows how the 
mostly likely to give impetus to the US’s solar asset-backed securities markets do not 
come from Dodd-Frank or SEC rules on securitisation. They come from crowdfunding 
legislation. Such legal changes – with their view toward information-sharing and easing 
restrictions on participating in all kinds of securitisation transactions -- will likely affect 
securitisations in sunrise industries at all levels.251  
 
The US CROWDFUND Act represents the first step toward creating the legal framework 
for transparent, wide-spread participation in the US’s sunrise industries’ asset-backed 
securities –like those offered by Mosaic Solar.252 Provisions in a part of the Act – known 
individually as the CROWDFUND Act – regulate many newly established 
crowdfunders.253 Figure 51 summarises some of the key provisions of the Act, and 
related rulemaking by the SEC and FINRA.254  While the provisions target small-scale 




Figure 51: New Provisions Governing US CROWDFUND companies 
 
a) investments must be less than $1 million  
b) limits on investment depend on investors’ income 
c) regulates “funding portals” as quasi broker-dealers 
d) register with a self-regulating organisation 
e) “health warnings” to potential investors 
f)  background checks on directors 
g) requires “all or nothing” offers 
h) requires intermediation through portal or broker (no direct sales) 
i) three tier financial reporting (100k or less is income tax statements, 100-500k is financial 
statements and 500k+ is audited financial statements).  
While US lawmakers have laid the foundations for developing online asset-backed 
securities markets, the SFC has taken pains to remind potential crowdfunders about the 
                                                                                                                                                 
US puts into practice many of the principles we have described. See Mosaic, Offering Memorandum: Solar 
Mosaic, Inc. $294,790 Solar Power Notes, 2013, available online. 
251 Several authors have commented on the way the legislation we describe in this section represents a 
paradigm shift in the way lawmakers and regulators think about financial regulation. Like with any change, 
several authors express scepticism about the fit of the law in existing corpus of financial law and its likely 
impact. Hemingway and Hoffman question the legal fit and impacts, whereas Wenzell questions the 
economic impacts. See Joan Heminway and Shelden Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and 
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 2011. See also Tom Wentzell, The JOBS Act: Effects on 
Capital Market Competition in Both Public and Private Markets, 10 U. OF ST. THOMAS L. J. 3, 2013.  
252 As part of the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, the Capital Raising Online While 
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure (CROWDFUND) Act focuses specifically on activities the 
reader would identify with crowdfunding. We keep our discussion of the JOBS Act and Title III of that Act 
(known as the CROWDFUND Act) relatively short. See Peter Sumners, Article IV: Crowdfunding 
America's Small Businesses After the JOBS Act of 2012, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 38, 2012.  
253 For an overview, see Michael Zuppone, Demystifying the Recently Enacted Crowdfunding and Private 
Offering Reforms: Opportunities for Issuers and Investors, available online.  
254 For a overview, see Noam Noked, Jobs Act Title III Crowdfunding Moves Closer To Reality, HLS 
FCGFR DEC. 6, 2013, available online. 
 
illegality of offering securities in Hong Kong under a crowdfunding scheme.255 
Crowdfunded solar (and other sunrise industry) asset sales require three things in Hong 
KOng. First, solar-asset websites and offerers – whether in general or in a crowdfunded 
scheme – must be licensed and offer SFC-authorised securities.256 Second, 
advertisements themselves must follow SFC regulations and offerers must provide for a 
prospectus.257  Third, platforms (like Mosaic) operated in Hong Kong would probably 
breach provisions related to the offer of automated trading services and existence as a 
recognized exchange company.258 Some types of advertisements could be exempted 
under Hong Kong’s “qualified investors” provisions. However, the other points still 
apply.259  Hong Kong law does not allow for many of the provisions already adopted 
in the US – making Hong Kong an unlikely jurisdiction for the creation and trade of 
sunrise industry asset-backed securities and other securitised products. 260 
 
What can Hong Kong do to put in place platforms (like Mosaic)? Figure 52 provides a 
“for dummies” version of the relevant provisions governing the authorisation of an 
automated trading service and recognized exchange company like a Hong Kong version 
of Mosaic Solar.261 In both cases (allowing an “automated trading service” or 
“recognized exchange company”), the Securities and Futures Commission has the 
authority to authorise a company like Mosaic Solar to operate in Hong Kong.262 The 
Commission has published guidelines for regulating automated trading services. These 
principles-based rules require providers to have sufficient financial resources, engage in 
risk management, ensure their own operational integrity and fitness to operate an 
automated trading service.263 The Guidelines also require that providers keep records, 
                                                 
255 See SFC, Notice on Potential Regulations Applicable to, and Risks of, Crowd-funding Activities, 7 May 
2014, available online. 
256 Securities and Futures Ordinance at sec. 114 -115 and Schedule 5.  
257 For the requirement that only authorised securities are allowed to be advertised, see Securities and 
Futures Ordinance, at sec. 103. For prospectus requirements, and in case of an issue by a company 
incorporated in Hong Kong, see Companies Ordinance (provisions on winding up and other miscellaneous 
provisions), at sec. 38, 38B and 38D. For a company incorporated outside Hong Kong, Companies 
Ordinance at sec. 342 and 342C.   
258 Securities and Futures Ordinance, sec. 19 and 95.  
259 Aspiring solar-backed securities mongers seem highly unlikely to succeed without going through the 
same kinds of authorisation process as the large banks and broker-dealers. Hong Kong -- like the US -- 
exempts advertisements and sales materials pitched only to professional investors. However, offers still 
need the appropriate SFC licenses. See Securities and Futures Ordinance, CAP. 571, at sec. 103.  
260 Even the discourse about crowdfunding these kinds of investments in Hong Kong starkly differs from 
the excited and optimistic tone of the US. The SCMP’s Howard Winn has penned a number of hopeful 
articles about the sector -- noting general malaise in the crowdfunding space. For example, see Howard 
Winn, Hong Kong crowd funding site looking for momentum, SCMP 13 MAR., 2014, available online. 
261 We provide this description of the reader uninterested in the technicalities of the Ordinance and thus 
unlikely to rely on our paraphrase of the Ordinance. To take one example, the original refers to the 
“Commission” which we paraphrase as “SFC.” Even a cursory reading will see we make many elisions like 
this. The reader should read our paraphrase side-by-side with the original to make sure some items have not 
been ‘lost in translation.’   
262 Sec. 95(2) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance provides the authority to authorise a automated 
trading service, while sec. 19(2) allows the Commission to authorise an exchange company.  
263 See SFC, Guidelines for the Regulation of Automated Trading Services, at Standard 1-3, available 
online.  




Figure 52: “For Dummies” Description of Securities and Futures Ordinance Provisions 
Allowing for a Hong Kong Version of Mosaic Solar 




1) No person shall operate a stock market (platform for buying and selling securities) unless the 
person is a recognised exchange company (among other criteria), 
2) the SFC can recognise a person as a recognised exchange company if such recognition serves 
the public interest or helps regulate securities markets,  
3) the SFC can change or amend its recognition (in consultation with the Financial Secretary) as it 
sees fit,  
4) such a change occurs when the SFC says it occurs (as defined in a notice), 
5) any person operating a stock market can be punished with fines and/or jail time,  
6) when the SFC recognises a “recognised exchange company”, such recognition shall appear in 
the (government) Gazette, 
7)  when the SFC does not want to recognise an exchange company, the SFC shall listen to the 
arguments of an aspiring “recognised exchange company” before rejecting the application for 
recognition,  
8) the SFC shall inform the aspiring “recognised exchange company” who failed to obtain 
recognition about the reasons for its refusal,  
9) providing automated trading services for the operation of a futures market does not constitute 
operating a stock market (and thus require recognition as an exchange company), 
10) a “stock market” is a stock market (as defined in the Ordinance).  
 
Autorization for providing automated trading services 
 
1) Only authorised persons can provide automated trading services, 
2) the SFC can authorise a person to provide these services as it likes,  
3) when the SFC grants such authorisation, it shall announce the authorisation in the Gazette,  
4) the SFC must listen to the arguments of a person applying for authorisation to provide 
automated trading services before refusing them,  
5) the SFC should give reasons for refusing to authorise an automated trading services provider, 
6) the SFC shall publish in the Gazette procedures, principles and standards for applying as an 
automated trading services provider,  
7) such guidelines do not have legal force,  
8) providers shall offer automated trading services to Hong Kong persons,  
9) a person shall not technically be offering automated trading services if that person has and is 
providing financial services to the offeree.  
 
Disclaimer: our brief (and possibly glib) simplification of the Securities and Futures Ordinance provisions 
highlighted omits several elements from each point and in several cases only roughly describes the article 
in the section. Please see the original for the exact wording and meaning. We label our description as “for 
Dummies” because the summary does not remain faithful to the content of the article in several cases.   
 
                                                 
264 Id at Standard 4-7.  
 
The US provides examples of how such portals could be regulated. Under the JOBS Act, 
the Act defines a “funding portal” as “any person acting as an intermediary in a 
transaction involving the offer or sale of securities for the account of others.”265 Funding 
portals need not register as a broker-dealers as long as they remain subject to SEC 
rulemaking, hold membership in a national securities association and follow other rules 
set down by the SEC.266 The Act limits them by requiring that they do not offer 
investment advice or recommendations, actually offer or solicit interest in the securities 
shown on their website, pay agents commissions for helping to sell securities displayed 
on the site, hold/manage investors funds, or other activities the SEC prohibit.267 The 
effect of such legislation consists of creating a two-track regulatory structure -- with 
regulatory easement for sunrise industries.  
 
SEC rulemaking adds clarity to several JOBS Act provisions -- again mostly providing 
extensive and pro-active rules of encouraging the production and dissemination of 
information.268 The extensive list of information which funding portals must put in the 
public domain clearly aim at deepening information markets as much as the financial 
markets they underpin. These include 21 pieces of information -- including a description 
of the issuer’s ownership and capital structure, financial condition, and disclosure of the 
amount of compensation paid to the intermediary for conducting the offering (among 
other factors). Interestingly, the US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
has proposed regulations for funding portals which one would expect of a self-regulating 
body – such as requirements to register, face disciplinary sanctions and so forth.269 
FINRA rules allow the FINRA to post information given by funder portals. Increasingly 
the availability of public information clearly represents a goal of FINRA policy. Clearly, 
these regulations aim to solve a collective action problem by mandating information 
disclosure, thereby deepening US sunrise industry financial markets.270  
 
Requiring such a high degree of disclosure in Hong Kong could significantly add 
transparency (and thus interest) in asset-backed securities marketed in the city.271 
                                                 
265 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, at sec. 304(b). For an overview, see Reid Godbolt, SEC Proposes 
Crowdfunding Rules for Issuers and Funding Portals, 2014, available online. 
266 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, at 304(a). 
267 Id at 304(b)(A-E). 
268 See SEC, Crowdfunding, FILE NO. S7-09-13, 2014, available online. For a more digestable version, see 
Michael Zuppone, SEC Proposes Regulation to Implement JOBS Act Crowdfunding Offering Provisions, 
available online.  
269 See FINRA, Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act: FINRA Requests Comment on Proposed 
Funding Portal Rules and Related Forms, Regulatory Notice 13-34, 2013, available online. See also FINRA, 
Appendix A: Funding Portal Rules, available online. 
270 A number of commentators rightly critique the SEC rules for the wrong reason. These authors argue for 
relaxed information requirements because these provisions’ steep compliance costs. One estimate places 
the cost of raising $100,000 under these rules at about $40,000. Critiques about their cost ignore the large 
social value placed on information disclosure. See Rutheford Campbell, Proposed Crowdfunding 
Regulations Under the Jobs Act: Please, SEC, Revise Your Proposed Regulations in Order to Promote 
Small Business Capital Formation, available online. 
271 In a recent study, Friewald and co-authors find that increased reporting of structured products (on the 
TRACE database) has corresponded to increased market liquidity and depth. See Nils Friewald, Rainer 
Some of these information items required under the new US rules already appear in Hong 
Kong prospectuses and other information. Yet, not all infomediaries have the same 
objectives -- and thus regulators should not treat them equally. Heminway broadly 
characterizes these infomediaries as distributional (like Sunfunder), informational (like 
most) and collectivizing intermediaries (like Mosaic).272 Clearly, the SEC and Finra (or 
their Hong Kong equivalent in the SFC) should not regulate informational sites which do 
not take money the same way they regulate aggregators. Moreover, as Schwartz notes, 
the CROWDFUND Act basically has the effect of converting debt and asset-backed into 
equity-like securities.273 Paraphrasing his argument, the Act imposes information 
reporting and other requirements on crowdfunded debt and asset-backed securities - 
making them look, feel and act like equity. Regulation can have the effect of making 
non-equities look, feel and trade like equity -- increasing Hong Kong’s market depth 
and liquidity and popularity.  
 
Yet, Hong Kong should not slavish follow the US’s lead. Figure 53 shows the major 
issues raised in the US’s infomediary and funding portal regulations, and Hong Kong’s 
preferred response. Most importantly in the figure, US regulations do not allow for the 
trade of asset-backed securities under the JOBS and CROWDFUNDING Acts’ rules.274 
We previously argued the US’s differential treatment of crowdfunding and asset-backed 
securities reflects history, more than practical necessity.275 No a priori reason exists to 
exclude asset-backed securities from the regime we advocate - a regime encouraging 
Mosiac-like reporting and user-friendly investment analysis.  
 
Figure 53: How Should Provisions in Hong Kong Relate to Changes Happening in 
the US?  
 
Issue US Hong Kong (preferred)* 
nationality of firms taking 
part 
US-only anyone 
allow already registered 
companies 
already registered only allow anyone 
adverts not allowed should be allowed 
commissions not allowed should be allowed 
secondary sales only back to issuer  anyone 
anti-dilution (tag-along) doesn’t have  should have  
21 pieces of information 
put in the public domain 
yes also should have 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jankowitsch, and Marti Subrahmanyam, To Disclose or not to Disclose: Transparency and Liquidity in the 
Structured Product Market, 2013, available online. 
272 See Joan Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals under the CROWDFUND 
Act, 13 UC DAVIS BUS. L. J. 1, 2013.  
273 See Andrew Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. VOL. 1, 2013. 
274 See Orrick, Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act Eases Restrictions on Rule 144A and Private 
Offerings – ABS Considerations, 2012, available online.  
275 As Orrick notes, the Dodd-Frank Act (with its focus on financial system risk) contains a punitive  
approach to asset-backed securities’ regulation. The JOBS Act, in contrast, focuses on promoting job 
growth in a recessionary environment.     
asset-backed securities 
allowed? 
no yes (should be allowed) 
risk-retention yes no 
The figure shows major issues in the US’s asset-backed securities and crowdfunding law and provides 
suggestions as to how Hong Kong regulators should deal with these same issues.  
* Hong Kong represents authors’ recommendations.  
Source: US based on JOBS Act and SEC regulations.  
 
Several other areas should differentiate Hong Kong’s sunrise industries financial 
industries financial regulation from the US JOBS Act predecessor. US law does not allow 
for anti-dilution (tag-along) rights -- discouraging future investors.276 Clearly, this 
represents an oversight which Hong Kong regulators can relatively easily address at 
home. US-based asset-backed securitisation schemes controversially require issuers 
(originators) to retain some of the risk in the securitised assets they sell.277 Such risk 
retention requirements will likely make the US markets less attractive, increasing Hong 
Kong’s lustre as a securitisation centre.278 Hong Kong lawmakers need not -- and 
probably will not -- adopt similar risk-retention measures at home.279 The US only allows 
US firms to take part in the JOBS Act -- and its incentives. Clearly, faults with US 
securitisation rules provide a market opportunity for Hong Kong.280  
 
Making advertising easier and more informative  
 
Advertising represents one of the key ways of informing investors about the most 
productive opportunities for deploying their capital – particularly in sunrise industries. 
Regulators and their advisors usually focus on “persuasive” advertising – advertising 
which seeks to encourage investors to buy investments they normally would not in the 
absence of such advertising.281  Statutorily-defined objectives focusing on investor 
protection usually guide regulators’ focus on persuasive advertising.282  Yet, 
                                                 
276 See John Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture 
Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. 3, 2013.  
277 See KPMG, Regulators Revise Proposed Risk Retention Rules for Asset-Backed Securitizations, 13 
Defining Issues 46, 2013, available online. 
278 We ignore the issue of whether such rules will promote financial stability -- as the academic literature 
still has not reached a conclusion. The main point remains -- US risk retention requirements under Dodd-
Frank make Hong Kong attractive. See Timothy Geithner, Macroeconomic Effectsof Risk Retention 
Requirements, 2011, available online. 
279 In the US context, when an originator in California passes off all the risks of an asset-backed security to 
investors in New York, the US as a whole still faces systemic risk. However, if originators in Hong Kong 
pass off these risks to investors in Mexico (for example), we externalise these systemic risks. Thus, Hong 
Kong is in the enviable position of passing off risks which fragilise foreign economies, while reaping the 
benefits of fat securitisation fees and commissions.   
280 Academics from all disciplines remain highly critical of Dodd-Frank and its effect on the 
competitiveness of the US financial services industry. For one of the many examples of such analysis, see 
David Batty, Dodd-Frank's Requirement of Skin in the game for Asset-Backed Securities May Scalp 
Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 2011.  
281 For a review of these kinds of advertising and the broader economic principles of advertising in all 
sectors (including financial services), see Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, 2005, 
available online. 
282 In Hong Kong for example, the Securities and Futures Ordinance requires that the SFC “provide 
protection for members of the public investing in or holding financial products.” The Ordinance also 
“informative” and “complementary” advertising actually allow investors to identify 
investment opportunities and participate in them. Numerous studies have shown that the 
informative advertising of financial services creates value and reduces investors’ 
dissatisfaction with their investments.283 Many authors have noted that strong incentives 
exist in the financial services to engage persuasive advertising which adds no particular 
value – and may destroy by encouraging investors to purchase high risk – low return 
investments.284 Fortunately, at least in the US, regulators have increasingly relaxed rules 
on financial services advertising.  
 
The JOBS Act allows for advertising which helps better match investors’ needs with 
investment products. Under the Act, private companies – like many of the solar 
companies reviewed earlier in this paper – can directly advertise to “accredited investors” 
and “qualified institutional investors” (who receive this designation because of their self-
identified desire to receive such advertisements).285 The Act and related SEC rules have 
three effects in promoting the development of information markets in sunrise 
industries.286 First, general solicitation (in newspapers, on the internet, in public speeches 
and so forth) is now allowed. Solar companies like Yingli can put up posters in Times 
Square (New York) saying “Buy 100 shares of Yingli and Reduce Your Reliance on Coal 
Electricity.”287 Second, SEC rules look poised create a class of accredited investors able 
to receive advertisements about solar (and other) investment opportunities.288 Overtime, a 
group of “accredited investors” will expand – creating an expanded class of investors, but 
still not providing information to the broader public as originally hoped.289 Third, 
regulators seek to create public markets in information by requiring companies to report 
                                                                                                                                                 
requires the SFC to “promote understanding by the public of financial services including the operation and 
functioning of the securities and futures industry” – but not understanding of particular products or 
industries. Such objectives clearly encourage the SFC to focus on the risk-side of securities advertising 
without much regard for the return-side of such advertising. See Securities and Futures Ordinance, at sec 4.  
283 See Simone Wies, Arvid Hoffmann, Jaakko Aspara, and Joost Pennings, Shareholder Complaints and 
Advertising Investments, 2014, available online. 
284 Mutual funds in particular represent an area where academics have found advertising probably destroys 
rather than creates value. See Alan Palmiter and Ahmed Taha, Mutual Fund Performance Advertising: 
Inherently and Materially Misleading? GEORGIA L. REV., 2011, available online. See also Bruce Huhmann 
and Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, Does mutual fund advertising provide necessary investment information?, 
23 INT’L J. OF BANK MARKETING 4, 2005.  
285 For more, see Larissa Lee, The Ban Has Lifted: Now is the Time to Change the Accredited-Investor 
Standard, UTAH L. REV. Forthcoming, 2014, available online. At the time of this writing, individuals (and 
institutions) receive such status because they have identified themselves to the advertiser or an intermediary 
whom the advertiser relies on when obtaining the lead’s contact information. Accredited investors usually 
sign a declaration saying they met the criteria of an accredited investor without providing any supporting 
documents or proof of their assets or income.  
286 The legislative history of the JOBS Act indicates that such advertisements clearly aim at encouraging 
the development sunrise industries (which consist of small companies looking for capital to expand). As 
US President Barrack Obama said, at the Act’s signing, the Act will allow “startups and small business[es 
to] . . . have access to a big new pool of potential investors, namely, the American people.” Remarks on 
Signing the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 2012.  
287 Companies can solicit to the public, but only sell to “accredited investors.”   
288 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, File No. S7-07-12, available online. 
289 For an analysis of the SEC’s rules on “accredited investors”, see The SEC’s JOBS Act Rulemaking: 
What It Means for Private Fund Managers, 2013, available online.  
to the SEC such public advertising.290 In this way, advertisements -- and the valuable 
information they contain -- can not stay within a limited group of persons.  
 
Yet, the JOBS Act (and its amendments of US securities law) still misses the point. First, 
new rules allowing general solicitation to the public will likely encourage potentially 
harmful “persuasive” advertising, rather than the constructive “informative” and 
“complementary” advertising.” Nothing requires companies and financial intermediaries 
to post educational Ogilvy-style ads rather than BDDP & Fils racy ones. If “persuasive” 
advertising of structured products and asset-backed securities contributed to the 2008 
financial crisis, then “informative” advertising could have helped mitigate it.291 Second, 
regulators and academics still wrongly view any definition of “accredited investors” as 
revolving around their wealth or income. Lee for example, proposes to strengthen the 
current principles-based accreditation procedure by using metrics like the investors’ 
financial sophistication, wealth verification, diversification, and upfront disclosures.292 
Instead, policymakers should look at investors’ need for asset-backed securities. Do they 
help the investor understand the market or the assets (for example a coal producer buys 
solar-backed bonds in order to see how they perform before making large-scale 
investments in solar energy)? Do their price movements help hedge other parts of the 
investors’ portfolios (we showed in a previous section that Mainland solar asset’s value 
correlate negatively with the Japanese stock market). Such US financial law defects 
represent an opportunity for Hong Kong.  
 
While Hong Kong law is pretty relaxed about advertising investments, such law clearly 
does not encourage the kind of “informative” advertisement we think will make Hong 
Kong a competitive international financial centre for sunrise industries. In general, 
advertisements abroad – which as we have argued represent the majority of sunrise 
industries’ “catchments area” -- naturally fall within other countries’ jurisdiction.293 The 
regime covering the sale of Hong Kong securities to Hong Kong residents remains as 
restrictive as anywhere in the developed world.294  Companies and investment advisors 
can not put material from a prospectus in an advertisement.295 Exceptions include 
material authorised by the SFC, which informs the viewer of the listing applicant to 
which the advertisement relates, warns potential investors to read the prospectus, and 
states that the advertisement does not constitute an offer or an invitation to buy 
                                                 
290 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, FILE 
NO. S7-06-13, available online.  
291 Wide-spread evidence shows that asset-backed asset offerers and structured product sellers relied on 
increasing the complexity of their securities as a way to reduce competitive pressures in their sector. 
Clearly, such complexity could not exist in a market where investors have become used to clear and 
informative advertising and product information. See Claire Cererier and Boris Vallee , What Drives 
Financial Complexity? A Look into the Retail Market for Structured Products, available online. 
292 See Larissa Lee, The Ban Has Lifted: Now is the Time to Change the Accredited-Investor Standard, 
UTAH L. REV., Forthcoming, 2014, available online. 
293 The Securities and Futures Ordinance excludes foreign advertising from registration. See Securities and 
Futures Ordinance, at 103(3)j.  
294 Sections 103 to 106 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance provide an extensive list of do’s and don’t 
for advertising securities, as well as the types of securities and persons potentially excluded.  
295 See Companies Ordinance, at 38B 
securities.296 Like in most places, Hong Kong law generally allows the giving of 
investment advice in public media – allowing for specific recommendations contained in 
sites like Seeking Alpha or Motley Fool. See Securities and Futures Ordinance at 
Schedule 5(ix). Yet, as briefly discussed in Figure 55, Hong Kong lacks an English-
language information source for Hong Kong and Mainland shares.297 Without a vibrant 
English-language financial press that reports company-level (and even asset-level 





Figure 55: Why Doesn’t Hong Kong Have Its Own Jim Cramer? 
 
Jim Cramer, the host of CNBC’s Mad Money, represents a uniquely American phenomenon. 
Every day, his show and other fora (like TheStreet.com) provide TV viewers and internet 
readers with very specific stock picks. Such picks clearly solicit interest (long or short) in 
specific shares. What makes Jim different from the CEOs of these companies? Or you and I? 
In other words, why does US law allow for – and obviously encourage – advertisements in 
specific shares (even before the JOBS Act)?  Maybe Hong Kong locals may not tune into a 
Hong Kong version of Mad Money – but what about the millions in the US and EU with an 
interest in Mainland (and Hong Kong) shares? Hong Kong law may not prohibit a local Jim 
Cramer – but it neither provides strong incentives for others to replicate Mr. Cramer’s stock 
picking media empire around the China South Sea.  
Hong Kong’s regulatory response has been the tighten regulations around advertising 
investments – rather than let the disinfecting sunlight of transparency do its work. The 
Code on Unlisted Structured Investment Products reflects this approach. The Code 
provides numerous requirements to provide warnings to investors.299 Yet, the Code 
mentions nothing about encouraging intermediaries to provide ideas about such 
investments that could contribute to a well-balanced portfolio. Under the rules, any such 
ideas might be considered as “contain[ing] language, artwork or graphics that is 
inaccurate or inconsistent with the offering document for the relevant structured 
investment product.” Reforms which make advertising structured products more 
                                                 
296 See Companies Ordinance at Schedule 19.  
297 Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, Reuters and other international media organisations work in Hong 
Kong. However, their coverage of Hong Kong companies pales in comparison to their US coverage. A 
simple look at Bloomberg’s Hong Kong page shows much of the “news” about market aggregates and 
macro-economic data from across Asia.  
298 The evidence clearly shows that adopting English has very positive effects on portfolio investment. 
While some of this preference reflects a “home bias” by native English speakers, much of the effect comes 
down to English’s pivotal role as the language of international financial media (and thus source of learning 
about investment options). See Zoran Ivkovic and Scott Weisbenner, Information Diffusion Effects in 
Individual Investors' Common Stock Purchases: Covet Thy Neighbors' Investment Choices, 20 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 4, 2007. See also Thomas Jeanjean, Herve Stolowy, Michael Erkens & Teri Yohn, International 
evidence on the impact of adopting English as an external reporting language, 45 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUD. 5, 
2014.  
299 See Code on Unlisted Structured Investment Products, at Appendix D (Advertising guidelines applicable 
to unlisted structured investment products). 
difficult deprive investors of the information they need to protect themselves from 
the abusive marketing practices committed during the Minibond episode.  
 
Arranging for collections against Mainland collateral  
 
Nothing about Hong Kong’s law makes it a particularly friendly (or unfriendly) 
jurisdiction for securitising assets. Hong Kong follows UK law – giving direct effect to 
UK cases before 1997 and following legislative developments closely since that time. In 
HKSAR v Ma Wai-kwan and others (29 July 1997), the Hong Kong Court of Appeal 
decided that the common law and rules of equity of England which applied in Hong 
Kong on 30 June 1997 continue to apply in the HKSAR, subject to their independent 
development.300 Yet, as much of the collateral for the securitised transactions that rely on 
the Ma Wai-kwan et al. ruling will likely physically rest in other countries. What issues 
does this pose for Hong Kong as an international financial (and securitisation) centre? 
 
Given weaknesses with China’s legal framework governing securitization, “importing” 
Hong Kong law through cross-border securitisation appears the best option for the 
international sale of Mainland solar securities. China has made efforts to develop the 
legal framework around the securitisation of assets and income streams deriving from 
those assets.301 Yet, Mainland law remains extremely non-conducive toward such 
securitisations.302 Following Faleris, we also think that cross-border securitised 
transactions provide the most likely vector for developing the Mainland’s securitised 
asset market – and promoting broader securities market development in general.303 The 
solar industry represents the perfect already-made sector with its own group of 
specialised international investors.304 Moreover, since China lacks laws to govern such 
securitisation, importing law from Hong Kong can help reduce uncertainty around 
the assignment of rights and risks – at least at the securitisation stage.  
 
Depending on the way the originators structure the securitisation, the property rights 
enshrined in the securitisation instruments passing through the hands of Hong Kong’s 
                                                 
300 See Kingsley Ong and Annie Lam, Chapter 20: Hong Kong, In The International Comparative Legal 
Guide to Securitisation 2011, available online.  
301 See Yuwa Wei, Asset-Backed Securitization in China, 6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 225, 2007. See also 
Mimi Hu, Developing Securitization Laws in China, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 2008.  
302 We do not discuss and analyse specific points of Mainland law, in order to keep this paper at a 
reasonable length. For the reader interested in a detailed – though succinct – analysis of the major issues, 
see Roy Zhang and Ma Feng, Chapter 12: China, International Comparative Legal Guide to Securitisation 
2013, available online.  
303 See Nicholas Faleris, Cross-Border Securitized Transactions: The Missing Link in Establishing a Viable 
Chinese Securitization Market, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 201, 2006.  
304 Farleris specifically argues that “rather than attempting to both build an infrastructure and attract 
asset-backed securitization investors with large, sweeping changes, the market would be better served by 
building up the securitization infrastructure gradually and by developing a core group of regional 
investors at the same time.” He specifically seeks to implement his plan with a set of state-owned enterprise 
assets. However, even the causal reader can see his approach (and argument) would be more effective if he 
had framed it in terms of a specific industry like solar. See Id. at 202. See also Id at V.5.   
international financial institutions may fall into one or more jurisdictions.305 Figure 56 
provides an example of the way that various rights, returns and risks flow in the cross-
border sale of Mainland asset-backed solar securities to foreigner investors (like US 
investors).306 We use techniques from a branch of economics known as New Institutional 
Economics, to determine how risks and returns “attach” to various institutions. The figure 
shows each step of the securitisation process, the contracts involved and the risks 
involved (in green below each step). As the number of contracts and jurisdictions 
involved in them increases, the higher the amount of risk inherent in the security.307 
Cross-border securitisation thus tends to increase risks without providing a way of 
making the underlying assets any more productive. As such, the development of deep 
markets for sunrise industry securitisations will rely on finding cheaper and less 
risk-introducing contractual methods of creating asset-backed securities.     
 
Figure 56: Cross-Border Solar Securitisation as a Nexus of Contracts





















Following the New Institutional Economics approach, the figure shows the way the various contracts in solar securitisation “partition” assets and 
expose various parties to de juro and de facto risks and returns. As show, the introduction of more contracts results in the asset picking up 
different kinds of risks without “picking up” extra returns. 
* Series 6 refers to the tranching scheme we describe Figure 32 of the paper.  
Source: authors – with reference to Sandstad and Roy (2012), for the legal issues involved in each step of the securitisation in the Hong Kong
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The major legal issues affecting the assignment of rights (and risks) relates to the 
Mainland’s law on “true sale” and Hong Kong’s law on “equitable assignment.” 
Combined, both issues reduce final investors’ rights over solar assets – particularly in 
case payments stop for any reason. Related to the issue of true-sale, final investors could 
find out that the solar-backed securities they hold never held legal title to the solar panels 
                                                 
305 The instruments underpinning a securitisation represent a method of allocating property rights over the 
securitised assets. Interestingly, new institutional economists -- the branch of economics best equipped to 
analysis how these contracts assign rights and obligations – have conducted few studies of the way the 
assignment of residual rights to these assets affects contract performance (and the way law enforcement and 
national traditions affect the value of those rights). For one study, see Philipp Naubereit and Sonja Gier, An 
Institutional Economic Analysis of Securitization in Real Estate, 2002, available online. 
306 We provide only a summary of the process, with a focus on the aspects of securitisation relevant for our 
discussion. For a broader background, see Jacob Gyntelberg and Eli Remolona, Securitisation in Asia and 
the Pacific: implications for liquidity and credit risks, BIS QUART. REV., 2006, available online. 
307 For deeper discussion, see Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 
8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 255, 1998.   
(or underlying assets) in the first place.308 In Hong Kong’s case, equitable assignment 
means that assets (and income streams) may not “perfectly” pass to final investors.309 In 
both cases, the contractual form chosen may reduce returns to final investors and increase 
risks. As such, Hong Kong law should focus on ways of reducing the securitisation 
agency-chains which introduce risk and dissipate returns.   
 
The other major issue concerns recourse to the solar assets (and liabilities) themselves.  
What happens if these solar panels stop generating (and distributing) income to their 
residual owners of these property rights in the US? What are these investors’ de jure 
rights over the underlying collateral (and the income itself)? If a key advantage of using 
Hong Kong as a securitisation centre revolves around its “better” law, what is the 
likelihood of getting its court orders translated into the Mainland? In general, recognition 
of foreign judgements – particularly those involving civil claims – remains highly 
problematic.310 While bringing action from Hong Kong may be easier than from the US 
or EU( for example), such action still remains difficult.311  
 
Yet, the desultory number of solar-related disputes in Hong Kong at present makes Hong 
Kong hardly look like a centre for exercising solar company-related rights. Figure 56 
presents several Hong Kong solar-related cases, compared with similar cases in other 
jurisdictions.  These can be divided into four major kinds -- patent infringement, contract 
disputes, employment disputes and shareholder disputes. Exciting and industry-forming 
patent disputes comprised only a small part of these civil actions. Only Solarex Corp. v. 
Arco Solar Inc. and Siemens Solar Industries involved a patent dispute. Lack of 
significant photovoltaic sector cases suggests that no court has yet risen to play the 
important industry-forming role it played in sunrise industries like information or 
biological technology.312 Lack of significant litigation of solar industry cases 
represents an opportunity for Hong Kong to establish itself as a venue-of-choice in 




                                                 
308 See Mimi Hu, Developing Securitization Laws in China, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 2008. See also 
Shengzhe Wang, TRUE SALE SECURITIZATION: GERMANY AND CHINA, 2007.  
309 In legal language, “perfection” or “perfecting” an assignment relates to passing of legal rights and 
obligations to the third-party.  
310 See Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken 
and How Do We Fix It? 31 BERKELEY J. OF INT’L L. 1, 2013.  
311 See Jie Huang, Interregional Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: 
Lessons for China from US and EU Laws, J. OF INT’L PRIVATE L., 2010, available online.  
312 For a discussion of the way court judgments can help determine the development of a sunrise industry, 
see Bradford Smith and Susan Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software 
Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. OF CHICAGO L. REV.  1, 2004.  See also Polk Wagner,  
Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1, 2004 
313 The lack of litigation involving asset-based securitisation (or involving the securitisation process in 
general) represents a more serious concern for policymakers looking to Hong Kong’s courts as a venue for 
establishing the cutting-edge legal doctrines which will define the development of sunrise industries like 
solar. Only 3 Hong Kong cases emerged from a brief Westlaw search of asset-backed securities cases. In 
contrast, a cursory search of US federal and state law produced over 2,000 cases.  
Figure 57: Solar-Related Court Cases So Far Extremely Uninspiring  
 
Hong Kong 
CEP Ltd. v Wuxi Jiacheng Solar Energy Technology Co. Ltd.  
[2014] HKCU 1485 
Case involved a dispute over whether the buyer allowed to use a transferable letter of credit to make 
payment and whether the conduct of the seller's representative constituted waiver/estoppel against seller 
on the use of transferable letter of credit.  
Re Solar Touch Ltd.  
[2004] HKCU 751 
Creditor asked to wind up C, a BVI incorporated company.   
Solar Exports Ltd. v Yick Lee Trading (China) Ltd.  
[2003] HKEC 722 
Pedestrian case involving a payment dispute. 
Mainland 
Jiangsu Huaiyin Huihuang Solar Energy Co. Ltd. v Hou Lina 
Dispute involving the infringement of the right to use a trademark. 
US 
Sunearth Inc. and The Solaray Corp. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., NBSolar USA and Does 1-10 
Trademark and trade name infringement case over the right to the Sun Earth name.  
Sybac Solar AG. v. Sybac Solar LLC  
German solar energy company sued its US subsidiary for breaching a project agreement.  
Gaea Holdings, LLC v. Solar Energy Initiatives, Inc. 
Case involved dispute over an independent consulting agreement  
Ray Angelini, Inc., v. SEC BESD Solar One and others  
Ray Angelini Inc. alleged non-payment for services performed.  
Michael Oberstein v. Sunpower Corp. and others.  
NYSA used exclusively SunPower solar PV components in exchange for marketing, advertising, and 
SunPower’s work developing local markets. Later claimed Sunpower did not do enough to promote 
business in the area.  
GT Solar Incorporated v. Fabrizio Goi  
GT Solar Incorporated sued Fabrizio Goi for obtaining confidential information about GT Solar's 
manufacturing process and sharing it with GT Solar's California-based competitor. 
Arkansas Public Employee Retirement System et al. v. GT Solar International, Inc. et al. 
An investor (Arkansas Public Employee Retirement System) who purchased GT Solar shares in the IPO 
sued the company for losses in share price of 24%. The investor claimed GT Solar’s promoters  failed to 
disclose in its offering documents the "substantial likelihood" that GT Solar's biggest customer would stop 
buying its furnaces from GT Solar (which it did stop).  
Siemens Solar Industries v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 
Siemens Solar Industries bought a company manufacturing thin film silicon (TFS) technology. The buyer 
later found out the technology was not commercially viable and abandoned production. The buyer 
claimed the seller did not inform them sufficiently well about such a possible production stoppage.  
Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar Inc. and Siemens Solar Industries, LP.  
Solarex Corp  claimed Arco Solar Inc. and Siemens Solar Industries  violated its patents.  
Invenergy Solar Development v. Gonergy Caribbean SARL and Yazid Aksas  
Gonergy Caribbean SARL and Yazid Aksas agreed to buy Invenergy Solar Development. When the 
acquirers found out the potential acquiree’s projects were not commercially viable, the acquirer tried to 
cancel the sale. The acquirees wanted development fees the acquirer promised. 
MEMC Electronic Materials Inc. et al. v. BP Solar Internatioonal Inc.  
Case revolved around whether one of the company actually purchased silicon powder.  
Solar Cells Inc. v. True North Partners LLC, First Solar LLC, Michael J. Ahearn, Michael L. 
Pierce and Michael Gallagher.  
Shareholders objected to a merger which diluted their share of one of the pre-merger companies.  
Source: Westlaw (2014).  
 
How can Hong Kong law help promote the production of enforceable judgements 
regarding Mainland solar assets? If Hong Kong will develop as a venue-of-choice for 
securitising solar assets, investors must be able to sue Mainland solar companies in case 
of problems. They must know the courts will act – and should have recourse to Hong 
Kong’s courts in case Mainland courts provide little assistance. The 2006 Arrangement 
on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters represents a first step in this direction.314 Figure 58 shows the major provisions 
from the Agreement. In theory, US investors looking to sue a non-listed Mainland 
company like Zhejiang Firstar Panel Tech (for non-payment of promised payments under 
a securitisation claim) may use Hong Kong courts to try and enforce the judgement 
(particularly if they agreed to Hong Kong as the venue-of-choice). Yet, only one case has 
so far mentioned the Arrangement.315 Improving the arrangement will rely on pro-
active government support.  
 
Figure 58: Overview of the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters Arrangement 
 
Article Topic covered 
Article 1 Power to seek recognition of foreign court’s judgment 
Article 2  Definition of “enforceable final judgment” 
Article 3 Definition of “choice of court agreement in writing” 
Article 4  Place to apply for recognition 
Article 5 Standing in case defendant lives/works in more than one province 
Article 6 Documents plaintiff needs to submit (application) 
Article 7 Information needed in application  
Article 8 Application of local law during application proceedings 
Article 9 Conditions mitigating (stopping) any recognition/enforcement 
Article 10 Proceeds on applications during an appeal 
Article 11 Equivalence in effect for court recognising application  
Article 12 Procedure for appealing a decision based on an application 
Article 13 No opening settled cases or using more than one jurisdiction (court) 
Article 14 Authorisation to freeze assets in case of  
Article 15 Payment of enforcement fees/costs 
Article 16 Power to include interest, lawyer fees, and litigation costs  
Article 17 No applications about judgement made before arrangement comes into effect 
Article 18 Dispute resolution (between Mainland and Hong Kong authorities) 
Article 19 Date the Arrangement starts 
 
What can’t the Government do to improve knowledge about, and the use of, the 
Agreement in improving the settlement of potential disputes around securitised assets 
(like solar-backed securities)? The Government established the Financial Dispute 
Resolution Centre specifically in response to poorly functioning securitisation markets – 
                                                 
314 See Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Pursuant to 
Choice of Court Agreements between Parties Concerned, 2006, available online. 
315 See Chengdu Transportation Construction Development Co., Ltd. Thailand v. Neo-China Land Group 
Ltd., [2013] HKCU 51.  
as epitomised by the Minibond scandal.316 Investors dealing with cross-border solar 
securitisations will likely prefer Hong Kong’s financial dispute resolution scheme to the 
Mainland’s.317 The non-regulatory nature of the Centre makes its serious functioning 
unlikely.318 Lack of public information about the Centre’s proceedings make using its 
deliberations as the basis for setting solar-securitisation policy unlikely.319 Mediation and 
arbitration decisions do not accrete into legal doctrines in the same way that case law 
does -- making the Centre a substitute rather than complement to court-based litigation. 
Such critiques are not new. Most proposals aimed at improving the US’s (and to a lesser 
extent the UK’s) dispute resolution framework focus on increasing the transparency of 
the process and releasing more information about these disputes.320 The development of 
alternative (non-judicial) dispute resolution stunts the development of an 
internationally competitive financial law which can attract various parties to solar 
securitisations. 321  
 
What can the Hong Kong Government do to encourage the development of Hong Kong 
as a venue-of-choice in deciding the law of solar-securitisation? In line with our thesis, 
open-access information about investment disputes (including disputes about solar-
backed securities) best allows investors to decide on the risks and mitigate them. The 
Financial Dispute Resolution Centre should have to publish information about all 
disputes, including the financial equivalent value of money concerned (though not the 
outcomes). Improving the arrangement will rely on pro-active support from the 
Department of Justice, working in collaboration with the Financial Services Development 




An international financial centre represents a technology for bringing money to new (and 
existing) tastes and technologies. Yet, somehow, financial regulators and policymakers 
have lost sight of that fact. In this paper, we have illustrated numerous mismatches 
between the supply of, and demand for, funds in China’s solar industry. Financial law – 
                                                 
316 See SFC, Memorandum of Understanding, available online. See also Terms of Reference, available 
online. For a popular media discussion of the Centre, see Enoch Yiu, Hong Kong mediation centre aims to 
end Lehman minibonds investor pain, SCMP 20 MAY, 2013, available online. 
317 See Robin Huang and Shahla Ali, Governing Financial Disputes in China: What Have We Learned 
From the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 7 E. ASIA L. REV. 195, 2012.  
Governing Financial Disputes in China: What Have We Learned From the Global Financial Crisis of 2008;  
318 See Shahla Ali and Antonio Da Roza, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Financial Markets ― Some 
More Equal than Others: Hong Kong’s Proposed Financial Dispute Resolution Centre in the Context of 
Experience in the UK, US, Australia and Singapore, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL. J. 3, 2012. See also Shahla Ali 
and John Kwok, After Lehman: International Response to Financial Disputes – A Focus on Hong Kong, 10 
RICHMOND J.  OF GLOBAL L. & BUS. 2, 2011.  
319 If the Centre provided extensive information about disputes mediated and arbitrated through its good 
offices, policymakers could see emerging issues and respond to them.  
320 For an excellent argument, see Alicia Surdyk, On the Continued Vitality of Securities Arbitration: Why 
Reform Efforts Must Not Preclude Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1131, 2010.  
321 A host of other reasons militate against mediation and arbitration – including thresholds for arbitration 
under HK$500,000. See Justin D'Agostino, The Hong Kong Financial Dispute Resolution Centre – 
Specialist arbitrators required to perform a delicate balancing act?, 2013, available online. 
and other policies – supposedly seek to help Hong Kong’s financial institutions bridge 
those gaps. However, the international financial centre’s financial law (banking and 
securities ordinances and subsidiary regulation) have not helped as much as they could. 
Why not? 
 
A focus on Hong Kong’s financial sector – and the law which governs it – has diverted 
attention away from the industries and consumer preferences which use that financial 
sector. In this paper, we describe the Mainland solar industry’s need for international 
financing. We describe why asset securitisation represents an important method of 
obtaining such finance. We also describe how Hong Kong’s financial law should adopt to 
“drape over” tastes for solar funding and new technologies available for providing such 
funding. We argue that the SFC should modify existing rules -- making informational 
advertising to solar-company investors easier. We also argue that the HKMA and SFC 
should promulgate regulations requiring broader dissemination of bond trades as well as 
information about asset-backed securities. By promoting the development of solar-backed 
security finance, Hong Kong lawmakers will promote the development of sunrise 
industries in general - and thus ensure Hong Kong’s role as an international financial 




Appendix I: Solar Company Finance and the Financial Services Development 
Council’s Business Plan  
 
What can the Financial Services Development Council do to encourage the development 
of solar securitisation financial services? Throughout this paper, we have argued for five 
roles for Financial Services Development Council -- assuming the Council becomes the 
private company it has always intended to become.322 First, it can set up and maintain a 
Mosaic-like website. Second, the Council can help syndicate local English-language 
versions of sites like Seeking Alpha (HK) and Motley Fool (HK). Third, it can set up a 
harmonised webcasting platform like the NASDAQ offers so internet users can see 
investor day presentations, earning calls, annual meetings and other presentations online. 
Fourth, it can help underwrite the Bauhinia solar fund (which sells pooled solar assets) 
and participate in the origination of other solar-backed securities.  Fifth, it can maintain a 
database about disputes involving asset-backed securities (and particularly solar-backed 
ones). These revenue-generating activities supplement its normal role, providing advice 
on the development of Hong Kong’s financial services sector.  
 
The FSDC should provide public goods which make solar securitisation possible 
 
The Financial Services Development Council (FSDC) represents the organisation best 
placed to provide many of the public goods needed for the development of a solar-
securitisation centre in Hong Kong. Promoting sunrise industries – and the securitisation 
of photovoltaic assets and liabilities in particular – represents a public good in three ways. 
First, once a vibrant market for solar asset securitisations exists, private market actors 
will face lower costs in establishing their own services. Second, information disclosure 
represents both a first-mover disadvantage and an experience good (service). Third, 
investments in English-language services can help reduce switching costs as current local 
(non-international) financial institutions target ASEAN, US and EU markets. Initial 
funding for the Council helps pay for initial costs that would be unprofitable for 
private sector actors to pay in the short-run, but which profit all parties in the 
longer-run.  
 
                                                 
322 The original terms of reference for the Council envisioned it as a limited company with its own funding. 
See Cha et al., Preparatory Task Force’s Report on the Setting Up of a Financial Services Development 
Council, 2012, available online.  
 
 
Figure A1: Hong Kong Can’t (Technically) be an International Financial Centre without 
Extensive International English-Language Financial Information  
 
A core strategy pushed by the Financial Services Development Council and pundits advising Hong 
Kong’s policymakers all encourage deeper and closer linkages with the Mainland. Gathering more 
Mainland assets and customers will make Hong Kong a more vibrant international financial centre. 
Concomitant with that approach has been hiring of Mandarin speakers (and keeping printed materials in 
Chinese).  
 
At the risk of seeming pedantic, technically, they are not correct. Hong Kong represents a special 
administrative region in China. Developing Mainland financial service offerings will make Hong Kong 
a more vibrant domestic financial centre (albeit one in a very vibrant market). By definition, if Hong 
Kong wants to become an international financial centre, its financial institutions need clients outside of 
China. And developing these clients requires the lengua franca of the business world – English.  
 
Yet, public investments will need to move Hong Kong’s financial institutions (except international ones 
like Citi and Deutsche Bank to name a few) into using English more widely. Hong Kong financial 
institutions are locked in – having developed Chinese-language materials and customers. Its cheaper to 
expand the Chinese Economic Journal, then develop an English language version of a Hong Kong 
Business Daily. Yet, if these resources already existed, adding to them would only incur marginal costs. 
The Financial Services Development Council can provide resources for the “sunk costs” needed to 
make marginal investments in English-language resources less expensive for financial firms.   
Establishing and updating the web portal about investments in solar assets 
 
Why can’t Hong Kong copy Mosaic? Mosaic has emerged as the result of a public-
private partnership.323 In the text, we described how displaying asset-backed securities 
the way Mosaic does can help deepen Hong Kong’s solar securities markets and make 
investments safer. The Financial Services Development Council -- through a Secretariat -
-- could help crowd-in investments for asset-backed securities by setting up a Mosaic-HK 
as a pilot project.324 Like Mosaic (and other similar sites), the site can list Mainland solar 
asset (and liability) securities on offer once the Financial Secretary’s Office pushes 
through the regulatory framework needed for their offer.325 The site can show 
advertisements – both “persuasive” and “informative” (to the extent allowed by law). The 
site can also charge serious investors for accessing information on a premium basis not 
visible to the general public. Work on this activity would likely be a part-time job. Once 
the software is up and running and initial projects are identified and displayed, the site 
should take care of itself. Specialist staff would need to address complex issues that arise, 
like tax issues, whether a particular asset can be listed, and so forth. Figure A2 provides 
the initial budget for this activity.326  
                                                 
323 The US Department of Energy put up $2 million and private investors put up about $3.4 million in first 
round funding.  Unlike in the case we propose, Mosiac emerged mostly from private initiative. In Hong 
Kong’s case, we propose the public-part of the public-private partnership to go first.  
324 In Arner et al. (2014) we advocate converting the Council into a public body --albeit one still about to 
earn a profit. The Council would need a Secretariat in order to undertake much of the work we propose in 
that paper, and in the current paper you are now reading.  
325 Appendix II describes in more detail the complementary regulatory changes needed for legal and 
successful offer of many of the activities in this section.  
326 Most of the benefits accrue to Hong Kong’s banks -- who then pay back part of these benefits as taxes. 
Yet, we do not calculate the social impacts (costs and benefits) of these activities – as such calculations 








Revenue    
Project listings 80 listings $10,000 $800,000 
Number advertisements 450 ads $2,000 $900,000 
Investor registrations 750 regist. $500 $375,000 
     Sub-total   $2,075,000 
    
Expenses    
Project staff 40 days $5,000 $200,000 
Due diligence and specialised 
staff 
20 days $10,000 $200,000 
     Sub-total   $400,000 
    
Expected annual gain   $1,675,000 
 
The Financial Services Development Council has a particular role to play in setting up a 
Mosaic-copy cat. First, its contacts allow it to source these projects and offer them on a 
non-discriminatory basis to both institutional and retail investors. Second, the Council 
would have more leverage (prestige) than a local company if negotiating with a company 
like the California-based Mosaic for rights to use the trade name. Third, because this 
project does not require a full person (and won’t generate significant profits), the activity 
should be done by the quasi-public sector.  
 
Syndicating data to third-party users (like Yahoo) and developing online infomediaries 
 
A vibrant market for information can help promote the liquidity of solar-backed securities, 
as well as a range of other securities. Yet, Hong Kong’s financial sector lacks far behind 
in producing data usable by investors and others. A simple search on Yahoo Finance, 
Google Finance, and even paid services like Reuter’s Eikon produces far less information 
about Hong Kong’s companies (and asset-backed securities!) than for their US or UK 
counterparts. By making initial investments in developing platforms like Seeking Alpha 
or Yahoo Finance, the Financial Services Development Council can help crowd-in other 
market actors. Unlike markets for rice or shoes, markets for information goods become 
deeper and more profitable as they become more widespread.  
 
The economics of establishing a top-tier infomediary echo those of creating a Mosaic-like 
platform. Figure A3 shows a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the relevant costs and 
benefits (revenues) of providing information about security prices and investor talk-chat 
services like Seeking Alpha. The business model shown in the figure differs from the 
Mosaic-clone site in its scope. The wide scope of this service can help crowd-in demand 
for solar-backed assets as well as other assets.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
would likely excite controversy and detract attention away from the business model itself. Thus, the 
benefits we estimate certainly and largely under-estimate the value of such a service.  
 
Figure A3: Creating English-Language Infomediaries Generates about HKD$14 
million 
 




Revenue    
Paid content 600 placements $25,000 $15,000,000 
Pay of click ads 450,000 clicks $0.1 $45,000 
Commissions on referrals for 
analyst reports etc.  
700 referrals $2,500 $1,750,000 
     Sub-total   $16,795,000 
    
Expenses    
Project staff 250 days $5,000/day $1,250,000 
Data purchase plans 365 days $10,000/day $3,650,000 
     Sub-total   $4,900,000 
    
Expected annual gain   $11,895,000 
 
The Financial Services Development Council’s Secretariat could sign syndication 
agreements with the relevant data and platform providers in order to get these services off 
the ground. Seeking Alpha only has a US-focused service (so far). The Council could 
sign a licensing agreement to use the name and HTML code (giving the site its look-and 
feel). The Council could also enter into a similar agreement with Yahoo (and possibly 
Google) to set up English-language Yahoo Finance and Google Finance sites with data 
fed from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, HKMA and SFC. Similar agreements with the 
Exchange, HKMA and SFC would need to obtain access to such information in the first 
place.  
 
Working with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on webcast syndications 
 
Webcasts represent an important way that investors (institutional and retail) can interact 
with the companies they invest in. They also help ensure that institutional investors do 
not have access to privileged information – as webcasts provide investors of all incomes 
and locations the same chance to hear the same information. Corporate-IR.net – the 
platform that many companies use to put their webcasts online – ranks 2,280 out of all 
websites in the US (and 7,770 in the world).327 Nasdaq OMX – which offers corporate 
services like webcasting – ranks 5,640 in the US and 12,315 in the world.328 Nasdaq 
OMX’s technology segment earned about $400 million in revenue in 2013 – 
sufficient revenues if a Hong Kong copycat earned even half of that amount.  
 
The Financial Services Development Council can work with local companies and service 
providers in three ways. First, the Council’s Secretariat -- through its participation in a 
limited liability company – can start offering rudimentary webcasting with simultaneous 
                                                 
327 See Alexa.com at http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/corporate-ir.net  
328 http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/shareholder.com  
English-language translation in one central location.329 Second, the Council can generate 
content as well as simply act as an intermediary. Indeed, having a Mosaic-like portal, an 
arrangement with a service-provider like Yahoo for an English version of its Hong Kong 
finance site, and its own propriety content can develop such information markets. We do 
not have enough information to cost out this option.  
 
Underwriting the Bauhinia Solar Investment Fund and other securities 
 
Asset-backed securities sales in Hong Kong require public investment in order to jump-
start this market. As we have shown, securitisations remain low in Hong Kong – and 
many of the structured products existing in the market focus on speculative (rather than 
productive) investment. The Financial Services Development Council could work with a 
financial institution like HSBC (or another) to securitise assets and liabilities of these 
organisations.  
 
By bearing most of the expenses in the first underwriting of the securities we propose in 
this paper, the Council could also dictate the structure and targets of these financial 
services. At present, Hong Kong’s financial institutions might be “locked in” to their 
existing profitable segments. By moving first, the FSDC can sort out the regulatory and 
market issues of offering solar-backed securities – making marginal market entry less 
expensive (and thus more profitable). After the Council oversees the first successful 
securitisations, their marketing and sale, the Council would stop this activity. In that way, 
the Council does not crowd-out private market actors.  
 
Mainland solar companies hold enough assets and liabilities to create a vibrant market for 
asset-backed securities in Hong Kong. As we have previously showed, the value of these 
assets and liabilities come to about $90 million. If financial institutions can generate 1% 
on the value of these securities in commissions, revenue from this activity would come to 
about $900,000 (before expenses). In all likelihood, expenses would completely 
dissipate these revenues. However, the security could be advertised on web portals and 
in other venue – deepening the market for these services.  
 
Maintaining the database about sunrise industry disputes 
 
Disputes represent the way that laws and institutions develop.330 As we described in the 
main paper, without public knowledge about these disputes (and the outcome of these 
disputes), sunrise industries have difficulty developing. Public knowledge about disputes 
                                                 
329 In practice, these events may be available only through the companies’ websites. Nevertheless, the 
FSDC can host the webcasts – either on its own site or through a company it participates in. We do not 
have an opinion about whether the FSDC should offer these services as a private company, exist as a public 
company while holding shares in a private company, or go it alone. Different models for the FSDC have 
been proposed.  
330 Readers familiar with the “conflict resolution” school of New Institutional Economics will recognise 
that institutions develop as the accretion of resolutions to previous conflicts. Law (and the institutions it 
governs) changes as the equilibrium outcome of these conflicts.  
in the solar energy sector will have three impacts.331 First, a database about these disputes 
will show how the industry is developing. Second, it will help assure solar companies and 
investors that an active mechanism is in place for resolving disputes – thus encouraging 
participation in solar company securitised assets and liabilities. Third, the collection of 
these disputes (and their solutions) will help create a type of jurisprudence which never 
arrives at the courts. Legal scholars and analysts can analyse the types of disputes 
occurring – and propose policies which resolve the underlying factors causing the 
disputes in the first place. Naturally, the exact information disclosed would need to be 
agreed with potential users of the system in the first place.  
 
The FSDC can offer three products aimed at promoting the dissemination of information 
about conflicts in the solar securitisation industry. First, it can help collect such 
information in a database it could charge money to access. The Council could work with 
the Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) on ways of encouraging people to 
complain. Such assistance to the FSRC Public assistance can help attract attention to the 
Council’s information products.  If the Council is allowed to participate financially in the 
Centre’s profits, sending business to it could also help its bottom line. Second, the 
Council can sell this information to infomediaries like Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis. Naturally, 
the information sold would only be what the disputing parties agree to. Third, the market 
may be big enough to support revenue earned from sessions at Hong Kong’s various 
investors and compliance conferences. The Council can help find speakers, participants 
and “sub-contract” sessions on solar-industry development and dispute resolution. 
Revenues from this area – while probably barely recovering costs – would probably 
also help attract attention to the Council’s other information offerings.  
 
Serve as an anchor for Sunrise Industries Promotion Policy  
 
Part of the Financial Services Development Council’s work would consist of promoting 
certain public policies. The Council needs to earn profits to survive. Yet, as a public-
private partnership, the Council could lobby for market-friendly policies. We have 
previously argued that the Council should be a public body – with the ability to raise 
revenue (and without a bail-out guarantee by the Government). What policymaking 
functions would the Council have in the areas of solar-backed securitisation? Frankel 
provides 9 suggestions for reforming securitisation markets in general.332 We provide 
these suggestions below - explaining what the Council can do to address this policy area.  
 
1. Provide loan-level information that investors, ratings agencies and regulators can 
use to evaluate collateral and its expected economic performance, both at pool 
underwriting and continuously over the life of a securitization. 
 
If the Council helps find money Hong Kong versions of a Mosaic, Yahoo finance and 
other information intermediaries, these intermediaries could provide such information. 
We show in Figure 50 what such information might look like. We describe in Appendix 
                                                 
331 We do not specify the amount of information disclosed or other details about such a disclosure regime in 
the main body of this paper. We leave it to regulators and the markets to work this out.  
332 See Alison Frankel, Reforming the Asset-Backed Securities Market, 2010, available online. 
II the regulations the Council can lobby for -- which would require this kind of security-
level disclosure.  
 
2. Make deal documents for all asset-backed securities and structured finance 
securities publicly available to market participants and regulators. 
 
Ditto (see 1 above). 
 
3. Develop, for each asset class, standard pooling and servicing agreements with 
model representations and warranties as a non-waivable industry minimum legal 
standard. 
 
The Council would have a role to play in such stardardised securitisation documents. As 
we argue in the main paper, the US represents a very heterogeneous securitisation market. 
In theory, Hong Kong financial institutions could even set up the international template 
for such agreements -- with leadership from the Council.   
 
4. Develop clear standard definitions for securitization markets 
 
By encouraging all securitised assets to appear online (and by encouraging public 
discussion of these products in fora like a Seeking Alpha-HK), the Council could 
encourage the market to create such definitions. All asset and liability-backed securities 
appearing on these websites would clearly comprise the market. Thus, instead of sitting 
in an Ivy-Tower and dreaming up a definition using legal theory, the Council’s 
information products could encourage markets to develop these definitions for 
themselves.  
 
5. Directly address conflicts of interest of servicers that have economic interests 
adverse to those of investors, by imposing direct fiduciary duties to investors and/or 
mandatory separation of those economic interests, and standardize servicer 
accounting and reporting for restructuring, modification or work-out of collateral 
assets. 
 
The Council has two roles. First, the Council would lobby for disclosing such conflicts of 
interest (using rules which we propose in Appendix II). Second, the Council would 
encourage the development of the infomediaries (like Mosaic-HK) where conflict of 
interest declarations could appear along side the offer of the securities themselves.  
 
6. Just as the US Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires the appointment of a suitably 
independent and qualified trustee to act for the benefit of holders of corporate debt 
securities, Hong Kong model securitization agreements could contain substantive 
provisions to protect asset-backed security holders. 
 
The Council could encourage the development of these provisions through legal advice to 
the SFC (as we describe in Appendix II). With vibrant and critical discussion of 
individual securities on websites like a Seeking Alpha-HK or Motley Fool-HK, such 
provisions would become less important. Market actors themselves could police the 
managers of securitisation trusts. Economic incentives would far more  
 
7. Asset-backed securities should be explicitly made subject to private right of action 
provisions of anti-fraud statutes in securities law and to appropriate Sarbanes-
Oxley-like disclosures and controls. 
 
The Council could take the lead in gathering opinions from market actors (both in Hong 
Kong and abroad) as well as providing a forum for debate/discussion. The Minibond 
scandal shows the way government activity can work with (and substitute for) private 
right of action.  
 
8. Certain asset-backed securities could be simplified and standardized so as to 
encourage increased trading in the secondary market on venues, such as exchanges, 
where trading prices are more visible to investors and regulators. 
 
The Council can encourage the sharing of information (through the websites it helps set 
up) which makes such exchange-based trading efficient. The Council - through setting up 
a Mosaic-HK like website and encouraging the legal changes which allow for its 
operation -- can also help create new exchanges.  
 
9. Ratings agencies need to use loan-level data in their initial ratings and to update 
their assumptions and ratings as market conditions evolve and collateral 
performance is reported. 
 
The Council’s work on developing infomediaries would help supplement the problematic 
rating agencies ratings. These websites would also contain information and debate about 
the assumptions and information the rating agencies use to arrive at their rankings. Many 
critical articles appear on Motley Fool, Seeking Alpha, and other websites of rating 
agencies’ reports. The Council can encourage such analysis -- without necessarily 




The Financial Services Development Council can expect to make almost US$5 million in 
profits from the activities we describe in this appendix. These funds show that the 
Council can promote the development of a sunrise securitisation market while still 
making a profit. Without the Council’s participation, these activities seem highly unlikely 
to develop. Using the Council also fits with the “contingency” approach we describe in 
the paper -- by finding a need in Hong Kong’s financial markets and addressing it at a 
profit.  
 
Appendix II: Regulatory Provisions Implementing a Sunrise Industries Promotion 
Policy  
 
In recent years, many financial centres have focused on modifying their law to encourage 
the development of new and innovative industries. The US had its JOBS Act – focusing 
narrowly on new and innovative industries. The UK’s Financial Services and Markets 
Act (FSMA) establishes a principles-based approach to regulation – letting markets rather 
than financial law take the lead. Hong Kong’s Financial Secretary has convened a Task 
Force looking at how to make Hong Kong’s financial services more internationally 
competitive.333 However, no serious policy initiatives have aimed at promoting returns – 
as well as managing risks – of Hong Kong’s financial services sector.  
 
In this paper, we have argued for several policies aimed at promoting the securitisation of 
assets used in sunrise industries like solar energy. First, we have argued for a pro-active 
policy promulgated by the Financial Secretary’s Office for encouraging the development 
of Hong Kong as a securitisation centre. Second, we have argued for improving the 
availability of public information about stocks, bonds and asset-back securities offered 
and traded. Third, we have argued for relaxing SFC requirements – especially governing 
funding portals and around the “informative” advertising of asset-backed securities in 
sunrise industries. Fourth, we have argued for increasing information about disputes and 
about the 2006 Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters and sharing information about financial disputes. To 
keep our appendix short, we omit discussing the final point.  
 
Outlines of the Policy 
 
The Financial Secretary’s Office needs to promulgate an administrative order (either 
formally or informally) putting in place provisions of a Sunrise Industries Promotion 
Policy (SIPP).334 Numerous academic authors argue that for a special prudential 
regulatory scheme for renewable energy – and in our case specifically solar 
investments.335 Moreover, the Financial Secretary’s Office (through such a Policy) 
should coordinate the activity of the HKMA and SFC for several reasons. First, thes
institutions are sub-ordinate to the Financial Secretary’s Office. Because of their risk 
adverse nature, they will not take action on the reform-minded proposals we have 
outlined in our paper without specific instructions from the Government.
e two 
                                                
336 Second, the 
cross-institutional nature of the policy requires the participation of the Financial Services 
 
333 We review these policies in Arner et. al. (2014). We refer the reader to this study so as not to repeat 
these arguments here.  
334 The Policy serves as an analogue to the US JOBS Act -- with its focus on defining Emerging Growth 
Companies. We describe the Act and its special regime for sunrise industry companies in the main body of 
our paper.  
335 See Panagiotis Delimatsis, Promoting Renewable Energy Through Adaptive Prudential Regulation in 
Financial Services, TILEC DP 2010-017, 2010, available online.  
336 We describe the administrative dependence of the SFC and HKMA in Arner et al. (2014). To briefly 
recap, the HMKA is subordinate to the Financial Secretary. The SFC is highly attentive (though technically 
independent).  
Development Council, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, private sector and the regulators 
(HKMA and SFC). Only the Financial Secretary’s Office has the legitimacy and 
authority to engage in such a broad-sweeping activity. The HKMA and SFC have 
extensive delegated rulemaking powers. Thus, only an administratively superiour 
organisation – like the Financial Secretary’s Office – can engage in such coordination.   
 
The Sunrise Industries Promotion Policy should consist of broad instructions to agencies 
“depending” on the Financial Secretary’s Office. Figure A4 shows the major areas 
contained in the policy document.337 The Financial Secretary’s Office should define a 
Hong Kong equivalent to the US JOBS Act’s “emerging growth companies” – called 
sunrise industry companies in Hong Kong (and defined differently). Such a definition 
would focus attention on these companies – and serve as a pilot for broader coverage. In 
keeping with the pilot, the easiest thing for the Financial Secretary’s Office to do is use 
the list from the Mainland’s 12th Five Year Plan. Such a list makes sense because many 
of the assets listed in Hong Kong (do and would) come from the Mainland. Second, the 
Financial Secretary’s Office can instruct the HKMA to modify the Central 
Moneymarkets Unit webpage. The instruction would likely contain instructions on the 
types of materials on the site and a requirement that independent evaluation find the site 
“good” or “outstanding”.338  
 
 
Figure A4: Financial Secretary’s Instructions to HKMA and SFC* 
 
1. Definition of “emerging growth companies" coinciding with the seven sectors 
defined in the Mainland’s 12th Five Year Plan,  
2 Establish a bond and asset-backed securities web portal platform and issue 
guidelines requiring electronic submission of all asset data in XBRL format, 
3. Encourage the SFC to issue a rulebook on Sunrise Industries (including new rules 
on funding platforms and advertising, particularly of asset-backed securities), 
4.  Instruct HKMA, SFC and Financial Disputes Resolution Centre to deal with 
Mainland counterparts on dispute resolution (and particularly sharing information), 
5. Work with Financial Services Development Council and Department of Justice on 
improving the functioning of the 2006 Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
 
* The SFC while technically independent, still must consult with the Financial Secretary.  
                                                 
337 Unlike other jurisdictions, Hong Kong’s financial law relies heavily on principles-based regulation. As 
such, the Financial Secretary’s Office probably needs not (and wants not) to issue very specific instructions. 
See Bryane Michael, Does Objectives-Based Financial Regulation Imply A Rethink of Legislatively 
Mandated Economic Regulation? The Case of Hong Kong and Twin Peaks Financial Sector Regulation, 
available online. 
338 Such a requirement allows the Financial Secretary’s Office to delegate decisions over the form, layout, 
structure and content of the site – while ensuring its market-oriented approach. Such a market-based 
approach toward defining the site also conforms with the “contingency-based” approach we argue for in the 
main paper. A “structuralist” view of financial law (a view we disagree with) would require the Financial 
Secretary’s Office to promulgate specific instructions about how the Moneymarkets website should look 
like.  
Several other instructions can promote the rapid development of the Sunrise Industries 
Promotion Program. First, the Financial Secretary’s Office can require the HKMA to 
issue a guideline to all broker-dealers and asset managers requiring the electronic 
submission of asset trades in XBRL. This would allow the HKMA (and later by 
infomediaries) to report bond and securitised-asset and securitised-liability trades in real 
time. Again, if the HKMA reports such trades on its Moneymarkets site (and keeping 
with a “contingency” rather than “structuralist” approach), rulemaking should require 
“good” or “outstanding” assessments of any HKMA platform by a random sample of the 
portal’s users (or preferably an independent evaluation service).339 Second, the Financial 
Secretary’s Office can request that the SFC develop a consolidated Rulebook on Sunrise 
Industries. The Rulebook provide rules for funding portals looking to become automated 
trading services and/or recognized exchange companies. The Rulebook would also 
provide new rules encouraging “informative” advertising and other provisions which we 
describe in the main body of our paper. Third, the policy would request the HKMA, SFC, 
and the Financial Dispute Resolution Centre to work with Mainland counterparts – as 
well as report information about disputes brought before the Centre. Because of the 
international nature of this work, the Financial Secretary has a key “diplomatic” role to 
play. Finally, the policy can encourage the Financial Services Development Council and 
the regulators (HKMA and SFC in particular) to work with the Department of Justice on 
improving the performance of the 2006 Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The Financial Secretary 
represents a political, as well as administrative, office. By using the standard channels for 
building and communicating political support for the policy, the Financial Secretary’s 
Office can help encourage participation by local banks and other financial services actors.  
 
HKMA Statutory Guideline on Debt and Securities-Backed Instrument Reporting  
 
Reporting on securities in Hong Kong follows the regulators’ current “structuralist” 
approach to regulation, rather than the “contingency” one we have argued for throughout 
this paper.340 The HKMA’s current system for reporting trades is complex and poorly 
covers asset-backed securities like solar. Ideally, broker-dealers and asset managers 
should go to one page where they put in trades (or upload trades in a batch from their 
firm’s software) and even see the latest trade information.341 Figure A5 shows the 
webpage for the trade repository – in effect Hong Kong’s central resource for reporting 
asset trades. Instead of providing a simple platform (and accompanying Guideline), the 
trade repository pages provide links to literally thousands of pages of manuals and 
                                                 
339 Their website is located at: https://www.cmu.org.hk/cmupbb_ws/eng/page/wmp0100/wmp010001.aspx  
340 The introduction to the HKMA’s Trade Repository webpage provides the general attitude toward such 
reporting. Following a structuralist mindset of adopting best practice, the HKMA notes, “the reform 
measures adopted by the international regulatory community include requiring all OTC derivatives 
transactions be reported to trade repositories (TRs) and all standardised OTC derivatives transactions be 
cleared at central counterparty (CCP) clearing facilities.” A contingency approach to regulation might start 
this text by saying, “In order to provide for more efficient markets and trading for investors and companies, 
the HKMA offers this Trade Repository service.”  
341 In practice, traders do not report on trades (given incentives for misreporting). Intermediaries (like 
superiors or clerical stuff) and independent staff make, confirm and report on such trades.  
instructions.342 The products currently covered consist of interest rate derivatives and 
foreign exchange derivatives. The trade repository will require a complete redesign to 
deal with asset-backed securities like solar-backed bonds and pooled liabilities.  
 
Figure A5: Trade Repository Layout Follows the HKMA’s Needs Rather than 
Market Participants’ 
 
The HKMA’s Trade 
Repository represents an 
important first step in 
gathering data about “hard 
to reach” trades. Its 
complicated approach 
follows the HKMA’s 
corporate style. As the SFC 
takes over some of the 
HKMA’s functions in this 
area, reporting may become 
simpler.   
 
A Guideline governing a debt and securities-backed instrument reporting scheme would 
cover the general principles we describe in our paper. In some cases, the Guideline can 
consolidate the voluminous instructions currently provided on the trade repository 
website. In most cases, the Guideline would need to create new rules for reporting trades 
in securitised assets and liabilities (both in primary and secondary markets). Except in the 
case of government and corporate debt, stocks, bonds, and standard derivatives, the 
Guideline would define who, what, where, when and how to report on these assets.343 
Also, as shown in Figure A6, he Rulebook would also encourage the distribution of such 
data to third-party infomediaries. The Guideline would also need to cover how data gets 
imported from the CMU, CCASS and other exchanges (as relevant). The Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange’s own query tool for finding information about exchange-traded 
securities is very clumsy. The Trade Repository should not duplicate information 










                                                 
342 These instructions revolve around reporting trades (as one major group) and matching/confirmation.  
343 The Central Moneymarkets Unit of the HKMA provides electronic clearing, settlement, and custodian 
services for Hong Kong dollar-debt instruments. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Central Clearing and 




Figure A6: Outline Guideline for Debt and Asset-Backed Securities 
 
Section 1:  Objectives of the Guideline 
Section 2:  “Five Ws” of reporting debt and asset-backed securities (whether             
                  traded on exchanges or over-the-counter). 
Section 3:  Special requirements for persons not trade repository members 
Section 4:   Methods of reporting for persons already reporting to an exchange 
Section 5:  Reporting methods for over-the-counter transactions 
Section 6: Differences between securitisation reports, trading reports, and  
                        “bespoke” transactions   
Section 7:  The use and reuse of the data you provide 
Section 8:  Services offered by the HKMA (or its successor)* to help you report 
Section 9:        Rules governing the third-party distribution of your data 
Section 10:  Complaints about the collection and use of your data 
The relevant working groups on drafting the Guideline will need to tackle a number of 
issues. First, when registering securities, how to isolate the “bespoke” market from 
securities destined to be traded on markets. Originators make some asset-backed 
securities only for a particular buyer (or group of buyers). These securities are sold – but 
not meant for resale.  In addition, as we have previously stated, the HKMA should hire an 
outside consulting firm to conduct an assessment of the Trade Repository. Figure A7 
shows the terms of reference for such an assignment. Following the market-driven 
approach to regulation (what we call “contingency-based”), such an assessment should 
focus on users – rather than the needs of the HKMA. Clearly, having a centralised source 
of information about solar-backed securities can help deepen Hong Kong’s markets. An 
assessment which focuses on final users can only help in achieving that objective. A 
similar terms of reference can govern a similar assessment of the Moneymarket 
Unit’s website reporting bond trades.344  
 
Figure A7: Model Terms of Reference for Independent Assessment of the Trade Repository Interface 
 
The Consultant shall conduct a 20 day assessment of the HKMA’s Trade Repository page. The assessment 
shall focus on the user-friendliness, interactivity and “marketing mindset” of the repository. The assessment 
must be primarily based on current and potential users of the site and must rely on hard-data (such as 
surveys, interviews, references to the site and so forth).  
 
Parts of the assessment may include: 
 
a) “look and feel” including how easy it is to use the site, its graphical interfaces, and use by a range of 
actors,  
b) explanatory materials – including their user-friendliness, clarity, helpfulness, and so forth.  
c) users’ perceptions of the current design – including complaints they have about any part of the service 
and their suggestions for improving the site,  
 
                                                 
344 We have already discussed the ways reporting about bond trades in Hong Kong can be improved. No 
rulemaking needs to be done to change the way the Moneymakers Unit reports about bond trades – as the 
Unit can engage in such work without an administrative diktat.  
As a market-friendliness study, the assessors shall not consider aspects like website security, integration 
with the HKMA’s other systems, the practicality of proposals in light of existing regulations and technical 
possibilities, difficulties in coordinating with the SFC, and other HKMA capacities. The assessor may have 
access to the website during the course of the assessment using a guest account which can not post data or 
access sensitive data on live trades. The HKMA also reserves the right to conduct the engagement in a way 
which minimises the possibility of using data for the consultant’s personal benefit.  
 
Individuals and companies interested in the assignment should submit a short (1 page or less) description 
how they would conduct the assignment, their budget for this work, and CV(s).  
 
 
SFC Code on the Electronic Offer of Asset-Backed Securities in Sunrise Industries  
 
SFC work enabling market platforms for trading solar-backed securities can promote the 
development sunrise industry financing more generally. In the US, reforms aimed at 
improving reporting of securities transactions and allowing for greater participation in 
asset-backed securities investments was couched in terms of crowdfunding. Yet, as we 
described already, there is no reason why Mosaic needs to focus only on crowdfunding 
(and relatively small investments). One could just as easily imagine Mosaic containing 
sections for institutional investors and presenting very large investments in the same 
simple and clear way it presents small investments in single solar panel investments. 
While the US JOBS Act may inspire changes in SFC rules governing the offer of asset-
backed securities, the Act needs not serve as a rigid model.   
 
The new SFC Code governing investments in asset-backed securities (like solar-backed 
assets) focuses primarily on promoting “informative” internet advertising (solicitation) as 
well as the offer and sale of these investments. The Code would achieve two objectives -- 
defining rules of funding platforms and for websites that advertise solar-backed (and 
other sunrise industry) securities, without offering them. Figure A8 shows the outlines of 
such a Code. We have provided detailed explanations about how to change existing SFC 
rulemaking in the main body of our paper.  
 
 
Figure A8: Outline of the “Sunrise Industries Code” 
 
Section 1:  Objectives 
Section 2:  Definitions (Funding Portal, Crowdfunding Portal, Informative    
              Advertising, Sunrise Industry) 
Section 3:  Provisions related to the registration of automated trading services and/or  
  recognized exchange companies conforming to the definition of a   
  crowdsourcing portal 
Section 4: Types of warnings required on portals 
Section 5:  Substantive information required on portals and about portals 
Section 6: Guidelines for advertising asset-backed securities 
Section 7:  Definition of “qualified investors” 
Section 8:  SFC database on funding portals and asset-backed securities 
Section 9: Regulations of portal infomediaries 
 
 
Each section would enable Mosaic-like websites (and the websites like Seeking Alpha-
HK which make these websites more useful) to function effectively in Hong Kong. 
Section 1 -- in keeping with Hong Kong’s principles-based regulatory structure -- would 
define the Code’s objectives. As a general principle, securitised solar assets and liabilities 
should be advertised as clearly as shoes, computers and things consumers can actually 
tough. Section 2 would define “funding portals” in the context of the Securities and 
Futures Ordinance’s current definitions of “automated trading services” and/or 
“recognized exchange companies”. The section might also provide definitions for the 
infomediary sites -- like a Seeking Alpha-HK - where investors would discuss publicly 
listed asset-backed securities. Section 4, in keeping with the SFC’s desire to provide 
warnings, would define the types of warnings that funding portals and infomediaries 
offering securitised assets and liabilities, would need to post online. Section 5, following 
the US example, would describe the kinds of information a Mosaic-HK and Seeking 
Alpha-HK would need to include. Section 6 would define the relaxed requirements for 
listing and advertising approved securities under the scheme we describe in our main 
paper.  The Code would also provide guidance for providing “informative” rather than 
simply “persuasive” advertising. We have described the other sections in the main body 




Hong Kong’s financial institutions will not develop deep and innovative securitised 
products without help from the Government. In the previous appendix, we described the 
activities the Financial Services Development Council could undertake to “crowd-in” the 
development of market infrastructure needed to trade across borders securitised products. 
In this appendix, we describe the activities the Financial Secretary’s Office needs to 
undertake. Much of such work consists of cheer-leading the HKMA and SFC. The 
HKMA (and SFC) should revise the way it collects and reports data on securitised 
transactions. The SFC should create rules which allow for the operation of funding 
platforms and securitised products infomediaries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
